boko haram suspected financier executed

Chief Sunday Adeyemo (Igboho) of having links with financiers of Boko Haram. stay execution of judgment, We can't betray Igboho. A week later, a man was killed and another blew his leg off trying to Fai was believed to have become a major Boko Haram financier after. least four dozen fishermen were killed in a suspected Boko Haram ambush in November 2014. The Boko Haram has found new financiers in Borno and in. boko haram suspected financier executed

Boko haram suspected financier executed -

MMP: Boko Haram

Formed: 2002

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: December 24, 2003: Boko Haram members attacked and occupied police stations in Geiam and Kanamma in Yobe State, raising the flag of the Afghanistan Taliban (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[1]

Last Attack: March 2, 2018:  Suspected Boko Haram militants killed at least 11 people including three aid workers in an attack on a military barracks in the town of Rann, in northeastern Borno state near the Cameroon border.[2]

Executive Summary

In 2002, Mohammad Yusuf formed Boko Haram as a Sunni Islamist sect to oppose Western education and establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. The group has carried out numerous attacks since 2009, including the 2011 bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Abuja, but is best known for the 2014 Chibok schoolgirl kidnapping, when the group abducted over 300 young Nigerian girls. Its primary base of operation is northeastern Nigeria, but it has conducted limited operations in Cameroon and Niger. In March 2015, Boko Haram became an affiliate of the Islamic State (IS). In August 2016, leadership struggles led to a split within Boko Haram, pitting the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) against Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS).

Group Narrative

Boko Haram formed in 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf, a well-known preacher and proselytizer of the Izala sect of Islam in the Maiduguri region of Nigeria, began to radicalize his discourse to reject all secular aspects of Nigerian society.

In 2002, Yusuf opened a religious complex with an Islamic school in Maiduguri, Nigeria, which attracted students from poor Muslim families across the country. Yusuf reportedly used the school to convert and recruit future jihadis.[3] Boko Haram expanded into Yobe state, where it set up another base, nicknamed “Afghanistan,” near the Nigeria-Niger border in 2003.[4]

From 2002-2003, a group of Yusuf’s students formed a community near Kanama, Nigeria in order to adhere to Yusuf’s teachings and live outside secular society. Members of this group, dubbed Al Sunna Wal Jamma (Followers of the Prophet’s Teachings) were the first followers of Yusuf to instigate violence against the Nigerian government. This sect was quashed by the Nigerian government in 2003.[5]  In response Boko Haram conducted its first attack, occupying a police station and raising the Afghan Taliban flag.[6]

Before 2009, the group was less politically focused, seeking to separate themselves from secular society. With the Yusuf’s death and increased conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government, Boko Haram came to seek the overthrow of the Nigerian government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

Open conflict erupted in July 2009 following a violent clash between Boko Haram members and the police, when militants refused to adhere to a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. This incident incited violent uprisings in Bauchi and quickly spread to Borno, Yobe, and Kano.[7]  Nigerian military forces killed over 700 in suppressing the uprisings and capturing Yusuf.  Security forces later killed Yusuf, claiming that he had tried to escape.[8]

After suffering severe losses in 2009, Boko Haram regrouped in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s second-in-command.[9]  The frequency, lethality, and sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks increased dramatically under Shekau, allegedly as a result of increased cooperation with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). To protest the election of Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from southern Nigeria, Boko Haram carried out a series of bombings during Jonathan’s presidential inauguration in May 2011.[10]  The escalation of violence continued throughout the year, including an attack on the Abuja UN building in August, Boko Haram’s first foreign target.[11]  President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the areas of Yobe, Borno, Plateau, and Niger later that year.[12]

As Boko Haram grew increasingly violent, tensions grew between Mamman Nur, a leader of an independent faction within Boko Haram, and Shekau. In January 2012, members who opposed killing Muslims split off from Boko Haram to form Ansaru. Although Ansaru was originally composed of militants who supported Nur’s leadership over Shekau’s, Nur’s role is unknown.[13]  Ansaru conducted numerous attacks against foreigners in northern Nigeria and its neighbors between 2013 and 2014.[14] Ansaru stopped its attacks around 2014, and authorities captured its leader in 2016, effectively ending its campaign.[15]

Boko Haram became notorious when it kidnapped over 300 young girls from a secular school in Chibok, Nigeria, in April 2014. Just over 50 girls were able to escape immediately after the attack. The Twitter hashtag #BringBackOurGirls inspired several other campaigns on various social media websites in hopes of pressuring the Nigerian government to do more to recover the girls.[16]  In October 2014, the government announced that it had negotiated a ceasefire with Boko Haram and that the schoolgirls would be released shortly. However, within two weeks of the announcement, Boko Haram released a video in which Shekau repudiated the ceasefire and claimed that the missing girls had already been converted to Islam and were married to Boko Haram members.[17]  The Chibok kidnappings prompted the United States to deploy additional counterterrorism resources to Nigerian law enforcement agencies.[18]

 As of January 2018, 106 girls had been rescued. The Nigerian government negotiated and the International Committee of the Red Cross facilitated the release in exchange for Boko Haram militants.[19]  The girls rescued were found living as wives and mothers among Boko Haram fighters. On January 15, 2018, Boko Haram released a video featuring kidnapped women and the remaining Chibok girls. [20]

In January 2015, Boko Haram unleashed a massive assault on the villages of Baga and Doron Baga in Borno State and claimed control over the area.  Local officials suggested that as many as 2,000 people were killed in these attacks, but the Nigerian government capped the death toll at 150.[21] A few weeks later, militants tried to attack Maiduguri, Borno’s capital city, but government troops prevented the planned takeover.[22] According to the Council on Foreign Relations, by August 2015 more than 16,000 people had been killed and 2.5 million people displaced because of Boko Haram violence.[23]

In response to the threat, the African Union (AU) endorsed a military coalition to contain and degrade Boko Haram’s activities in Nigeria; they  changed the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to encompass counter-terrorist operations and increased its funding.  Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Benin pledged troops for the 7,500-strong Multinational Joint Task Force. The coalition aimed to protect the Nigerian border and the Lake Chad region but not participate in the conflict within Nigeria. The force deployed on March 6, 2015, and the offensive against Boko Haram began with Chadian and Nigerian airstrikes that drove the organization out of a dozen towns in Northern Nigeria.  As a result of Chadian participation in the MNJTF, Boko Haram began targeting the Chad basin region, torching homes and kidnapping villagers before being pushed back by the Chadian military.[24]

On February 7, 2015, Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced that national elections would be postponed for six weeks in order for security forces to launch an offensive to regain territory controlled by Boko Haram.[25]  Estimates suggested that Boko Haram controlled about 20,000 square miles of territory in northeastern Nigeria. [26] Attacks on civilians continued, including across borders in both Chad and Cameroon.[27]  On March 28, the Nigerian Election Day, Boko Haram killed 41 people in an attempt to keep voters from the polls but millions still voted.[28]

In early March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) in an audio message posted online, featuring Shekau. [29] Reportedly, Boko Haram militants were traveling to train at IS military camps at that time.  When IS accepted the pledge in late March, it referred to Boko Haram as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), a name that subsequently appeared on social media accounts linked to IS.  IS also encouraged Muslims to join Boko Haram and other West African militant groups.[30]  Some analysts argued that the affiliation between Boko Haram and IS was a desperate move by Boko Haram “to boost its members’ morale, image and attract local support” after the African Union coalition force drove the group into the Sambisa Forest.[31]  In April 2015, the Nigerian government considered the offensive against Boko Haram to be in its last stages: Boko Haram controlled no towns, and the coalition was closing in on the Sambisa Forest.[32]

Despite being pushed out of its stronghold, Boko Haram continued operations, often employing suicide bombers to attack civilian, police, and government targets throughout Nigeria.  In March 2016, militants from Boko Haram were reportedly fighting for IS in Libya.[33]

On August 3, 2016, IS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of the founder of Boko Haram, would assume leadership.  Two days later, Shekau responded that Barnawi’s followers were manipulating IS leaders in order to cut him off in a sort of coup and that he and his followers would not follow Barnawi. This dispute reportedly led to splits within Boko Haram.[34]  Barnawi was arrested in late 2016, but the two factions of Boko Haram remained, one known as ISWAP, and the other known as JAS. The media and government typically treated the two splinters as one group.

In late 2016 and early 2017 the number of killings by Boko Haram was significantly reduced, but activity increased again.  Between April and September 2017 there were an estimated 400 deaths.[35] The group remained active in northeast Nigeria, using suicide bombers to attack markets, universities, and displacement camps, and raiding villages. Most attacks were credited to Barnawi and occurred in Nigeria, for example, the 2017 ambush of an oil exploration team from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the reclaim of territory in Borno.[36]  Boko Haram’s escalation in 2017 is attributed to the withdrawal of Chadian forces from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) posted along Lake Chad.[37]

In 2018 the split within Boko Haram persisted. Barnawi continued to lead the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Shekau led Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS). JAS was stronger, more active, and also more transnational in its operations.  Even so, the two groups were ideologically similar, and outside media typically treated them as the same group.



[1] ONuoha, Freedom. “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, June 9, 2014.

[2] Carsten,Paul.Suspected Boko Haram militants kill 11 including three aid workers in Nigeria,” Reuters World News, March 2, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/suspected-boko-haram-militants-kill-11-including-three-aid-workers-in-nigeria-idUSKCN1GE14Z. 

[3] Chothia, Farouk. “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” BBC News. May 20, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501.

[4] Zenn, Jacob. “Boko Haram’s International Connections.” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, Issue 1 Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. January, 2013.

[5] Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, editor. “Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security, and the state in Nigeria,” West African Politics and Society Series, Vol. 2. African Studies Center 2014. 

[6] ONuoha, Freedom. “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, June 9, 2014.

[7] Sergie, Mohammed Aly and Toni Johnson. “Boko Haram.” Council on Foreign Relations. Updated Oct. 7, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739.

[8] Adetunji, Jo. “Bomb attack kills at least 25 in northern Nigeria.” The Guardian. June 26, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/27/nigeria-bombings-terrorist-killings-islamist. 

[9]Chothia, Farouk. “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” BBC News. May 20, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501. 

[10] “Nigeria attacks claimed by Islamist sect Boko Haram.” BBC News.  June 1, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13618775.

[12] “Boko Haram attacks prompt Nigeria state of emergency.” BBC News. Jan. 1, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16373531.   

[13] Raghavan, Sudarsan. “Nigerian Islamist militants return from Mali with weapons, skills.” The Washington Post. May 31, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/nigerian-islamist-militants-return-from-mali-with-weapons-skills/2013/05/31/d377579e-c628-11e2-9cd9-3b9a22a4000a_story.html.

[14] Blanchard, Lauren. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions.” Congressional Research Service. June 10, 2014. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf. Zenn, Jacob. “Nigerian al-Qaedaism” The Hudson Group. March 11, 2014.    https://www.hudson.org/research/10172-nigerian-al-qaedaism-.

[15] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru), July 19, 2017.  http://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e3d313.html. 

[16] Kristof, Nicholas. “Bring Back Our Girls.” New York Times. May 3 2014.

[17] “What now after Nigeria’s Boko Haram ceasefire fiasco?” BBC News. Nov. 3, 2014.

[18] Blanchard, Lauren. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions.” Congressional Research Service. June 10, 2014. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf. 

[19] Nigeria Chibok abductions: what we know” BBC News, May 8, 2017. "Chibok Girls: Kidnapped Schoolgirl Found in Nigeria." BBC News, May 18, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32299943

[20] Searcy, Dionne. “Boko Haram Video is Said to Show Captured Girls from Chibok” New York Times, Jan. 15, 2018. https://nyti.ms/2FEQmNp; "Chibok Girls: Kidnapped Schoolgirl Found in Nigeria." BBC News, May 18, 2016. “Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions.” Congressional Research Service. June 10, 2014. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf.

[21] Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Baga Destruction ‘shown in images’.” BBC News. Jan. 15, 2015.

[22] Ola, Lanre and Ardoo Abdullah. “Nigeria repels suspected Boko Haram attack on Maiduguri City.” Reuters. Jan. 25, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/25/us-nigeria-violence-maiduguri-idUSKBN0KY08720150125. 

[23]“ISIS Owns Headlines, but Nigeria’s Boko Haram Kills More than Ever,” NBC News, December 23, 2015 quoting the Council on Foreign Relations https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2015-year-in-review/isis-owns-headlines-nigeria-s-boko-haram-kills-more-ever-n480986.  

[24]Comolli, Victoria “The evolution and impact of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin” Humanitarian Practice Network. Oct 2017. "Nigeria postpones elections, focuses on major offensive against Boko Haram". The Christian Science Monitor. August 18, 2015. 

[25] Nossiter, Adam. “Nigeria Postpones Elections, Saying Security is a Concern.” New York Times. Feb. 7, 2015.  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/world/africa/nigeria-postpones-elections-citing-security-concerns.html?_r=0.

[26] Blair, David. “Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own territory.” The Telegraph. Jan. 10, 2015.

[27] "Boko Haram Goes on Deadly Rampage after Chad Offensive." Al Jazeera America. February 4, 2015.  

[28] “Boko Haram Kills 41 as Millions of Nigerians Vote in Close Presidential Election." CTVNews/AP. March 28, 2015.

[29] "Islamic State 'accepts' Boko Haram's Allegiance Pledge." BBC News. March 13, 2015.

[30] "Analysis: Islamic State Strengthens Ties with Boko Haram." BBC News. April 24, 2015.

[31] Chandler, Adam. "The Islamic State of Boko Haram?" The Atlantic. Mar. 9, 2015.

[32] "Nigerian Military Enter 'Final Stages' of Boko Haram Offensive." Newsweek. April 23, 2015. "Nigerian Troops Rescue More Boko Haram Captives from Forest Redoubt." The Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor. April 30, 2015.

[33] Cooper, Helene. “Boko Haram and ISIS Are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Says.”  The New York Times, April 20, 2016. 

[34] Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Jacob Zenn. "Boko Haram’s Doomed Marriage to the Islamic State." War on the Rocks, Aug. 26, 2016.

[35] “Nigerians fear 'no end in sight' to Boko Haram fight.”  Al Jazeera News, Oct. 1, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/nigerians-fear-sight-...

[36] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Nigeria, January 18, 2018. 

[37] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Nigeria Situation, Situational Update - 01-30 November 2017, November 30, 2017. 

Источник: https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram

Justifying Jihad: A Case Study of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram

Daniel Pesature

Jihad - Today this ancient Arabic word has near universal recognition, but also near universal misunderstanding.  In the non-Muslim world jihad erroneously conjures images of masked gunmen and televised beheadings.  Fundamental misunderstanding relating to jihad are not confined to non-Muslims however.  A perversion of Islam known as jihadi-salafism attempts to justify monstrous atrocities through the establishment of a pure Islamic State (Caliphate) and a return to the pristine version of Islam practiced in the age of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (Salaf).[i]  Al Shabaab and Boko Haram are two jihadi-salafist groups that manipulate the tenets of jihad to justify violence on an immense scale.  Their actions, and those of other jihadi-salafist groups, threaten to shape America’s perception of Islam.  At its core, jihadi-salafism is an ideological perversion, and the long-term solution is a counter narrative true to the tenets of Islam.

Drone strikes and commando raids will not solve this issue.  The United States (US) must understand the problem of jihadi-salafism so that the policies it enacts do not alienate the vast majority of good, law-abiding Muslims.  The cure cannot kill the patient.  Islam is the antidote to the poison of jihadi-salafism.  Al Shabaab and Boko Haram both manipulate Islamic law (Sharia) to justify their jihads in Somalia and Nigeria.  They use genuine transgressions like the collapse of order, foreign invasion, corruption, and oppression to sanction cruel, primal, reciprocal violence.  Analyzing the false jihads of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram provides a window into the minds of jihadi-salafists, and it also offers recommendations on countering this spreading and imminent threat.

Sharia regulates jihad.  Sharia is far more than a criminal code, as it influences every aspect of Muslim life.  Sharia is mainly derived from the Quran and from the sayings or actions of the Prophet Muhammed (Hadith).  The Quran is best divided into two sections: the Meccan period (before hijra), and the Medinan period (after hijra).  The two periods are written with different perspectives, and there are often contradictions.  The Quran is contextual.  It is based on the specific enemies and situations present during the time of Muhammad.[ii]  The Hadith provide even less clarity.  Some Hadith were recorded in the time of Muhammad, while others were recorded much later.  Islamic scholars (ulama) loosely codify the numerous Hadiths based on strength, veracity, probably authenticity, and consensus (ijma).

In the past, the ulama could also apply reasoning (ijtihad) to the Quran and Hadith, but in the ninth century the Abbasid Caliphate proclaimed that all pertinent guidance was extracted from these sources and closed the gates of ijtihad.  Today the ulama can only consult the Quran, Hadith, and prior rulings to reach ijma and issue a religious ruling (fatwa).  It is difficult for the ulama to apply dated sources and interpretations to the situations of a modern, globalized world.  For example, there is a Hadith that forbids women from traveling one day’s travel without a male escort.  During the age of reasoning, the ulama’s ijma was that this distance could not exceed fifty miles.  In the modern age, however, a woman can travel that distance in less than an hour by car and in mere minutes by plane.[iii]  Jihad originates from Sharia, and like Sharia it can be misinterpreted or misapplied in the modern age.[iv]

Jihad is derived from the Arabic root that means to struggle or strive in the service of God.  War is not simply jihad and jihad is not simply war.[v]  There is the greater jihad and the lesser jihad.  The greater jihad is the ever-raging battle within the hearts and minds of all Muslims to stay true to the teachings and tenets of Islam.  This greater jihad was called the “jihad of the tongue” because Muslims were ideologically struggling to overcome disbelief (kufr) and polytheism (shirk).  Muhammad stressed the importance of greater jihad repeatedly throughout the Quran.  Muhammad stated, “The best struggle is to struggle against your soul.”[vi]  The greater jihad is a peaceful jihad, and it is the most esteemed version of jihad in the Quran.[vii]

The lesser jihad dominates the headlines today.  This jihad is war, albeit war in the name and service of God.  The Quran emphasizes order because Islam is a communal religion and cannot thrive in chaos.[viii]  Accordingly, strict laws govern the violence inherent in lesser jihad.[ix]  Only the legitimate ruler of an Islamic State can declare jihad.[x]  Jihad, however, cannot create an Islamic State because only an Islamic State can sanction jihad in the first place.  Muhammad did not use the force of arms to establish the Islamic State in Medina.  God provided for the peaceful establishment of this Islamic State through the Charter of Medina.[xi]

The Quran advises Muslim leaders on the criteria for jihad, and the intended audience is not every Muslim.[xii]  Jihad must restore order and provide justice.  If this is not the purpose of jihad, then it is just violent anarchy which the Quran forbids.[xiii]  Furthermore, a just end can never be achieved through unjust means.  Muhammad Tahir Al Qadri, the founder of Minhaj Al Quran International and a fierce opponent of extremism, preaches pure acts for pure goals.  A Muslim cannot finance the construction of a mosque by robbing a bank.[xiv]

Islam prefers order to chaos, even if that order is not perfect.  Jihad to overthrow rulers is extremely difficult to justify.  Muslims who live in non-Muslim societies cannot use jihad to overthrow non-Muslim rulers who do not implement Sharia.  A non-Muslim ruler who protects the religious rights of Muslims and does not force them to act against Sharia cannot face jihad.[xv]  The Quran advocates peace and dialogue in the face of oppressive rulers.  Muhammad said, “The best jihad is a true word spoken in the presence of a tyrannical ruler.”[xvi]  God granted Muhammad permission to wage jihad only after he migrated to Medina and the Meccans pursued him.[xvii]  Quranic verse 22:39 is the first verse that approves violence.  It reads, “Permission is given to those who are fought against,” but it comes only after seventy previous verses forbidding violence.[xviii]

It also difficult to justify jihad through claims of disbelief.  In Islam there is a huge difference between disbelief and sin.  The Quran advises all Muslims to assume sin and let God be the judge of disbelief.  Anything short of a public denouncement of Islam fails to justify a jihad to overthrow a Muslim ruler, and an uprising against a non-Muslim ruler is only permissible jihad if that ruler blatantly oppresses the practice of Islam.  For example, if a Muslim ruler announces publicly that Ramadan is forbidden, then that is disbelief and worthy of jihad.  However, if that ruler simply fails to fast, then that is laziness and merely sinful.[xix]

There are many additional laws that control that conduct of jihad.  The false jihad of the Islamic State flies in the face of true and legitimate jihad.  Massacres on the streets of Paris, suicide bombings in Beirut, and pressing captured Yezidi girls into sexual slavery are not jihad.  Muhammad set the precedent for true jihad during the conflicts of the Medinan period and the Quran clearly demarcates these rules.[xx]  Sharia prohibits the killing of the elderly, sick, women, or children.  The deliberate destruction of animals or fruit producing trees is also forbidden.  The Quran specifically inhibits the mistreatment of prisoners, the mutilation of fallen enemy warriors, and reneging on treaties or agreements. 

Saladin is perhaps the most accepted exemplification of righteous jihad in Islamic history, excluding the Prophet.  Saladin waged a defensive jihad at the behest of a legitimate Muslim ruler to regain the holy city of Jerusalem.  In 1099 Christian Crusaders sacked Jerusalem and put the Muslim residents to the sword.  Saladin avenged this conquest, and reconquered Jerusalem, in 1187.  Saladin, however, followed the tenets of jihad and spared the Christian inhabitants of the city.  The wives and daughters of killed Crusaders even asked for his mercy, which he granted by giving them gifts, money, and protection.[xxi]  Saladin honored all treaties, truces, and agreements with the Crusaders and ensured that prisoners were treated in accordance with Sharia.[xxii]  Saladin is considered the standard in Islam for just, righteous jihad.

The jihads of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram do not live up to Saladin’s standard.  The jihadi-salafists today use Al Qaeda’s interpretation of jihad, which stems from the Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia.  The gradual exposure of Somalia and Nigeria to Wahhabism made their populations more susceptible to the militant tenets of jihadi-salafism.  Saudi Arabia used their significant finances to export their particular strain of Islam.  In the 1990’s, Saudi Arabia provided over $70 billion to fund over 1500 mosques, 210 Islamic Centers, 202 Islamic Colleges, and roughly 2000 Islamic schools all over the Muslim world.[xxiii]

Al Shabaab’s and Boko Haram’s ideological ties to Wahhabism explain how fundamentalist jihadi-salafist groups sprung from the largely Sufi landscapes of Somalia and Nigeria.  When Al Shabaab emerged in 2006 fully half of their eight-man Shura council were veterans who fought under Al Qaeda’s banners in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the late 1980s.[xxiv]  Boko Haram’s origins stem from the ideological founder of the Salafist Izala movement in Nigeria, Sheikh Abubakar Gumi.  Gumi worked in Saudi Arabia and established a network of Wahhabi financiers who bank rolled his Izala movement.  Boko Haram’s founder, Muhammad Yusut, was a former member of Izala.

The militant ideology of jihadi-salafism stretches back to the thirteenth century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya.  Ibn Taymiyya preached a return to the pure Islam of the Prophet, and he argued that a lack of Muslim piety caused the calamity of the Mongol invasion.  Ibn Taymiyya released a fatwa which stated that multiple emirates, or Islamic states, were permitted, and that each ruler could proclaim jihad.[xxv]  Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, brought Ibn Taymiyya’s militant jihad into the twentieth century.  Sayyed Qutb, Muhammad Abd Al Salam Faraj, and Abdullah Mawdudi continued to expand on this unique and controversial interpretation of jihad.[xxvi]

Abdallah Azzam merged the disparate militant interpretations into today’s modern version.  Azzam issued a fatwa in 1979 titled, “In Defense of Muslim Lands,” that really championed the notion of non-state sanctioned jihad.[xxvii]  He supported the claim that the famous “sword verse” of the Quran abrogated all the preceding verses which promoted peace.  Azzam ushered in the age of Islamic terrorism by giving groups like Al Shabaab and Boko Haram the doctrine they needed to lay a false claim to justified jihad.

Azzam provided the Islamists in Somalia the ideological doctrine to wage jihad, but the iron regime of Said Barre prevented them from actually acquiring power.  The complete collapse of order in 1991 provided the opening for the Islamist groups waiting on the periphery, Al Shabaab among them, to rise to prominence in Somalia.  Al Shabaab existed as an organization long before they officially became a distinct group in 2006.[xxviii]  The Sharia Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu served as an incubator for the fledgling group.  The years following the collapse of the Barre regime were filled with chaos and corruption.  Islam requires order to flourish, and Somalis were tired of the constant conflict.  Somalis experiences the failures of authoritarianism, clannism, nationalism, socialism, and warlordism.  The powerful and influential Mogadishu businessmen were especially desperate for order, and they turned to the Islamists.[xxix]  The Sharia courts appeared in Mogadishu in 1998, and they merged in the street battles of 2006 to become the Islamic Courts Union.

The ICU, Al Shabaab, various militias, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) all controlled certain areas and neighborhoods of Mogadishu.  Al Shabaab suddenly experienced the opportunity to govern and administer actual territory.  The disparity in governance between Al Shabaab’s area and the areas under the control of the TFG or militias quickly became apparent to the residents.  The international community trained the majority of the TFG-militia members, but the Somali government lacked the resources to actually pay these fighters a fixed, predictable salary.  As a result, these militia members preyed on the local population through corruption and extortion to acquire the fixed income that their government could not provide.[xxx]  The TFG-militia forces alienated the people under their administration, and many of these people began to support Al Shabaab.

The price of Al Shabaab’s order was far from cheap.  Al Shabaab prevented theft and corruption, but in the process they altered the very fabric of daily life.  They destroyed Sufi tombs and assassinated Sufi clerics under charges of heresy.  Al Shabaab ruthlessly applied a draconian interpretation of Sharia law that was totally alien to the local population.  Sheikh Abdallah Ali, a senior cleric in the ICU, release a fatwa in 2006 which stated, “He who does not perform prayers will be considered an infidel and Sharia law orders that person be killed.”[xxxi]  Somalis, however, were willing to pay Al Shabaab’s price to eliminate corruption and chaos.  A unanimous Somali man told the Human Rights Watch, “A human being always strives to get independence and freedom, but the Shabaab administration brought peace and stability.”[xxxii]  Al Shabaab initially justified their jihad by proclaiming that they reestablished order, stability, and rule of law.

The collapse of order gave Al Shabaab their initial opportunity, but foreign intervention enabled them to continuously justify their jihad.  Al Shabaab played off traditional Somali xenophobia by claiming a defensive jihad, and by tying Somalia into the Muslim clash of civilization with the West.  Ethiopia was wary of a potential Islamist state on their border, and they executed a relatively limited incursion into Somalia in 1996 to secure their borders.  In December 2006, Ethiopia raised the stakes substantially by conducting a large-scale invasion to prevent the Islamists from conquering the TFG capital of Baidoa.  Ethiopian forces proceeded to occupy parts of Mogadishu and Kismayo, two of the largest cities in Somalia.  The African Union created the Somalia Mission (AMISOM) and deployed roughly 1,500 Ugandan troops to Mogadishu in March 2007.  Kenya followed in 2011 with an additional deployment of troops.  Meanwhile, the United States conducted near continuous drone strikes targeting Al Shabaab leadership.[xxxiii]  Somalis watched as foreign forces poured into their homeland.

None of the forces that intervened in Somalia originated from Muslim majority countries, and these attacks enabled Al Shabaab to advertise a defensive jihad against infidel and apostate forces attacking Islam.  The very fact that the TFG received support from Ethiopia and Kenya tainted them in the eyes of the Islamists and prevented any potential peace negotiations.  In June 2006, the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, said, “As long as Ethiopia is in our country, talks with the governmental cannot go ahead…if the government cares about the Somalis it should remove our enemy from the country.”[xxxiv]

Foreign intervention justified Al Shabaab’s jihad and provided a steady stream of recruits.  Ethiopian forces followed a Soviet Doctrine which relied on heavy artillery bombardments.  They adhered to this doctrine even when operating in the heavily populated urban areas of Mogadishu.[xxxv]  These bombardments caused massive civilian casualties and collateral damage, and Al Shabaab stepped in to market themselves as defenders and avengers of Muslim blood.  Consequently, the clans with the most exposure to Ethiopian forces provided the most recruits to Al Shabaab.[xxxvi]

Foreign intervention did more than justify the jihad in the eyes of Al Shabaab, it also changed the very nature of their jihad.  In his book Chechen Jihad, Yossef Bodansky coined the term “Chechenization” to describe the process of jihadi-salafists co-opting a localized conflicts and steering it toward global objectives.[xxxvii]  Today, Al Qaeda pursues this same objective when it seeks to “unify the jihad.”  Lorenzo Vidino applied this concept more directly to Somalia in his article, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa.”  Vidino uses the term “sacralization” to describe conflicts where religion goes from being irrelevant or secondary in the initial phases to becoming the driving force in the later phases.[xxxviii]  Al Shabaab exploited the feeling within the broader Muslim community (ummah) that Islam was under siege worldwide from Somalia to Iraq, Palestine to Afghanistan to tie the struggle in Somalia into the conflicts raging across the Muslim world.[xxxix]

Al Shabaab worked with Al Qaeda to globalize the Somali jihad.  In 2006, Usama Bin Laden released a video in which he called the TFG leader an “agent of foreign apostates,” and promised the international community that all true Muslims would “fight your soldiers on the land of Somalia and will fight you on your own land if you dispatch troops to Somalia.”[xl]  The ideologue of Al Shabaab, Sheikh Shongola, released a statement in 2007 tying Al Shabaab to the struggles in Jerusalem, Gaza, Iraq, and Afghanistan.[xli]  Muktar Robow, a key Al Shabaab leader, further embraced the concept of a global jihad when he said, “Al Qaeda is the mother of holy war in Somalia.”[xlii]

Al Shabaab and the ICU did not share a vision for a global jihad, and this difference led to severe tensions.  In their official magazine, Millet Ibrahim, Al Shabaab attacked the leader of the ICU for simple nationalism when they wrote, “He had a different opinion about Ethiopia and its war, and about America and its aggressiveness.  Rather, he is nothing more than a Somali nationalist, pure and simple.  The global jihad means nothing to him.”[xliii]  Al Shabaab altered the purpose of the Somali jihad by aligning it with the global aims of Al Qaeda.  This alignment became official in 2012, when Al Shabaab formally merged with Al Qaeda.  In truth, this merger simply formalized in name what was already occurring in practice.

The Somali ulama were slow to condemn Al Shabaab.  In 2006, when Al Shabaab emerged, no one was really certain of their aspirations or intentions.  Over time, Al Shabaab clearly demonstrated to the ulama that they were manipulating Islam and perverting the concept of jihad to help them consolidate power.  On 12 September 2013, after years and years of wanton violence and bloodshed, 160 Somali ulama finally convened and released the first fatwa against Al Shabaab.  This fatwa prohibited violence against the legitimate Somali government, joining or supporting Al Shabaab, and urged Somalis to fight the group.  The fatwa stated, “Al Shabaab has strayed from the correct path of Islam, leading the Somali people onto the wrong path.  The ideology they are spreading is a danger to the Islamic religion and the existence of the Somali society.”[xliv]  Al Shabaab confirmed the danger they posed only a week later when they stormed the West Gate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya and massacred dozens of innocent shoppers.

When Said Barre fled Somalia in 1999 he found sanctuary in Nigeria.  The chaos and conflict for which Somalia is infamous followed him there.  By 2011, the Nigerian academic professor Pat Utomi remarked, “We’ve arrived in Somalia…the average Nigerian now seems disconnected from the Nigerian state (like the Somalis).  He doesn’t feel he is worth much.  If his life means nothing, the lives of others means nothing to him also.”[xlv]  Theophilus Danjuma, a former Nigerian Minister of Defense, coined the term “Somalisation” to describe Nigeria’s rapid descent into chaos.[xlvi]

Nigeria contains about 20% of Africa’s entire population, and it is the largest country in the world that is almost equally divided between Muslims and Christians.[xlvii]  Nigeria has a long history of inter-religious and inter-communal violence which is exacerbated today by the earning potential of massive hydrocarbon resources.[xlviii]  Nigeria is a different case than Somalia, but it is similar in that it also under siege by violent jihadi-salafists.  In Somalia, Al Shabaab used a lack of governance to initiate jihad and foreign intervention to sustain it.  In Nigeria, Boko Haram used the corruption of an existing government to begin jihad and unrelenting government brutality to spread it.

In 1999 Nigerians looked to a restored democracy to solve their problems and realize their hope for a better future.  Nigerians yearned for better living conditions, and for Nigeria to take her rightful place among the industrialized nations of the world.  They were soon disappointed.  Today about 75% of Northern Nigerians live on less than a dollar a day.  Oil revenues increase yearly, but so does the percentage of Nigerians living in poverty.[xlix]  Less than 54% of men can read and half of all children under the age of five are stunted due to malnutrition.  Only one house out of four has access to electricity.[l]  All of this abject poverty is present in Northern Nigeria despite Nigeria earning over $86 billion in hydrocarbon exports in 2011 alone.[li]

Northern Nigerians saw the quality of life improve in the non-Muslim south.  Southern Nigerians today fare better in every economic and educational statistic.  Democracy failed the Nigerian Muslims, and bereft of other options, they looked to their religious history to secure their future.  The implementation of Sharia law began in the Zamfara state in October 1999, and it quickly swept across the North.  Life, however, did not improve under Sharia for the majority of Muslims.  The elite used Sharia to consolidate power, enrich themselves, and continue to oppress the masses.[lii]  The misapplication of God’s law and continued corruption propelled the rise of Muhammad Yusuf and the organization he founded: Boko Haram.

Boko Haram began as an Izala splinter group which sought to implement Sharia law and eliminate the endemic corruption in Nigeria.  Corruption was culprit for the disparity between horrid living conditions and massive hydrocarbon wealth.  Government officials at every level siphoned off hundreds of billions of dollars since the discovery and exportation of Nigerian hydrocarbons.[liii]  Bribes were part of the rhythm of everyday life.  Bribes initiated criminal investigations, and bribes determined the eventual outcome of those investigations.  Corruption permeated everything, from school admissions to road construction.  Extortion was also rampant.  The police organizations were pyramid schemes.  Low-level police officers made payments up the chain to the highest levels.  This organizational demand for cash pushed policemen to relentlessly extort the local populations.[liv]

Boko Haram’s message of a return to the pristine Islam of the Prophet and the equal justice of Sharia law resonated with the corruption weary populace.  The membership and influence of Boko Haram soared.  A Nigerian journalist interviewed Yusuf and wrote, “His teaching was easily accepted because the environment, the frustrations, the corruption, and the injustice made it fertile for his ideology to grow fast, very fast, like wild fire.”[lv]  An arrested Boko Haram member shouted to journalists in the crowd, “Our objective of fighting corruption by institutionalizing Islamic government must be achieved very soon.”[lvi]  The government grew wary of Boko Haram’s growing reach and influence.

Corruption enabled Boko Haram to craft a message that resounded with the Muslim population and attracted new members.  Heavy-handed government oppression, however, handed Boko Haram the provocation they needed to declare jihad.  Nigerian Security Force (SF) members conducted Operation Flush in June 2009 to oppress a growing and alarmingly influential Boko Haram.  They stopped a Boko Haram funeral procession in the Boko Haram stronghold of Maiduguri because several motorcyclists within the procession were not wearing helmets in accordance with local laws.  The Boko Haram members refused to comply, and the SF opened fire on the procession, wounding seventeen people.[lvii]  Yusuf demanded a public apology and a transparent investigation, but the government did not concede to Yusuf’s demands.  In response, Boko Haram’s jihad began in earnest on 26 July 2009 with attacks across Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Maiduguri.

The SF’s brutality continued to sustain Boko Haram’s jihad by alienating the population and providing Boko Haram with the manpower and motivation to continue.  Yusuf warned his followers against surrendering to the mercies of the government and told them, “If we give ourselves up, or they get us or me, they will kill me.”[lviii]  It was a prophetic revelation.  Police captured Yusuf alive on 30 July 2009 and summarily executed him while he was in police custody shortly thereafter.  The police executed at least twenty-four suspected Boko Haram members in Maiduguri alone between 28 July and 1 August 2009.[lix]  Yusuf’s father-in-law, Babu Fugu Mohammed, sent a letter to the Borno State governor prior to the attacks warning him of the impending violence.  After the attacks, Babu turned himself in to the local authorities at the behest of his lawyer, and the police promptly shot him dead.[lx]

The government failed to restrain their forces or investigate extrajudicial killings.  In a colossal display of short-sightedness, the Information Minister said that Yusuf’s murder was, “the best thing that could have happened to Nigeria.”[lxi]  The Nigerian government learned a lesson that the United States would learn years later after the raid on Abbottobad: killing the leader does not always kill the organization.  The government’s brutality validated all of Yusuf’s teachings and turned him into a martyr.  Boko Haram went underground for about a year, but then they reemerged with a vengeance in 2010 under the leadership of Yusuf’s more extreme protégé, Abubakar Shekau.

Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram attacks have increased in frequency, scope, and sophistication every year since 2010.  Government forces continue to answer violence with violence.  The government holds suspects indefinitely without charges or trials.  They execute suspects, burn homes, torture detainees, and use rape as a weapon.  Human Rights Watch estimated in 2012 that government forces caused as many casualties as Boko Haram.[lxii]  Today, the jihad of Boko Haram is in danger of transitioning to a full-fledged local insurgency under the banner of the Islamic State.  Boko Haram continues to rely on government brutality to recruit and sustain its membership.  In 2012, Shekau stated, “Everyone has seen what the security personnel have done to us.  Everyone has seen why we are fighting them.”[lxiii]  Government oppression continues to fuel the false jihad of Boko Haram.

The Nigerian ulama, unlike the Somali ulama, quickly attacked Boko Haram publicly with fatwas and statements.  The Nigerian ulama challenged the legitimacy of Boko Haram’s ideology even before the violent outbreaks.  The salafist Ja’far Adam publicly attacked Yusuf’s ideology and Islamic pedigree.[lxiv]  Muslim leaders like the Sultan of Sokoto labeled Boko Haram members as common criminals.  The prominent Nigerian cleric, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Islam Ibra him, issued the most damning fatwa in 2012.  Dr. Ibrahim said, “Terrorism, in its very essence, is an act that symbolizes infidelity and rejection of what Islam stands for…Only the victims of ignorance, jealousy, and malice go for militancy.  Islam declares them rebels.  They will abide in hell.”[lxv]  The global ummah was largely silent on Boko Haram until they kidnapped two-hundred school girls in April 2014, and today the entire ummah universally condemns Boko Haram.

The ulama across the Muslim world are finally awakening to the dangers of jihadi-salafism and the threat that groups like Al Shabaab and Boko Haram pose to the world at large.  The issue is that the ulama will often condemn atrocities, but refuse to condemn the individuals who committed those atrocities.  A former Kuwaiti official lamented in 2004 that the ulama did not issue a single fatwa calling for Bin Laden’s death.[lxvi]  There is bitter struggle within Islam between the educated ulama and unqualified criminals for the authority to issue fatwas.  If charismatic leaders with scant Islamic educations like Yusuf can issue religious rulings with no repercussions, then the system of Islamic jurisprudence is threatened with irrelevance.  A true Islamic education is a powerful for force for counter-radicalization, which is why few jihadi-salafist leaders are true members of the ulama.[lxvii]  The ulama must wage relentless jihad against the legitimacy and ideology of jihadi-salafism in order to take the narrative of Islam back from the hands of criminals and psychopaths.

Muslim democrats are also leading the ideological fight against jihadi-salafism.  Abdullahi Al-Naim adovcates a return to the Islam of the Meccan period.  “Meccan Islam” puts a premium on reasoning, the peaceful celebration of God, and upholding the moral responsibilities of the faithful.[lxviii]  A return to the Islam of the Meccan period would also open the gates of ijtihad, which is critical because this would give the ulama the right to apply logic and reasoning to modernize the applications of Islam.  Without ijtihad unqualified terrorists will continue to deliberately manipulate and misapply Sharia by exploiting loop-holes to justify bloodshed.

Misapplying Sharia is not uncommon, and cunning, charismatic leaders like Yusuf can selectively edit the Quran or Hadith to justify almost any action.  This is not a new trend.  In the thirteenth century the Islamic scholar Ibn Qayyim Al Jawziyya made an observant that remains relevant today: “As for the fanatics, they can place any problem upside down.  When they turn to the Sunnah they borrow only what corresponds to their pronouncements and contrive tricks to push away evidence that does not suit them.”[lxix]

There are true heroes within the ranks of the ulama, but not enough to turn to tides of this ideological war.  Jamal Al Banna actively disputes the ideology of his brother and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al Banna.  Jamal compares the militant Islamists today to the Kharijites who killed the Caliphs Uthman and Ali.[lxx]  El Fadl, Al Na’im, and Qadri are among the ulama who aggressively undermine the legitimacy of jihadi-salafism, and the jihadi-salafists who continue to commit heinous crimes in the name of Islam.  The Islamic State conducts mass executions, sells captured girls into a life of sexual slavery, and destroys ancient relics all while waving a black flag emblazoned with the name of God.  The question is, will mainstream, moderate Muslims confront these corruptions, or will they continue to let a bloodthirsty band of radicals define Islam for the non-Muslim world?

Jihadi-salafism is an Islamic problem, and it requires an Islamic solution.  Dr. Ibrahim, when speaking of Boko Haram, said, “They are in the minority in the Muslim ummah, but as is often the case, such forces are always the most vocal.  It is time now in our dear country for the voice of the majority who have always been against extremism and terrorism to move away from silence and let their voices be heard.”[lxxi]  If the majority remains silent, then it is likely violence will continue to escalate and transcend international borders, as it has most recently in France and Kenya.  Eventually the non-Muslim world, be it France, Russia, or the United States, will seek to impose a non-Muslim solution through the force of arms.  This will only add more fuel to an already blazing fire.  Will the ummah respond?

The opinions expressed in this article are solely the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of theU.S. Army or Department of Defense.

Bibliography

Ademowo, Adeyemi Johnson. Boko Haram, Peace Culture, and the Quest for a United Nigeria. Ibadan: Ayomide, 2012.

Afsaruddin, Asma. Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Albin-Lackey, Chris. Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by Al Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010.

Anonymous, “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram.” Journal of Religion in Africa 42 (2012).

Bar, Shmuel. Warrant for Terror: Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of the Jihad. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Inc., 2006.

Bodansky, Yoseff. Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 20.

Dennan, Shane. Constructing Takfir: From Abdullah Azzam to Djamel Zitouni. Available from: https:www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/constructing-takfir-from-abdullah-azzam-to-djamel-zitouni

Edde, Anne-Marie. Saladin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.

Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. The Islamic Shari’ah of Jihad. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Sciences, 2005.

Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

Harnischfeger, Johannes. Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria. New York: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Harper, Mary. “Somali Islamic Scholars Denounce Al-Shabaab in Fatwa.” BBC, 2013. Available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24057725

Ibrahim, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Islam. Fatwa on Boko Haram Suicide Bombing and Other Terrorist Activities in Nigeria. Available from: http://saharareporters.com/2012/01/20/fatwa-%E2%80%98boko-haram%E2%80%99-suicide-bombing-and-other-terrorist-activities-nigeria

Kalin, Ibrahim. War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad. Jordan: Institute for the Study of Islam, 2013.

Kelsay, John. Arguing the Just War in Islam. London: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Phillips, Jonathan. Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades. New York: Random House, 2009.

Shay, Shaul. Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction, 2008.

Turner, John A. Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi-Jihadism and the International Order. England: Macmillan, 2014.

Ukanah, Philip Oluwole. In God’s Name: The Story of Nigeria’s Religious War and its Brutal Killings. Ibadan: Divine Press, 2011.

Vidino, Lorenzo. “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict.” African Security 3.4 (2010): 216-238.

Williams, Daniel. Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012.

End Notes


[i]    John A. Turner, Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi-Jihadism and the International Order (England: Macmillan, 2014), 105.

[ii]  John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 175.

[v]  Asma Afsaruddin, Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10.

[vi]  Ibrahim Kalin, War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad (Jordan: Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought, 2013), 61.

[viii]  Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: Fawtas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Inc., 2006), 3.

[ix]  David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkely: University of California Press, 2005), 20.

[x]  Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, The Islamic Shari’ah of Jihad (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Sciences, 2005), 1.

[xxi]  Jonathan Phillips, Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades (New York: Random House, 2009), 135.

[xxii]  Anne-Marie Edde, Saladin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 272.

[xxiii]  Shaul Shay, Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration (London: Transaction, 2008), 49.

[xxiv]  Stig Jarle Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012 (New York: Columbia University press, 2013), 63.

[xxv]  Available from: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/280847/Ibn-Taymiyyah

[xxxii]  Chris Albin-Lackey, Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by Al Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), 22.

[xxxvii]  Yoseff Bodansky, Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

[xxxviii]  Lorenzo Vidino, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict,” African Security 3.4 (2010), 216-238.

[xlv]  Adeyemi Johnson Ademowo, Boko Haram, Peace Culture, and the Quest for a United Nigeria (Ibadan: Ayomide, 2012), 21.

[xlvii]  Daniel Williams, Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012), 27.

[xlix]  Johannes Harnischfeger, Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria (New York: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 196.

[lii]  Hamischfeger, 155.

[lvii]  Philip Oluwole Ukanah, In God’s Name: The Story of Nigeria’s Religious War and Its Brutal Killing (Ibadan: Divine Press, 2011), 251.

[lxiv]  Anonymous, “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram,” Journal of Religion in Africa 42 (2012): 122. 

[lxv]  Dr. Muhammad Abdul Islam Ibrahim, Fatwa on Boko Haram Suicide Bombing and Other Terrorist Activities in Nigeria. Available from: http://saharareporters.com/2012/01/20/fatwa-%E2%80%98boko-haram%E2%80%99-suicide-bombing-and-other-terrorist-activities-nigeria 

[lxvii]  Shane Drennan, Constructing Takfir: From Abdullah Azzam to Djamel Zitouni. Available from: https:www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/constructing-takfir-from-abdullah-azzam-to-djamel-zitouni 

About the Author(s)

Daniel Pesature

Major Daniel Pesature, U.S. Army, is a foreign area officer specializing in the Middle East and North Africa.  He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 2005 and recently earned a Master of International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.  Major Pesature is currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Comments

Источник: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/justifying-jihad-a-case-study-of-al-shabaab-and-boko-haram
Issue 3

Nigeria’s amnesty for terrorists re-opens old wounds

Mrs. Seun Sakaba could not control her anger when photographs of repentant Boko Haram fighters holding placards which read, ‘Nigerians, please forgive us’, recently went viral on social media.

The terrorists who surrendered along with their families were presented with foodstuffs and clothes. Commending the fighters for surrendering, the Nigerian Army said they would all be rehabilitated in a camp before being reintegrated into society.

It echoes the controversy about ‘Sulhu’ – a Nigerian programme to demobilise Boko Haram fighters which grew out of a sense that there were some muhajideen who were willing to negotiate.

“Sulhu is applauded by its supporters as smart warfare – a means to remove senior jihadists from the battlefield more effectively than the stuttering orthodox military campaign”, wrote Obi Anyadike about the secret Nigerian amnesty plan.

However, Sakaba, whose husband, a lieutenant-colonel, died alongside at least 117 soldiers during an attack on their base by Boko Haram on 18 November 2018, could not stand the thought of such terrorists evading justice.

“It will never be well with all of you. I should forgive them for making me a widow? I should forgive them for killing my husband, his brother and his mum? I should forgive them for making me seek shelter in another country?” she asked.

In earlier correspondence with the Nigerian Army, Sakaba lamented that she had not been paid her husband’s entitlement.

The distraught widow said she would no longer speak on the matter when The Africa Report reached out to her for further comment, saying she was “tired of talking.”

Sakaba is just one among many who have not yet gotten the justice they call for.

Mrs. Rebecca Sharibu, whose daughter, Leah, was kidnapped from school in Dapchi, Yobe State three years ago, shares a similar discontentment with Sakaba.

Leah was kidnapped on 19 February 19 2018 along with 109 other girls. While five of the girls died, 104 were released by the terrorists. Unfortunately, Leah – who was the only Christian among them – was held back for her refusal to convert to Islam and has remained in captivity ever since amid reports that she had been married off to a terrorist and given birth to a child.

Leah’s mother told The Africa Report that the government needs to prioritise the rescue of her daughter. The pardon and rehabilitation of Boko Haram fighters, she says, is most unfortunate.

Sharibu also noted that Boko Haram has different factions and wondered if it was the faction that kidnapped her daughter that was being pardoned.

“You know, even the Boko Haram we are talking about are not one and the same. There is one sect after another. And it is very likely that the ones being granted amnesty are not even the ones who took my daughter. If they are, then it’s sad to hear that Leah’s oppressors are granted freedom without giving my daughter her freedom. So far, we are still praying for her return and I am sure she will return to me.”

Reverend Enoch Mark, whose daughters – Monica and Sarah – were abducted from their school in Chibok in 2014, was too distraught to speak when The Africa Report contacted him, saying he had “lost his wife and also fallen into depression.”

On what he thought about the government’s amnesty programme, Mark who said he wasn’t aware of it, responded by saying: “Honestly, I have no nothing to say because my opinion doesn’t matter to the government.”

Thousands killed, millions displaced

According to the United Nations Development Programme, at least 35, 000 people in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in the North-East Nigeria have been killed by Boko Haram while 314,000 other have died of indirect causes of the conflict such as famine, water shortage and health problems.

…2.9 million Nigerians affected by the Boko Haram insurgency live in Internally Displaced Persons camps.

Due to the activities of Boko Haram and other violent groups in Nigeria, in the last seven years the country has consistently been ranked high on the Global Terrorism Index and currently ranks third behind Afghanistan and Iraq.

UNHCR also states that 2.9 million Nigerians affected by the Boko Haram insurgency live in Internally Displaced Persons camps. That is a population more than the size of Paris living in camps due to a humanitarian crisis.

More pardons, less convictions

The issue of amnesty for Boko Haram first came up in 2013 when the Northern Elders Forum approached President Goodluck Jonathan at the time to consider negotiating with the terrorists. This, however, failed as Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, rejected the offer, saying, “Surprisingly, the Nigerian government is talking about granting us amnesty. What wrong have we done? On the contrary, it is we that should grant you a pardon.”

When President Muhammadu Buhari took over in 2015, the Nigerian government in 2016 inaugurated the ‘Operation Safe Corridor’ (OSC) programme which was aimed at reformation and re-orientation of terrorists. It was an attempt to replicate the relative success of the amnesty programme of the oil rich Niger Delta region

The repentant terrorists were handed N20, 000 ($47) each and then given vocational training such as tailoring, plumbing and carpentry and given shops and equipment; but it was not made public.

According to the military, the programme was initially targeted at non-combatant Boko Haram members like women and children who had been forced into the group or informants and other persons sympathetic to Boko Haram’s cause. However, a few Boko Haram fighters who had willingly surrendered were also allowed to take part in the programme.

Defending the programme at an event in 2018, the President’s spokesperson, Garba Shehu, said: “You can defeat people technically in the field, but at the end you must come to the conference room to resolve all issues. So, if Boko Baram would lay down their arms and stop fighting and stop preaching that negative ideology, the country should be able to embrace them, welcome all of them so that they continue to live normal lives and be useful to the nation.

“What that means is that we will be saving cost, saving lives that are being lost through bombing, killing of service personnel and we will be saving money that we are using to procure weapons so that such money can go into services and infrastructure and welfare of the citizens of this country. It is a win-win situation.”

Assessing the “success” of the programme, the General Officer Commanding, 7 Division, Maj. Gen Abdulmalik Biu, boasted that repentant terrorists who lay down their arms stand the chance of becoming great in society and even emerging as the President of Nigeria.

The government resolved that those who were arrested in battle and others who were unwilling to surrender would be prosecuted but this remained a tall order.

Terrorism in Nigeria is a federal offence which means the Office of the Attorney General coordinates the trial of terror suspects. In 2017, about 2, 300 suspects were tried secretly. However, only about 205 were reported to have been convicted for minor offences such as providing material and non-violent support to Boko Haram, according to the Federal Ministry of Justice

Checks by The Africa Report based on several local media and official reports showed that since the war against insurgency started in 2009, less than 400 suspects have been convicted while the real sponsors of terrorism have never faced justice. In May, Nigeria’s attorney-general promised to expose and prosecute about 400 financiers of terrorism and 800 other terror suspects but there has been no update on the matter ever since.

The recent report by The New Humanitarian, revealed that the Suhlu programme was being coordinated by Nigeria’s secret police, the Department of State Services, and ensures that top terrorist commanders were given clemency, houses and substantial stipends on the condition that they continue to provide information to the military and ensure that top terrorists are encouraged to drop their weapons.

This has, however, not stopped military operations against terrorists.

Official reports suggest that the Nigerian government has released over 3,000 repentant terror suspects back into society since 2016. State governments have also introduced an opaque amnesty system that has led to the release of thousands of bandits, kidnappers and militants.

Killings, abductions continue despite amnesty

Despite the pardons, however, Nigeria’s security challenge has continued to worsen with the terror war changing from a religious one to pure kidnapping and banditry. Reports suggest that bombings and direct attacks by Boko Haram in the North-East have reduced substantially compared to previous years while abductions and killings by bandits have increased, spreading the insecurity to the entire North-West.

In March the Nigerian government was forced to declare a no fly zone over Zamfara State in the North-West due to the rising insecurity while the Kaduna State government revealed that 545 persons were killed and 1, 723 kidnapped between January and June.

It remains unclear if there are any links at all between bandits and terrorists. However, a leaked memo by the Nigeria Immigration Service last month states that some bandits were receiving training from Boko Haram.

More to receive amnesty

The death of Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, increased the strength of rival terrorist group, Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), and alienated some of his followers who have now decided to embrace amnesty.

According to the Nigerian military, no less than 1,200 Boko Haram terrorists have surrendered in recent weeks while more are expected to lay down their arms soon.

The repentant terrorists are now being housed in government facilities and are being processed. However, the Nigerian government has failed to state exactly if any of them will be prosecuted at all.

Military responds

When asked if the victims of Boko Haram insurgency would get justice, the spokesperson for the Nigerian military, Brigadier General, Onyema Nwachukwu, told The Africa Report that the military had no powers to prosecute anyone.

Nwachukwu further stated that the rules guiding conflict forbids the military from killing belligerents who have surrendered.

He stated: “Under international humanitarian law, it is unlawful to target an enemy who has surrendered and this provides that surrendering combatants be taken into custody, investigated and processed and not to take extrajudicial actions against them, as is the expectation in some quarters, no matter the enormity of their offence.

“As a professional military, our role is to take them into custody, profile them and hand them over to relevant agencies of the state for further necessary action. The military does not have the power to prosecute them. It is constitutionally not in the purview of the military to prosecute or set them free.”

A spokesperson for the Attorney-General, Umar Gwandu, said he would provide a response soon, but failed to do so.

If terrorists are surrendering and the military is accepting them, have the attacks stopped? The attacks have not stopped. Terrorists are terrorists.

The Minister of Information, Lai Mohammed, said he was informed by the military that the terrorists who had genuinely repented would be allowed to go.

He said: “I personally spoke to the military authorities before I left Nigeria and they said what they were doing is what the global practice dictates about soldiers that surrendered that should be treated as prisoners of war.

“You cannot just shoot them because there are international conventions that give rights also to prisoners of war. What the military is doing is that when they surrender, they profile them to ensure that they are genuine and reintegrate them into the society.’’

The Senate President, Ahmad Lawan, who is also from the North-East, said there was a need for caution regarding the amnesty programme.

“I believe that we should give people the benefit of the doubt, but we should also be very circumspect on those who may not be genuine in this, but we should accept people when they come and take the appropriate measures, get the right strategies on how to deal with the reintegration of such people into the community,” he says.

But Mike Ejiofor, a former Director with the DSS, faulted the amnesty for terrorists.

Ejiofor stated that the amnesty programme had not reduced the killings and the kidnappings in the country, adding that there was really no difference between terrorists and bandits.

“If terrorists are surrendering and the military is accepting them, have the attacks stopped? The attacks have not stopped. Terrorists are terrorists. The pains they have inflicted on the country and their victims is so much that you cannot just allow them back into society,” he told The Africa Report.

“Boko Haram leaders are still at large, operating. Releasing them back into society can be very dangerous. Where are the Chibok girls? Many of them are still in captivity. See what is happening in the North-West? What is even the difference between bandits and terrorists?” he added.

As the Boko Haram terrorists continue to lay down their arms, it remains to be seen if the victims of their 11-year violence including the over 100 Chibok schoolgirls still in captivity would ever find closure.

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daily indipentent, 08 Jul 2015

URL: http://allafrica.com/stories/201507011446.html

A Chadian Public Prosecutor, Alghassim Khamis, said on Tuesday that a leader of the Boko Haram sect, Baana Fanay, who has been coordinating trafficking of weapons in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad was arrested on Sunday in N'Djamena.

Khamis said Fanay alias Mahamat Moustapha, was arrested by security forces after a fierce resistance. He said Fanay, who was arrested with two other terrorists, was responsible for the purchase of weapons and recruitment of fighters for Boko Haram.

The prosecutor said the search in the suspect's house led to the seizure of different weapons and documents written in Arabic by Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, targeting the sect's recruits.

He said the arrest also led investigators to discover the location of seven other terrorists hiding in a house in Diguel, a Dinguessou suburb, on the periphery of N'Djamena.

Khamis said a man believed to be the financier of the group was arrested and is under investigations.

He added, the outcome of the investigation would help investigators to dismantle Boko Haram network in the country.

Since the simultaneous attacks that killed 38 people and injured 100 others in N'Djamena on June 15, Chadian security forces have arrested 74 people suspected of involvement in the attacks.

Источник: https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/news/11467
Volume 4

Justifying Jihad: A Case Study of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram

Daniel Pesature

Jihad - Today this ancient Arabic word has near universal recognition, but also near universal misunderstanding.  In the non-Muslim world jihad erroneously conjures images of masked gunmen and televised beheadings.  Fundamental misunderstanding relating to jihad are not confined to non-Muslims however.  A perversion of Islam known as jihadi-salafism attempts to justify monstrous atrocities through the establishment of a pure Islamic State (Caliphate) and a return to the pristine version of Islam practiced in the age of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (Salaf).[i]  Al Shabaab and Boko Haram are two jihadi-salafist groups that manipulate the tenets of jihad to justify violence on an immense scale.  Their actions, and those of other jihadi-salafist groups, threaten to shape America’s perception of Islam.  At its core, jihadi-salafism is an ideological perversion, and the long-term solution is a counter narrative true to the tenets of Islam.

Drone strikes and commando raids will not solve this issue.  The United States (US) must understand the problem of jihadi-salafism so that the policies it enacts do not alienate the vast majority of good, law-abiding Muslims.  The cure cannot kill the patient.  Islam is the antidote to the poison of jihadi-salafism.  Al Shabaab and Boko Haram both manipulate Islamic law (Sharia) to justify their jihads in Somalia and Nigeria.  They use genuine transgressions like the collapse of order, foreign invasion, corruption, and oppression to sanction cruel, primal, reciprocal violence.  Analyzing the false jihads of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram provides a window into the minds of jihadi-salafists, and it also offers recommendations on countering this spreading and imminent threat.

Sharia regulates jihad.  Sharia is far more than a criminal code, as it influences every aspect of Muslim life.  Sharia is mainly derived from the Quran and from the sayings or actions of the Prophet Muhammed (Hadith).  The Quran is best divided into two sections: the Meccan period (before hijra), and the Medinan period (after hijra).  The two periods are written with different perspectives, and there are often contradictions.  The Quran is contextual.  It is based on the specific enemies and situations present during the time of Muhammad.[ii]  The Hadith provide even less clarity.  Some Hadith were recorded in the time of Muhammad, while others were recorded much later.  Islamic scholars (ulama) loosely codify the numerous Hadiths based on strength, veracity, probably authenticity, and consensus (ijma).

In the past, the ulama could also apply reasoning (ijtihad) to the Quran and Hadith, but in the ninth century the Abbasid Caliphate country homes for sale near austin tx that all pertinent guidance was extracted from these sources and closed the gates of ijtihad.  Today the ulama can only consult the Quran, Hadith, and prior rulings to reach ijma and issue a religious ruling (fatwa).  It is difficult for the ulama to apply dated sources and interpretations to the situations of a modern, globalized world.  For example, there is a Hadith that forbids women from traveling one day’s travel without a male escort.  During the age of reasoning, the ulama’s ijma was td bank grants canada this distance could not exceed fifty miles.  In the modern age, however, a woman can travel that distance in less than an hour by car and in mere minutes by plane.[iii]  Jihad originates from Sharia, and like Sharia it can be misinterpreted or misapplied in the modern age.[iv]

Jihad is derived from the Arabic root that means to struggle or strive in the service of God.  War is not simply jihad and jihad is not simply war.[v]  There is the greater jihad and the lesser jihad.  The greater jihad is the ever-raging battle within the hearts and minds of all Muslims to stay true to the teachings and tenets of Islam.  This greater jihad metro bank customer service hotline philippines called the “jihad of the tongue” because Muslims were ideologically struggling to overcome disbelief (kufr) and polytheism (shirk).  Muhammad stressed the importance of greater jihad repeatedly throughout the Quran.  Muhammad stated, “The best struggle is to struggle against your soul.”[vi]  The greater jihad is a peaceful jihad, and it is the most esteemed version of jihad in the Quran.[vii]

The lesser jihad dominates the headlines today.  This jihad is war, albeit war in the name and service of God.  The Quran emphasizes order because Islam is a communal religion and cannot thrive in chaos.[viii]  Accordingly, strict laws govern the violence inherent in lesser jihad.[ix]  Only the legitimate ruler of an Dollar bank online banking customer service State can declare jihad.[x]  Jihad, however, cannot create an Islamic State because only an Islamic State can sanction jihad in the first place.  Muhammad did not use the force of arms to establish the Islamic State in Medina.  God provided for the peaceful establishment of this Islamic State through the Charter of Medina.[xi]

The Quran advises Muslim leaders on the criteria for jihad, and the intended audience is not every Muslim.[xii]  Jihad must restore order and provide justice.  If this is not the purpose of jihad, then it is just violent anarchy which the Quran forbids.[xiii]  Furthermore, a just end can never be achieved through unjust means.  Muhammad Tahir Al Qadri, the founder of Minhaj Al Quran International and a fierce opponent of extremism, preaches pure acts for pure goals.  A Muslim cannot finance the construction of a mosque by robbing a bank.[xiv]

Islam prefers order to chaos, even if that order is not perfect.  Jihad to overthrow rulers is extremely difficult to justify.  Muslims who live in non-Muslim societies cannot use jihad to overthrow non-Muslim rulers who do not implement Sharia.  A non-Muslim ruler who protects the religious rights of Muslims and does not force them to act against Sharia cannot face jihad.[xv]  The Quran advocates peace and dialogue in the face of oppressive rulers.  Muhammad said, “The best jihad is a true word spoken in the presence of a tyrannical ruler.”[xvi]  God granted Muhammad permission to wage jihad only after he migrated to Medina and the Meccans pursued him.[xvii]  Quranic verse 22:39 is the first verse that approves violence.  It reads, “Permission is given to those who are fought against,” but it comes only after seventy previous verses forbidding violence.[xviii]

It also difficult to justify jihad through claims of disbelief.  In Islam there is a huge difference between disbelief and sin.  The Quran advises all Muslims to assume sin and let God be the judge of disbelief.  Anything short of a public denouncement of Islam fails to justify a jihad to overthrow a Muslim ruler, and an uprising against a non-Muslim ruler is only permissible jihad if that ruler blatantly oppresses the practice of Islam.  For example, if a Muslim ruler announces publicly that Ramadan is forbidden, then that is disbelief and worthy of jihad.  However, if that ruler simply fails to fast, then that is laziness and merely sinful.[xix]

There are many additional laws that control that conduct of jihad.  The false jihad of the Islamic State flies in the face of true and legitimate jihad.  Massacres on the streets of Paris, suicide bombings in Beirut, and pressing captured Yezidi girls into sexual slavery are not jihad.  Muhammad set the precedent for true jihad during the conflicts of the Medinan period and the Quran clearly demarcates these rules.[xx]  Sharia boko haram suspected financier executed the killing of the elderly, sick, women, or children.  The deliberate destruction of animals or fruit producing trees is also forbidden.  The Quran specifically inhibits the mistreatment of prisoners, the mutilation of fallen enemy warriors, and reneging on treaties or agreements. 

Saladin is perhaps the most accepted exemplification of righteous jihad in Islamic history, excluding the Prophet.  Saladin waged a defensive jihad at the behest of a legitimate Muslim ruler to regain the holy city of Jerusalem.  In 1099 Christian Crusaders sacked Jerusalem and put the Muslim residents to the sword.  Saladin avenged this conquest, and reconquered Jerusalem, in 1187.  Saladin, however, followed the tenets of jihad and spared the Christian inhabitants of the city.  The wives and daughters of killed Crusaders even asked for his mercy, which he granted by giving them gifts, money, and protection.[xxi]  Saladin honored all treaties, truces, and agreements with the Crusaders and ensured that prisoners were treated in accordance with Sharia.[xxii]  Saladin is considered the standard in Islam for just, righteous jihad.

The jihads of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram do not live up to Saladin’s standard.  The jihadi-salafists today use Al Qaeda’s interpretation of jihad, which stems from the Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia.  The gradual exposure of Somalia and Nigeria to Wahhabism made their populations more susceptible to the militant tenets of jihadi-salafism.  Saudi Arabia used their significant finances to export their particular strain of Islam.  In the 1990’s, Saudi Arabia provided over $70 billion to fund over 1500 mosques, 210 Islamic Centers, 202 Islamic Colleges, and roughly 2000 Islamic schools all over the Muslim world.[xxiii]

Al Shabaab’s and Boko Haram’s ideological ties to Wahhabism explain how fundamentalist jihadi-salafist groups sprung from the largely Sufi landscapes of Somalia and Nigeria.  When Al Shabaab emerged in 2006 fully half of their eight-man Shura council were veterans who fought under Al Qaeda’s banners in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the late 1980s.[xxiv]  Boko Haram’s origins stem from the ideological founder of the Salafist Izala movement in Where can i add money to my cash app card, Sheikh Abubakar Gumi.  Gumi worked in Saudi Arabia and established a network of Wahhabi financiers who bank rolled his Izala movement.  Boko Haram’s founder, Muhammad Yusut, was a former member of Izala.

The militant ideology of jihadi-salafism stretches back to the thirteenth century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya.  Ibn Taymiyya preached a return to the pure Islam of the Prophet, and he argued that a lack of Muslim piety caused the calamity of the Mongol invasion.  Ibn Taymiyya released a fatwa which stated that multiple emirates, or Islamic states, were permitted, and that each ruler could proclaim jihad.[xxv]  Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, brought Ibn Taymiyya’s militant jihad into the twentieth century.  Sayyed Qutb, Muhammad Abd Al Salam Faraj, and Abdullah Mawdudi continued to expand on this unique and controversial interpretation of jihad.[xxvi]

Abdallah Azzam merged the disparate militant interpretations into today’s modern version.  Azzam issued a fatwa in 1979 titled, “In Defense of Muslim Lands,” that really championed the notion of non-state sanctioned jihad.[xxvii]  He supported the claim that the famous “sword verse” of the Quran abrogated all the preceding verses which promoted peace.  Azzam ushered in the age of Islamic terrorism by giving groups like Al Shabaab and Boko Haram the doctrine they needed to lay a false claim to justified jihad.

Azzam provided the Islamists in Somalia the ideological doctrine to wage jihad, but the iron regime of Said Barre prevented them from actually acquiring power.  The complete collapse of order in 1991 provided the opening for the Islamist groups waiting on the periphery, Boko haram suspected financier executed Shabaab among them, to rise to prominence in Somalia.  Al Shabaab existed as an organization long before they officially became a distinct group in 2006.[xxviii]  The Sharia Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu served as an incubator for the fledgling group.  The years following the collapse of the Barre regime were filled with chaos and corruption.  Islam requires order to flourish, and Somalis were tired of the constant conflict.  Somalis experiences the failures of authoritarianism, clannism, nationalism, socialism, and warlordism.  The powerful and influential Mogadishu businessmen were especially desperate for order, and they turned to the Islamists.[xxix]  The Sharia courts appeared in Mogadishu in 1998, and they merged in the street battles of 2006 to become the Islamic Courts Union.

The ICU, Al Shabaab, various militias, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) all controlled certain areas and neighborhoods of Mogadishu.  Al Shabaab suddenly experienced the opportunity to govern and administer actual territory.  The disparity in governance between Al Shabaab’s area and the areas under the control of the TFG or militias quickly became apparent to the residents.  The international community trained the majority of the TFG-militia members, but the Somali government lacked the resources to actually pay these fighters a fixed, predictable salary.  As a result, these militia members preyed on the local population through corruption and extortion to acquire the fixed income that their government could not provide.[xxx]  The TFG-militia forces alienated the people under their administration, and many of these people began to support Al Shabaab.

The price of Al Shabaab’s order was far from cheap.  Al Shabaab prevented theft and corruption, but in the process they altered the very fabric of daily life.  They destroyed Sufi tombs and assassinated Sufi clerics under charges of heresy.  Al Shabaab ruthlessly applied a draconian interpretation of Sharia law that was totally alien to the local population.  Sheikh Abdallah Ali, a senior cleric in the ICU, release a fatwa in 2006 which stated, “He who does not perform prayers will be considered an infidel and Sharia law orders that person be killed.”[xxxi]  Somalis, however, were willing to pay Al Shabaab’s price to eliminate corruption and chaos.  A unanimous Somali man told the Human Rights Watch, “A human being always strives to get independence and freedom, but the Shabaab administration brought peace and stability.”[xxxii]  Al Shabaab initially justified their jihad by proclaiming that they reestablished order, stability, and rule of law.

The collapse of order gave Al Shabaab their initial opportunity, but foreign intervention enabled them to continuously justify their jihad.  Al Shabaab played off traditional Somali xenophobia by claiming a defensive jihad, and by tying Somalia into the Muslim clash of civilization with the West.  Ethiopia was wary of a potential Islamist state on their border, and they executed a relatively limited incursion into Somalia in 1996 to secure their borders.  In December 2006, Ethiopia raised the stakes substantially by conducting a large-scale invasion to prevent the Islamists from conquering the TFG capital of Baidoa.  Ethiopian forces proceeded to occupy parts of Mogadishu and Kismayo, two of the largest cities in Somalia.  The African Union created the Somalia Mission (AMISOM) and deployed roughly 1,500 Ugandan troops to Mogadishu in March 2007.  Kenya followed in 2011 with an additional deployment of troops.  Meanwhile, the United States conducted near continuous drone strikes targeting Al Shabaab leadership.[xxxiii]  Somalis watched as foreign forces poured into their homeland.

None of the forces that intervened in Somalia originated from Muslim majority countries, and these attacks enabled Al Shabaab to advertise a defensive jihad against infidel and apostate forces attacking Islam.  The very fact that the TFG received support from Ethiopia and Kenya tainted them in the eyes of the Islamists and prevented any potential peace negotiations.  In June 2006, the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, said, “As long as Ethiopia is in our country, talks with the governmental cannot go ahead…if the government cares about the Somalis it should remove our enemy from the country.”[xxxiv]

Foreign intervention justified Al Shabaab’s jihad and provided a steady stream of recruits.  Ethiopian forces followed a Soviet Doctrine which relied on heavy artillery bombardments.  They adhered to this doctrine even when operating in the heavily populated urban areas of Mogadishu.[xxxv]  These bombardments caused massive civilian casualties and collateral damage, and Al Shabaab stepped in to market themselves as defenders and avengers of Muslim blood.  Consequently, the clans with the most boko haram suspected financier executed to Ethiopian forces provided the most recruits to Al Shabaab.[xxxvi]

Foreign intervention did more than justify the jihad in the eyes of Al Shabaab, it also changed the very nature of their jihad.  In his book Chechen Jihad, Yossef Bodansky coined the term “Chechenization” to describe the process of jihadi-salafists co-opting a localized conflicts and steering it toward global objectives.[xxxvii]  Today, Al Qaeda pursues this same objective when it seeks to “unify the jihad.”  Lorenzo Vidino applied this concept more directly to Somalia in his article, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa.”  Vidino uses boko haram suspected financier executed term “sacralization” to describe conflicts where religion goes from being irrelevant or secondary in the initial phases to becoming the driving force in the later phases.[xxxviii]  Al Shabaab exploited the feeling within the broader Muslim community (ummah) that Islam was under siege worldwide from Somalia to Iraq, Palestine to Afghanistan to tie the struggle in Somalia into the conflicts raging across the Muslim world.[xxxix]

Al Shabaab worked with Al Qaeda to globalize the Somali jihad.  In 2006, Usama Bin Laden released a video in which he called the TFG leader an “agent of foreign apostates,” and promised the international community that all true Muslims would “fight your soldiers on the land of Somalia and will fight you on your own land if you dispatch troops to Somalia.”[xl]  The ideologue of Al Shabaab, Sheikh Shongola, released a statement in 2007 tying Al Shabaab to the struggles in Jerusalem, Gaza, Iraq, and Afghanistan.[xli]  Muktar Robow, a key Al Shabaab leader, further embraced the concept of a global jihad when he said, “Al Qaeda is the mother of holy war in Somalia.”[xlii]

Al Shabaab and the ICU did not share a vision for a global jihad, and this difference led to severe tensions.  In their official magazine, Millet Ibrahim, Al Shabaab attacked the leader of the ICU for simple nationalism when they wrote, “He had a different opinion about Ethiopia and its war, and about America and its aggressiveness.  Rather, he is nothing more than a Somali nationalist, pure and simple.  The global jihad means nothing to him.”[xliii]  Al Shabaab altered the purpose of the Somali jihad by aligning it with the global aims of Al Qaeda.  This alignment became official in 2012, when Al Shabaab formally merged with Al Qaeda.  In truth, this merger simply formalized in name what was already occurring in practice.

The Somali ulama were slow to condemn Al Shabaab.  In 2006, when Al Shabaab emerged, no one was really certain of their aspirations or intentions.  Over time, Al Shabaab clearly demonstrated to the ulama that they were manipulating Islam and perverting the concept of jihad to help them consolidate power.  On 12 September 2013, after years and years of wanton violence and bloodshed, 160 Somali ulama finally convened and released the first fatwa against Al Shabaab.  This fatwa prohibited violence against mls guest search legitimate Somali government, joining or supporting Al Shabaab, and urged Somalis to fight the group.  The fatwa stated, “Al Shabaab has strayed from the correct path of Islam, leading the Somali people onto the wrong path.  The ideology they are spreading is a danger to the Islamic religion first chatham bank savannah ga the existence of the Somali society.”[xliv]  Al Shabaab confirmed the danger they posed only a week later when they stormed the West Gate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya and massacred dozens of innocent shoppers.

When Said Barre fled Somalia in 1999 he found sanctuary in Nigeria.  The chaos and conflict for which Somalia is infamous followed him there.  By 2011, the Nigerian academic professor Pat Utomi remarked, “We’ve arrived in Somalia…the average Nigerian now seems disconnected from the Nigerian state (like the Somalis).  He doesn’t feel he is worth much.  If his life means nothing, the lives of others means nothing to him also.”[xlv]  Theophilus Danjuma, a former Nigerian Minister of Defense, coined the term “Somalisation” to describe Nigeria’s rapid descent into chaos.[xlvi]

Nigeria contains about 20% of Africa’s entire population, and it is the largest country in the world that is almost equally divided between Muslims and Christians.[xlvii]  Nigeria has a long history of inter-religious and inter-communal violence which is exacerbated today by the earning potential of massive hydrocarbon resources.[xlviii]  Nigeria is a different case than Somalia, but it is similar in that it also under siege by violent jihadi-salafists.  In Somalia, Al Shabaab used a lack of governance to initiate jihad and foreign intervention to sustain it.  In Nigeria, Boko Haram used the corruption of an pauls valley golf course ok government to begin jihad and unrelenting government brutality to spread it.

In 1999 Nigerians looked to a restored democracy to solve their problems and realize their hope for a better future.  Nigerians yearned for better living conditions, and for Nigeria to take her rightful place among the industrialized nations of the world.  They were soon disappointed.  Today about 75% of Northern Nigerians live on less than a dollar a day.  Oil revenues increase yearly, but so does the percentage of Nigerians living in poverty.[xlix]  Less than 54% of men can read and half of all children under the age of five are stunted due to malnutrition.  Only one house out of four has access to electricity.[l]  All of this abject poverty is present in Northern Nigeria despite Nigeria earning over $86 billion in hydrocarbon exports in 2011 alone.[li]

Northern Nigerians saw the quality of life improve in the non-Muslim south.  Southern Nigerians today fare better in every economic and educational statistic.  Democracy failed the Nigerian Muslims, and bereft of other options, they looked to their religious history to secure their future.  The implementation of Sharia law began in the Zamfara state in October 1999, and it quickly swept across the North.  Life, however, did not improve under Sharia for the majority of Muslims.  The elite used Sharia to consolidate power, enrich themselves, and continue to oppress the masses.[lii]  The misapplication of God’s law and continued corruption propelled the rise of Muhammad Yusuf and the organization he founded: Boko Haram.

Boko Haram began as an Izala splinter group which sought to implement Sharia law and eliminate the endemic corruption in Nigeria.  Corruption was culprit for the disparity between horrid living conditions and massive hydrocarbon wealth.  Government officials at every level siphoned off hundreds of billions of dollars since the discovery and exportation of Nigerian hydrocarbons.[liii]  Bribes were part of the rhythm of everyday life.  Bribes initiated criminal investigations, and bribes determined the eventual my100bank mobile login of those investigations.  Corruption permeated everything, from school admissions to road construction.  Extortion was also rampant.  The police organizations were pyramid schemes.  Low-level police officers made payments up the chain to the highest levels.  This organizational demand for cash pushed policemen to relentlessly extort the local populations.[liv]

Boko Haram’s message of a return to the pristine Islam of the Prophet and the equal justice of Sharia law resonated with the corruption weary populace.  The membership and influence of Boko Haram soared.  A Nigerian journalist interviewed Yusuf and wrote, “His teaching was easily accepted because the environment, the frustrations, the corruption, and the injustice made it fertile for his ideology to grow fast, very fast, like wild fire.”[lv]  An arrested Boko Haram member shouted to journalists in the crowd, “Our objective of fighting corruption by institutionalizing Islamic government must be achieved very soon.”[lvi]  The government grew wary of Boko Haram’s growing reach and influence.

Corruption enabled Boko Haram to craft a message that resounded with the Muslim population and attracted new members.  Heavy-handed government oppression, however, handed Boko Haram the provocation they needed to declare jihad.  Nigerian Security Force (SF) members conducted Operation Flush in June 2009 to oppress a growing and alarmingly can you request credit line increase capital one Boko Haram.  They stopped a Boko Haram funeral procession in the Boko Haram stronghold of Maiduguri because several motorcyclists within the procession were not wearing helmets in accordance with local laws.  The Boko Haram members refused to comply, and the SF opened fire on the procession, wounding seventeen people.[lvii]  Yusuf demanded a public apology and a transparent investigation, but the government did not concede to Yusuf’s demands.  In response, Boko Haram’s jihad began in earnest on 26 July 2009 with attacks across Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Maiduguri.

The SF’s brutality continued to sustain Boko Haram’s jihad by alienating the population and providing Boko Haram with the manpower and motivation to continue.  Yusuf warned his followers against surrendering to the mercies of the government and told them, “If we give ourselves up, or they get us or me, they will kill me.”[lviii]  It was a prophetic revelation.  Police captured Yusuf alive on 30 July 2009 and summarily executed him while he was in police custody shortly thereafter.  The police executed at least twenty-four suspected Boko Haram members in Maiduguri alone between 28 July and 1 August 2009.[lix]  Yusuf’s father-in-law, Babu Fugu Mohammed, sent a letter to the Borno State governor prior to the attacks warning him of the impending violence.  After the attacks, Babu turned himself in to the local authorities at the behest of his lawyer, and the police promptly shot him dead.[lx]

The government failed to restrain their forces or investigate extrajudicial killings.  In a colossal display of short-sightedness, the Information Minister said that Yusuf’s murder was, “the best thing that could have happened to Nigeria.”[lxi]  The Nigerian government learned a lesson that the United States would learn years later after the raid on Abbottobad: killing the leader does not always kill the organization.  The government’s brutality validated all of Yusuf’s teachings and turned him into a martyr.  Boko Haram went underground for about a year, but then they reemerged with a vengeance in 2010 under the leadership of Yusuf’s more extreme protégé, Abubakar Shekau.

Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram attacks have increased in frequency, scope, and sophistication every year since 2010.  Government forces continue to answer violence with violence.  The government holds suspects indefinitely without charges or trials.  They execute suspects, burn homes, torture detainees, and use rape as a weapon.  Human Rights Watch estimated in 2012 that government forces caused as many casualties as Boko Haram.[lxii]  Today, the jihad of Boko Haram is in danger of transitioning to a full-fledged local insurgency under the banner of the Islamic State.  Boko Haram continues to rely on government brutality to recruit and sustain its membership.  In 2012, Shekau stated, “Everyone has seen what the security personnel have done to us.  Everyone has seen why we are fighting them.”[lxiii]  Government oppression continues to fuel the false jihad of Boko Haram.

The Nigerian ulama, unlike the Somali ulama, quickly attacked Boko Haram publicly with fatwas and statements.  The Nigerian ulama challenged the legitimacy of Boko Haram’s ideology even before the violent outbreaks.  The salafist Ja’far Adam publicly attacked Yusuf’s ideology and Islamic pedigree.[lxiv]  Muslim leaders like the Sultan of Sokoto labeled Boko Haram members as common criminals.  The prominent Nigerian cleric, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Islam Ibra him, issued the most damning fatwa in 2012.  Dr. Ibrahim said, “Terrorism, in its very essence, is an act that symbolizes infidelity and rejection of what Islam stands for…Only the victims of ignorance, jealousy, and malice go for militancy.  Islam declares them rebels.  They will abide in hell.”[lxv]  The global ummah was largely silent on Boko Haram until they kidnapped two-hundred school girls in April 2014, and today the homes for sale by owner macon ga ummah universally condemns Boko Haram.

The ulama across the Muslim world are finally awakening to the dangers of jihadi-salafism and the threat that groups like Al Shabaab and Boko Haram pose to the world at large.  The issue is that the ulama will often condemn atrocities, but refuse to condemn the individuals who committed those atrocities.  A former Kuwaiti official lamented in 2004 that the ulama did not issue a single fatwa calling for Bin Laden’s death.[lxvi]  There is bitter struggle within Islam between the educated ulama and unqualified criminals for the authority to issue fatwas.  If charismatic leaders with scant Islamic educations like Yusuf can issue religious rulings with no repercussions, then the system of Islamic jurisprudence is threatened with irrelevance.  A true Islamic education is a powerful for force for counter-radicalization, which is why few jihadi-salafist leaders are true members of the ulama.[lxvii]  The ulama must wage relentless jihad against the legitimacy and ideology of jihadi-salafism in order to take the narrative of Islam back from the hands of criminals and psychopaths.

Muslim democrats are also leading the ideological fight against jihadi-salafism.  Abdullahi Al-Naim adovcates a return to the Islam of the Meccan period.  “Meccan Islam” puts a premium on reasoning, the peaceful celebration of God, and upholding the moral responsibilities of the faithful.[lxviii]  A return to the Islam of the Meccan period would also open the gates of ijtihad, which is critical because this would give the ulama the right to apply logic and reasoning to modernize the applications of Islam.  Without ijtihad unqualified terrorists will continue to deliberately manipulate and misapply Sharia by exploiting loop-holes to justify bloodshed.

Misapplying Sharia is not uncommon, and cunning, charismatic leaders like Yusuf can selectively edit the Quran or Hadith to justify almost any action.  This is not a new trend.  In the home remedy for sunburn around eyes century the Islamic scholar Ibn Qayyim Al Jawziyya made an observant that remains relevant today: “As for the fanatics, they can place any problem upside down.  When they turn to the Sunnah they borrow only what corresponds to their pronouncements and contrive tricks to push away evidence that does not suit them.”[lxix]

There are true heroes within the ranks of the ulama, but not enough to turn to tides of this ideological war.  Jamal Al Banna actively disputes the ideology of his brother and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al Banna.  Jamal compares the militant Islamists today to the Kharijites who killed the Caliphs Uthman and Ali.[lxx]  El Fadl, Al Na’im, and Qadri are among the ulama who aggressively undermine the legitimacy of jihadi-salafism, and the jihadi-salafists who continue to commit heinous crimes in the name of Islam.  The Islamic State conducts mass executions, sells captured girls into a life of sexual slavery, and destroys ancient relics all while waving a black flag emblazoned with the name of God.  The question is, will mainstream, moderate Muslims confront these corruptions, or will they continue to let a bloodthirsty band of radicals define Islam for the non-Muslim world?

Jihadi-salafism is an Islamic problem, and it requires an Islamic solution.  Dr. Ibrahim, when speaking of Boko Haram, said, “They are in the minority in the Muslim ummah, but as is often the case, such forces are always the most vocal.  It is time now in our dear country for the voice of the majority who have always been against extremism and terrorism to move away from silence and let their voices be heard.”[lxxi]  If the majority remains silent, then it is likely violence will continue to escalate and transcend international borders, as it has most recently in France and Kenya.  Eventually the non-Muslim world, be it France, Russia, or the United States, will seek to impose a non-Muslim solution through the force of arms.  This will only add more fuel to an already blazing fire.  Will the ummah respond?

The opinions expressed in this article are solely the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of theU.S. Army or Department of Defense.

Bibliography

Ademowo, Adeyemi Johnson. Boko Haram, Peace Culture, and the Quest for a United Boko haram suspected financier executed. Ibadan: Ayomide, 2012.

Afsaruddin, Asma. Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Albin-Lackey, Chris. Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by Al Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010.

Anonymous, “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram.” Journal of Religion in Africa 42 (2012).

Bar, Shmuel. Warrant for Terror: Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of the Jihad. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Inc., 2006.

Bodansky, Yoseff. Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 20.

Dennan, Shane. Constructing Takfir: From Abdullah Azzam to Djamel Zitouni. Available from: https:www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/constructing-takfir-from-abdullah-azzam-to-djamel-zitouni

november 2020 holiday packages, Anne-Marie. Saladin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.

Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. The Islamic Shari’ah of Jihad. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Sciences, 2005.

Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

Harnischfeger, Johannes. Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria. New York: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Harper, Mary. “Somali Islamic Scholars Denounce Al-Shabaab in Fatwa.” BBC, 2013. Available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24057725

Ibrahim, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Islam. Fatwa on Boko Haram Suicide Bombing and Other Terrorist Activities in Nigeria. Available from: http://saharareporters.com/2012/01/20/fatwa-%E2%80%98boko-haram%E2%80%99-suicide-bombing-and-other-terrorist-activities-nigeria

Kalin, Ibrahim. War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad. Jordan: Institute for the Study of Islam, 2013.

Kelsay, John. Arguing the Just War in Islam. London: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Phillips, Jonathan. Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades. New York: Random House, 2009.

Shay, Shaul. Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction, 2008.

Turner, John A. Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi-Jihadism and the International Order. England: Macmillan, 2014.

Ukanah, Philip Oluwole. In God’s Name: The Story of Nigeria’s Religious War and its Brutal Killings. Ibadan: Divine Press, 2011.

Vidino, Lorenzo. “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict.” African Security 3.4 (2010): 216-238.

Williams, Daniel. Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012.

End Notes


[i]    John A. Turner, Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi-Jihadism and the International Order (England: Macmillan, 2014), 105.

[ii]  John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 175.

[v]  Asma Afsaruddin, Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Aol reset email password Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10.

[vi]  Ibrahim Kalin, War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad (Jordan: Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought, 2013), 61.

[viii]  Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: Fawtas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Inc., 2006), 3.

[ix]  David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkely: University of California Press, 2005), 20.

[x]  Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, The Islamic Shari’ah of Jihad (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Sciences, 2005), 1.

[xxi]  Jonathan Phillips, Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades (New York: Random House, 2009), 135.

[xxii]  Anne-Marie Edde, Saladin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 272.

[xxiii]  Shaul Shay, Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration (London: Transaction, 2008), 49.

[xxiv]  Stig Jarle Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012 (New York: Columbia University press, 2013), 63.

[xxv]  Available from: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/280847/Ibn-Taymiyyah

[xxxii]  Chris Albin-Lackey, Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by Al Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), 22.

[xxxvii]  Yoseff Bodansky, Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

[xxxviii]  Lorenzo Vidino, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict,” African Security 3.4 (2010), 216-238.

[xlv]  Adeyemi Johnson Ademowo, Boko Haram, Peace Culture, and the Quest for a United Nigeria (Ibadan: Ayomide, 2012), 21.

[xlvii]  Daniel Williams, Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012), 27.

[xlix]  Johannes Harnischfeger, Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria (New York: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 196.

[lii]  Hamischfeger, 155.

[lvii]  Philip Oluwole Ukanah, In God’s Name: The Story of Nigeria’s Religious War and Its Brutal Killing (Ibadan: Divine Press, 2011), 251.

[lxiv]  Anonymous, “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram,” Journal of Religion in Africa 42 (2012): 122. 

[lxv]  Dr. Muhammad Abdul Islam Ibrahim, Fatwa on Boko Haram Suicide Bombing and Other Terrorist Activities in Nigeria. Available from: http://saharareporters.com/2012/01/20/fatwa-%E2%80%98boko-haram%E2%80%99-suicide-bombing-and-other-terrorist-activities-nigeria 

[lxvii]  Shane Drennan, Constructing Takfir: From Abdullah Azzam to Djamel Zitouni. Available from: https:www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/constructing-takfir-from-abdullah-azzam-to-djamel-zitouni 

About the Author(s)

Daniel Pesature

Major Daniel Pesature, U.S. Army, is a foreign area officer specializing in the Middle East and North Africa.  He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 2005 and recently earned a Master of International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.  Major Pesature is currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Comments

Источник: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/justifying-jihad-a-case-study-of-al-shabaab-and-boko-haram
October, 2018 367 In the past administration of Goodluck Jonathan so many officers were indicted of sabotaging the fight with their conduct while others were accused of deliberately diverting funds meant for the welfare of the soldiers at the war front. There are several other allegations especially america first credit union hours bordering on the Arms procurement scandal (DasukiGate) where all the immediate past service chiefs, National Security Adviser (NSA) and other prominent personalities were implicated. There were also allegations and counter-allegations on why Boko-Haram seemed to be highly successful in all its operations at the expense of the civil populace and the military at the forefront. While the government blamed some members of its cabinet for sabotaging its efforts with the claims that Boko-Haram had successfully infiltrated all organs and arms of government; the army also accused some of the officers of its woes and many failures based on allegations of leakage of sensitive information to the sect. This claim was substantiated following the alarm raised by the Nigerian Army and the Defence headquarters claiming that more than fifteen senior military officers including ten generals have been tried and found guilty of giving information and ammunition to members of the dreaded Islamist. There was also allegation of Western countries with the USA at the lead position frustrating Nigeria's effort by its refusal to sell arms to the government while conspiring with other governments not to do same boko haram suspected financier executed the premise that Nigeria was excessively violating human rights and committing war crimes against civilians instead of fighting the insurgent group–Boko-Haram. It is a fact that "corruption" is one of the reasons the fight against Boko-Haram onslaught is still lingering even though emerging reports have shown that Nigeria is gradually winning the war. This paper seeks to examine the rise of the insurgent group Boko-Haram; how the three identified types of corruption escalated the sect’s activities; the involvement of International communities, Nigerian agencies and the military in some of the recognized corrupt practices. The overall purpose of this presentation is to show how corruption has negatively influenced the fight against insurgency repeatedly.

Keywords

Terrorism, Insurgency, Corruption, Boko-Haram

An Overview of Boko-Haram’s Insurgency

Some Nigerians have reasons to believe that Boko-Haram is an offshoot of Maitatsine an Islamist sect which wielded dominance in northern Nigerian states of Kano, Bauchi (present-day Gombe) and Maiduguri in the 1980s. For them, the uncle of the founder of the Boko-Haram sect Mohammad Yusuf was one of the top commanders of Maitatsine sect. He narrowly escaped Kano [1] during the state's military onslaught on the sect and decided to settle in Maiduguri. Mohammad Yusuf grew up under his uncle’s tutelage. Maitatsine was said to be responsible for series of attacks from 1980 to 1985 which claimed the lives of approximately eight thousand Nigerians. The sect engaged in maiming, raping, killing, burning of houses, looting and so on with the aid of bows and arrows, Dane guns, charms and leopard skins which served as bulletproof vests. Despite its weapons not being sophisticated per se, it achieved overwhelming success in most of its operations. It is important to note that the activities of this group continued even after the death of its founder and leader-Alhaji Mohammad Marwa who migrated from northern Cameroon to Kano in 1945 [1].

Back to Boko-Haram, its official name which is Arabic-"Jama'atu Ahilis Sunna Lidda'awati Walijihad –meaning People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad” [2]. The group which was founded in 2002 by late Mohammad Yusuf promoted a version of Islam which makes it an abomination (haram) for Muslims to take part in any political, social, or economic activities linked to Western best bank cd rates in ny. By 2009 it launched its first military operations aimed at creating an Islamic state. The United States later in 2013 designated the group as a “terrorist organization” in the face of fears and that the group has established operational contacts with other terrorist groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to wage a global war. The leadership of the sect Abubakar Shekau later pledged its allegiance to the Islamist State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) turning its back on al-Qaeda. With ISIS acceptance of Boko-Haram’s loyalty, the territories under its control were named the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) making it a part of the global caliphate it sought to establish [2].

By August 2016, the video of ISIS announcing the replacement of Shekau with Abu Musab al-Barnawi who is believed to be the son of late Mohammad Yusuf emerged. That video was one of the indications that Shekau’s relationship with ISIS was not as cordial as initially thought [2]. The kidnap of 276 Chibok school girls in 2014 sparked global outrage which saw the likes of Michelle Obama, David Cameron and other notable world leaders joining the “Bring Back Our Girls Campaign” a movement started by Obiageli Ezekwesili [3,4]. Though Shekau announced his intention to sell the girls into slavery but by Saturday 6 May 2017, government Ministers confirmed the release of eighty two Chibok girls in exchange for five Boko-Haram Commanders detained in various Nigeria Prisons [5]. Boko Haram's demands have primarily remained local, and the insurgency has fed on poverty, hopelessness, and unemployment in northern Nigeria. Again, finding-Boko Haram leaders who could legitimately negotiate a peace deal on behalf of the group has been a significant challenge [6].

So, can Boko-Haram be regarded as an insurgent group? Yes! The reason is anchored on what constitutes “insurgency?” the term is applied to any such armed uprising, typically guerrilla in character, against the recognized government of a state or country [7]. Insurgency is best defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow or destruction of a constituted government through the use of subversion, espionage, terrorism and armed conflict. Terrorism which is not an end in itself can be a subset of an insurgency, or it can be an act of violence by criminals or crazies who want to strike out at anyone especially a government [1,8]. It is important to note that insurgency takes different forms such as–defensive, reactionary and subversive, resource-based, apolitical, economic, commercial and spiritual, revolutionary separatist resistance, criminals, global Islamist, radical Islamist etc. [9]. Boko-Haram terrorist group can be classified under the radical Islamist emanating from the fact that Islam never underwent any reformation which ushered in secular political thoughts. The two variants of this form of the insurgency are the Shia and the Sunni. That terrorism is often mentioned vis-à-vis insurgency with insurgency capable of utilizing terrorism as one of its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) is also noteworthy [9].

What then is terrorism? The term terrorism was coined during the French Revolution and the Jacobean reign of terror [10]. There is currently no consensus on the definition of ‘terrorism' even as different member nations of United Nations have continued to call for the need for one generally accepted definition which should be the first requirement for understanding, initiating and winning the war against terror [10]. Words have meanings, and the term "terrorism" has been used promiscuously for a long time now [11]. For NATO, Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments happy state bank lockney societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives [2,12]. The FBI, on the other hand, aligns itself with the definition of terrorism as defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civil population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." It went further to identify and recognize two basic types of terrorism based on origin as ‘domestic' and ‘international' [12]. The two definitions are similar since they both accepted the unlawful use of violence and coercion in the actualization of both political and sociological objectives. However, the definition by NATO is more sacrosanct with this presentation because it recognizes religious or ideological goal which is what the Boko-Haram sect is pursuing.

Corruption and its Effects on Escalated Insurgency in N/E Nigeria

Transparency International has defined corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gains [13]. There are several other definitions of corruption, but the one by Transparency International stands out because of its ability to classify corruption into grand, petty and political corruptions. In other words, the definition by TI is quite comprehensive and covers all class of persons and institutions. An in-depth analysis of these forms of corruption shows that corruption cuts across class in the society and not a concept that should be tied to the elite public office holders alone. Escalating insurgency in N/E Nigeria is examined based on these identified types of corruption.

Grand Corruption and Insurgency

This type of corruption consists of acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies or central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of public good [14]. There have been insinuations from different quarters that Nigeria may never witness the end to Boko-Haram insurgency since some elites have designated the fight against "insurgency" as one of the ways of making quick and cool money. In other words, once Boko-Haram becomes a "history," their guaranteed source of income is automatically cut-off. It is geld overmaken naar creditcard ics to state that the recent report by Transparency International (TI) on "how military officials are benefiting from the fight against Boko-Haram lends credence to these emerging insinuations." The position of TI in the report was that corrupt military officials had taken advantage of the situation to create and award non-existent and fraudulent contracts to themselves and their cronies while the Federal Government and the victims of the insurgency are counting theirs loses. The proceeds of these unlawful gains are laundered in the UK, USA and elsewhere around the world. This has been noted as one of the factors weakening the country’s efforts in the fight against insurgency [15].

There is need to cast our minds back to the killing of Alhaji Buji Foi, an alleged Boko-Haram sponsor who was executed 24 hours after the sect's founder Mohammad Yusuf was executed. Surprisingly, Foi had served in various capacities as a public officer which includes being a two-time local government chairman in Borno and the Commissioner responsible for religious affairs in the first tenure of Senator Ali Modu Sheriff (SAS) as the governor of Borno state. Though it wasn't clear what his grouse were, he succeeded in using his position walmart hours near me tomorrow the state to provide shelter and other necessaries for members of Boko-Haram sect [16]. Sometime in 2012, Chief of Army Staff General Azubuike Ihejirika (retd.), Senator Ali Modi Sheriff and an unknown senior officer of the Central Bank of Nigeria were implicated as being complicit in the operations of Boko-Haram sect. This was a stunning disclosure by Dr. Stephen Cheapoair com customer service number an independent negotiator who claimed that the chief sponsors of the sect are politicians who channeled their funds through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to make their transaction look legitimate. However, these allegations were dismissed with a wave of the hand by Jonathan's administration on the premise that it was geared at tarnishing the image of his administration especially with the implication of his Army Chief and CBN [17].

In a way that may be seen as a deliberate attempt to further prove Ali Modi Sherrif's involvement with the sect, a former Commissioner for Justice and Attorney General of Borno state accused Sheriff of being responsible for Boko- Haram's insurgency. He went on to depose forty reasons to corroborate his claims. Chief among his reasons was that Sherrif as the Chief Security Officer of the state did nothing to secure the release of Mohammad Yusuf even though he was aware that he was i love you quotes for her pinterest to be executed by the police. The reason he may have done that was not farfetched according to the commissioner- he didn't want Yusuf to make a public confession which would have included his claims of being betrayed by Sherrif. The former governor again tendered an unreserved apology to the sect on 5th July 2011 for any wrongdoings. So why was the apology rendered if he did nothing that exacerbated the activities of the sect? [2,18]

Subsequently, the National Security Adviser (NSA) to Jonathan who 1st united services credit union san leandro later replaced by Sambo Dasuki at a conference maintained that Boko-Haram insurgency has continued to escalate due to the non-inclusive kind of politics played by the ruling PDP in the Northeast. For him, the issue of violence did not increase in any way until Jonathan declared his intentions to seek re-election in the second term. But in sharp contrast, Senator Godswill Akpabio stated that Northern Nigeria has produced the Presidents of the country consistently for more than 35 years and wondered why poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance should still be dominant and prevalent in the region. In other words, insurgency for him was as a result of poor quality leadership which predates Jonathan's regime [2,19]. For President Jonathan, the most significant challenge in the fight against insurgency lies in the fact that the sect had infiltrated the Executive, Legislative and Judicial arms of government and even the Armed Forces [20].

Upon the swearing in President Buhari in May 2015, one of the first arrests made by his government was the arrest of a former NSA to Jonathan–Colonel Dasuki Sambo (retd.) in the celebrated arms deal scandal that was later tagged “DasukiGate.” Dasuki was arrested for allegedly stealing $2.1bn earmarked for arms procurement-this was according to an investigative report that indicted him [20]. In the course of Dasuki’s incarceration which is still on-going, over fifteen top Nigerian politicians were implicated for different degrees of reasons while more persons are likely to get entangled in the DasukiGate web as the trial continues. Nevertheless, Dasuki has continued to insist that he was never invited by any investigative panel but was indicted even before his side of the story could be heard [21,22]. That is contrary to the rules of “Natural Justice” and better treated from a legal point of view. By April 2016, reports emerged on allegations by western media that President Buhari has channeled UK's aids running into E860m meant for the fight against Boko-Haram to the persecution of perceived political opponents from Jonathan's regime which was tantamount to the "misuse" of resources [2,23].

Another side to corruption in the fight against insurgency is the linkage of senior military officers to the squandering the monies meant for the welfare of the rank and files while allowing cod press f to pay respects to face Boko-Haram at their peril. Some of the soldiers in the field claimed in a corroborated account that their monthly allowances were slashed by 50% and that their benefit is sometimes delayed for several months. Aside from the issues of monthly stipends, they are also poorly fed and finds it difficult to get sufficient drinking water which leaves them dehydrated for most parts of the day [24]. One of the Police officers on a joint task force mission in Nigeria's N/E once told the Voice of America that they were meant to confront the insurgent group that confronts them with over 1000 bullets on a daily basis with just 30 bullets. Any officer that required more of the bullets will have to give kickbacks (bribes) to get them [25].

International Dimension to Grand Corruption in the Fight Against Insurgency in Nigeria

In 2014, Nigeria’s Ambassador to the United States expressed concerns about the US refusal to help the Nigerian government procure the ammunition needed to fight Boko-Haram. The High Commissioner stated that Nigerians are disappointed with the scope, nature, and content of US support in its fight against Insurgency [26]. Though another report emerged that the US refusal was based on the fact that the government of the day had refused to probe an unnamed service chief implicated in money laundry in the United States [27]. But what has one thing got to do with another in this instance given the many lives at stake? In May 2016 New York Times Editorial prevailed on Barrack Obama to block the sale republic bank liberty tax warplanes to Buhari’s government citing human rights violations [27].

The seizure of $9.3 million meant for arms procurement by South African Board Authorities and a subsequent seizure by South Africa of $5.7 million transferred by Societe D’Equipment’s Internationale of Nigeria to South Africa Arms Company, Cerberus Risk Solutions for same procurement of arms is still in public domain [28]. Though these funds were later released, but not after due process according to South African authorities [29]. The occasioned delay in the release constituted a major setback in the fight against insurgency and underscored Governor Kashim Shettima’s claim that Boko-Haram is more equipped and motivated than Nigerian troops [29].

Another report has it that the USA and its allies have not responded as expected in the fight against insurgency in Nigeria. The feeling in government quarters is that the USA, UK, France, Canada have always pledged support in the fight against insurgency but ends up not delivering on that mandate. A classic example was when some foreign experts were brought in by the Nigerian government to help track the whereabouts' of abducted Chibok girls and also aid in ensuring their safe return. These experts were celebrated to high heavens because they claimed to know where the girls were located but eventually turned around to say that their mission was to provide Nigeria Information on how the girls can be rescued not to rescue the girls per se. This was coming after they were granted permission to explore Nigeria's airspace [30]. "That means that while they were in Nigeria using their satellite equipment and drones to scan the country if they saw Boko-Haram's convoy passing or the sect maiming innocent Nigerians, they will do nothing about it because they were only observing" a senior military officer asked [31].

Petty Corruptions and Insurgency

Petty corruption refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low and mid-level public officials in their interaction with ordinary citizens, who are often trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police department and other agencies [31]. Looking at the cadre that this type of corruption covers makes it clear that this type of corruption will thrive more within the military's rank and file. An unmotivated officer is a sad officer who will never give his best because of low morale. It is quite easy for these neglected officers to join forces with Boko-Haram in desperate boko haram suspected financier executed for survival [5]. Many of them have been court-martialed for sabotaging the fight by running away on sighting the sect members. I don't call that sabotage I call that ‘being witty.' What else is expected of the soldiers when they have seen how their injured colleagues were completely abandoned by the military? It's even worse when a soldier dies in active service, and his family is abandoned without a befitting burial and care for the family left behind in the course of active service. I don't regard this scenario as "corrupt practice" in any way - I call it ‘self-defence' a right which the vulnerable field officers are entitled to [6].

Helping Boko-Haram in the sale of cattle gotten from rustling is what I call ‘corruption.' I also call the Leakage of sensitive operational information to Boko Haram ‘corruption.' In 2016, the Theatre Commander of operation Lafiya Dole confirmed the arrest of thirty persons helping Boko-Haram sect to sell rustled cows [31]. Of these persons, four were from the military which comprises- a Captain in charge of a Battalion, a lieutenant, Staff Sergeant and a Guard Commander [32]. After the attack on a military location in Gashiga in 2016, Military Spokesperson stated that a total boko haram suspected financier executed 32 persons were in custody for allegedly sabotaging the on-going military operations in Northeast [33].

Political Corruption and Insurgency

The fight against insurgency in Nigeria has no doubt been undermined to a large extent by the military and police in conflict hotspots like the Lake Chad Basin, the Middle Belt, and the Niger Delta [34]. Political corruption is a manipulation of policies, Institutions, and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political makers who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth [35]. The two interesting dimensions to this type of corruption from Nigeria’s perspective is the connection of the former Governor of Borno state-Ali Modi Sherriff to Boko-Haram as its major financier and the claims by the former Coordinating Minister of Nigeria’s Economy and Finance Ngozi Okonjo- Iweala that due process was not followed in the appropriation of Abacha’s loot that was released to the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) for arms procurement.

Major terrorism incidence that require funding include coordination with the military command system-Commander, Administration, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics [36]. However, It is important to keep in mind that terrorism cannot be defeated by military efforts alone [36]. In October 2012, Shuaibu Mohammed Bama who was one of the top ranking commanders of Boko-Haram sect was arrested by the joint military task force in the home of a PDP Senator who also doubled as his uncle. Surprisingly, the senator, Ahmed Zanna denied that Shuaibu was arrested at his residence and insisted that he was captured at the home of the then governor Ali Modi Sherrif. Senator Ahmed Zanna's claims then opened up the floodgate of accusations and counter accusations. Each of the parties in refuting the allegations also accused each other of sponsoring the sect. The State Security Services later released Senator Zanna while Shuaibu remained in detention without any formal legal charge initiated against the duo [37]. This precariousness made it obvious even to the cuckoo that Boko-Haram was budding with the help of prominent politicians at the state and national levels.

The youths in venting their displeasure and anger with the outcome of the case trooped to the house of the then ANPP chairman Alhaji Mala Othman where they succeeded in setting the house ablaze on the claims that he was also part of the sponsors of the sect. Several subsequent attempts were made to burn down the Governor’s residence on the allegation that he (Sherrif) and Othman are joint sponsors of the sect to no avail [8,38]. As sated earlier, the late Alhaji Foi a former Commissioner in the state used his position in government to provide an enabling environment for the sect before his impromptu demise [39]. The arrest and arraignment of Senator Ali Ndume in 2011 and 2013 on an allegation of sponsoring the sect makes the speculations in the public domain that Boko-Haram snowballed into a full-fledged terrorist group based on ostentatious political squabble in Borno state more credible. One of the reasons Senator Ndume was arrested was because the spokesperson of Boko Haram, Ali Sanda Umar Konduga, also known Al-Zawahiri, was arrested at his house. Ali Ndume who stood trial on a four-count charge has since been discharged and acquitted because no prima facie case was established against him [39].

DasukiGate scandal also comes under this category; it is pertinent to keep in mind that most corruption in arms procurement takes the form of bribes or kickbacks. In return for being awarded the contract, often as a result of having selection criteria manipulated in its favor, the supplier company pays bribes to officials involved in the decision-making process. The report that indicted Dasuki and other top military chiefs and politicians shows that the ex NSA awarded fictitious contracts to his cronies, family and associates to the tune of $1.7 billion for the procurement of explosives, arms and ammunition, fighter jets and helicopters that were never delivered [39]. On the other hand, the Central Bank management was ordered by the NSA to transfer the sums of USD 132 million and EUR 9 million respectively to the accounts of a Nigerian company, Societé d'Equipements Internationaux (SEI), without any contract awarded to justify the transfers [40]. At the moment, no one knows for sure the exact amount that was misused/laundered in the DasukiGate deal as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFFC) in 2016 reported that the actual cost of the arms deal transaction amounted to $15b which meant that the initially investigated sum of $2.1b was just a constituent part of the entire transaction [41].

In the recent hearing of the case against Raymond Dokpesi the chairman of DAAR Communications Plc. in March 2018, the Prosecuting counsel told the court that Dokpesi was paid two hundred billion, one hundred and two million nairas for a contract he never executed [42]. Dasuki is insistent that Jonathan ordered him to make all the necessary approvals regarding arms procurement [43]. Jonathan says he has never heard of that sum of money and wondered where it came from [44]. Some persons have also tried to get the former Minister of Finance, and the Coordinator of the Economy Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala entangled in this web for being an accomplice and disbursed funds in the most unprofessional manner, but she has since responded by releasing a memo which is now in public domain. The memo was a proof that she advised that due process is followed in the procurement of arms since she is not a member of the "National Security Council" and will not be in any of its meetings to justify the funds released to the NSA's office [45].

Consolidated and unabated corruption in Nigeria's defense sector has shown to have dire consequences in the frontline. Transparency International's report shows that the conspicuous type of corruption in the military has been the continued use of "security votes,” these are opaque slush funds given to certain federal, state, and local officials totaling over $670 million annually. At the federal level, the number of security votes tucked into the federal budget increased from about thirty in 2016 to over 190 in 2018, and their total value increased from ₦9.3 billion ($46.2 million) to ₦18.4 billion ($51 million). Unaudited, in cash, and exempt from standard procurement rules, most security vote expenditures almost certainly are lost to corruption [46]. Despite sharp increases in ad hoc defense spending since 2011, operations boko haram suspected financier executed the northeast remain hampered by equipment, machinery, and pay shortages. So far, details of the transactions that ensued in DasukiGate are still unfolding. There don't seem to be any comprehensive list yet on the number of persons implicated so far, but a total of about 36 military officers were named in the reports, as well as many government and business figures. The EFCC report also named 241 organizations as recipients of money from Dasuki [47]. However; reports are yet to emerge on secured convictions concerning DasukiGate, though many trials have commenced.

There are also cases of food items donated to IDPs by charitable organizations being diverted by disgruntled elements for their selfish gains. While reports on extremely malnourished Nigeria children in IDP camps continued to dominate news waves, these food items continue to make their way into the open market. Camp Managers have been accused of these sharp practices, the arrest of four police officers for diversion of relieve materials in Adamawa recently underscores the spate of this form of corruption [48]. There are presently series of petitions against the Director General of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and public hearings instituted by the House of Representative Committee on Emergency and Disaster Preparedness where it was revealed that there was over five billion nairas (N5,000,000,000) contract scandal under the management of current DG NEMA Maihaja. He is presently responding to allegations of how boko haram suspected financier executed spent over four hundred million nairas (N400, 000,000.00) Demurrage on donated Chinese Rice. He was also accused of awarding contracts to fake companies that are not qualified for business engagements in Nigeria which included N1 .6bn Flood Victims Fund for 16 States and N3.1bn Food Intervention for victims of Boko Haram in North-East [49].

Conclusions

It is clear from this presentation that Nigeria’s security sector is one of the most corrupt in the world [50]. Nigeria as the giant of Africa is renowned for leading ‘peacekeeping missions’ within the West African Sub-region. It also constitutes an integral part of Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) where it was said to have committed around 70% (about $4b) to ECOMOG operations that helped bring back peace to warring African nations. Nigerian also emerged 5th in the ranking of African nations with realtor homes for rent highest military strength behind South Africa in 2018 [51,52]. These statistics make it hard to fathom why this highly respected and rated military base has continued to suffer unquantifiable embarrassment and humiliation in the fight against Boko-Haram. Why is the military suddenly finding it difficult to replicate its exploits in Liberia and Sierra Leone?

As pointed out in this paper, the answers to these questions are not farfetched. Corruption is no doubt one of the major factors responsible for escalating insurgency by the Islamist sect, and until the multifaceted hydra-headed corrupt practices identified in this paper are dealt with decisively, the actual objective of winning this war may remain a far cry. This calls for concern since the poor tend to be at the receiving end of the adverse effects of corruption. This is because public policies and public resources are for their benefit [53]. For example; most of the people that have lost their lives in the course of Boko-Haram's insurgency are the masses who look up to the government for protection as against the elites who spend whatever it takes to fortify their security and that of their loved ones.

It is excellent news though that Nigeria's outlook improved in the recent Global Terrorism Index (GTI) ranking but more has to be done in ensuring that the safety of every Nigerian and alien's resident in Nigeria is guaranteed by the government. Unfortunately, most of the corrupt practices identified in the fight against insurgency from the past regime are still prevalent in the present dispensation but determining the cause of a problem is the first step in addressing it. Now that these expose' has been made, the onus is on the government to fashion out practical ways of combating the menace holistically. This is necessary because Corruption corrodes the social fabric of the society. It undermines people's trust in the political system, in its institutions and its leadership. A distrustful or apathetic public can become yet another hurdle to challenging corruption [54,55].

Entrenching the core principles of accountability and transparency from the central texas state parks military hierarchy will go a long way in checkmating this menace. Senior management officers will have no choice but to act honestly upon the realization that they are being monitored. The National Assembly also has a significant role to play in this fight by ensuring that its oversight of military operations are in the best interest of Nigerians by acting in utmost good faith because they owe it a duty to the electorate. In other words, they mustn't compromise the confidence reposed in them bank of the west fargo hours the voters. Furthermore, the welfare of junior officers that mortgage their lives daily in the course of this fight must be considered a priority. The soldiers can only deliver on their mandates when they are motivated. Poverty and deprivation are wicked and are some of the reasons many junior officers have decided to join forces with Boko-Haram thereby escalating the crises [12].

References

  1. Abiyami A. The Untold Story of Maitatsine, Nigeria’s Islamist Terror of 1980s and the Grandfather of Boko Haram. Online Nigeria, Nigeria; 2017.
  2. CNN. Who are Nigeria’s Boko-Haram Islamist Sect; 2016.
  3. Birchall G. Who are Boko-Haram, what do the Nigeria City national bank online account group want and who is the leader Abubakar Shekau; 2017.
  4. Bring Back Our Girls; 2018.
  5. Soriwe F. Major, Captain, Others held for leaking Information to Boko Haram. Punch; 2016.
  6. Factsheet: Explaining Boko-Haram and Its Violent Insurgency; 2017.
  7. The Editors. Insurgency. Encyclopedia Britannica; 2018.
  8. Hayden T. What is the difference between insurgency and terrorism. ProCon.org; 2007.
  9. Bunker RJ. Old and New Insurgency Forms of Insurgency; 2016.
  10. Spindlove JR, Simonsen CE. Terrorism today: the past, the players, the future. 4th ed. Pearson Education, New Jersey; 2013.
  11. Harmon CC, Pratt AN, Gorka S. Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism. McGraw-Hill, US; 2011.
  12. International Military Staff. NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism. North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 2016.
  13. Musa N, et al. How military officials benefit from fight against Boko-Haram. The Guardian; 2017.
  14. Nairaland Forum. Boko Haram Suspected Financier Executed-Which Way Nigeria-Politics-Nairaland; 2009.
  15. Ilevbare T. Boko-Haram Sponsors: Beyond Stephen Davis’ 30 year mortgage calculator amortization E. Sherif Provoked Boko Haram Insurgency, says Borno AG; 2016.
  16. Ogala E, Udo B. NSA Azazi Blames PDP for Boko Haram Attacks. Premium Times; 2018.
  17. Idonor D, Latona O. Boko-Haram members are in Government-Jonathan; 2012.
  18. BBC. Nigeria’s Dasuki arrested over $2bn arms fraud; 2015.
  19. Hakeem O. Politicians Linked To $2.1 Billion Arms Deal Scandal; 2016.
  20. Christopher I. Nigeria Using UK Aid to Persecute Buhari’s Foes rather Than Fight Boko-Haram. ThisDay; 2016.
  21. Fulani ID. How Corrupt Army Commanders Undermine the First Against Boko-Haram; 2014.
  22. Ahmed I, Eckel M. In The Home of Peace A Siege of Fear; 2014.
  23. Premium Times. Nigeria Blasts America, Says U.S has Let Nigeria Down in the War against Boko-Haram. 2014.
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  25. Editors. Alleged Human Rights Abuse: Block Sale of Warplanes to Nigeria New York Times Tells Obama. Vanguard, Lagos; 2016.
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  40. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. Dasukigate: Dokpesi did no job for N2.1bn received-Witness; 2018.
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  42. Daniel. I never signed $2bn contract for arms procurement-Jonathan. Nigeria Information; 2015.
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Источник: https://www.rroij.com/open-access/corruption-and-escalating-bokoharam-insurgency-in-nigeria.php?aid=87259

MMP: Boko Haram

Formed: 2002

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: December 24, 2003: Boko Haram members attacked and occupied police stations in Geiam and Kanamma in Yobe State, raising the flag of the Afghanistan Taliban (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[1]

Last Attack: March 2, 2018:  Suspected Boko Haram militants killed at least 11 people including three aid workers in an attack on a military barracks in the town of Rann, in northeastern Borno state near the Cameroon border.[2]

Executive Summary

In 2002, Mohammad Yusuf formed Boko Haram as a Sunni Islamist sect to oppose Western education and establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. The group has carried out numerous attacks since 2009, including the 2011 bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Abuja, but is best known for the 2014 Chibok schoolgirl kidnapping, when the group abducted over 300 young Nigerian girls. Its primary base of operation is northeastern Nigeria, but it has conducted limited operations in Cameroon and Niger. In March 2015, Boko Haram became an affiliate of the Islamic State (IS). In August 2016, leadership struggles led to a split within Boko Haram, pitting the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) against Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS).

Group Narrative

Boko Haram formed in 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf, a well-known preacher and proselytizer of the Izala sect of Islam in the Maiduguri region of Nigeria, began to radicalize his discourse to reject all secular aspects of Nigerian society.

In 2002, Yusuf opened a religious complex with an Islamic school in Maiduguri, Nigeria, which attracted students from poor Muslim families across the country. Yusuf reportedly used the school to convert and recruit future jihadis.[3] Boko Haram expanded into Yobe state, where it set up another base, nicknamed “Afghanistan,” near the Nigeria-Niger border in 2003.[4]

From 2002-2003, a group of Yusuf’s students formed a community near Kanama, Nigeria in order to adhere to Yusuf’s teachings and live outside secular society. Members of this group, dubbed Al Sunna Wal Jamma (Followers of the Prophet’s Teachings) were the first followers of Yusuf to instigate violence against the Nigerian government. This sect was quashed by the Nigerian government in 2003.[5]  In response Boko Haram conducted its first attack, occupying a police station and raising the Afghan Taliban flag.[6]

Before 2009, the group was less politically focused, seeking to separate themselves from secular society. With the Yusuf’s death and increased conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government, Boko Haram came to seek the overthrow of the Nigerian government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

Open conflict erupted in July 2009 following a violent clash between Boko Haram members and the police, when militants refused to adhere to a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. This incident incited violent uprisings in Bauchi and quickly spread to Borno, Yobe, and Kano.[7]  Nigerian military forces killed over 700 in suppressing the uprisings and capturing Yusuf.  Security forces later killed Yusuf, claiming that he had tried to escape.[8]

After meredith village savings bank jobs severe losses in 2009, Boko Haram regrouped in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s second-in-command.[9]  The frequency, lethality, and sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks increased dramatically under Shekau, allegedly as a result of increased cooperation with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). To protest the election of Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from southern Nigeria, Boko Haram carried out a series of bombings during Jonathan’s presidential inauguration in May 2011.[10]  The escalation of violence continued throughout the year, including an attack on the Abuja UN building in August, Boko Haram’s first foreign target.[11]  President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the areas of Yobe, Borno, Plateau, and Niger later that year.[12]

As Boko Haram grew increasingly violent, tensions grew between Mamman Nur, a leader of an independent faction within Boko Haram, and Shekau. In January 2012, members who opposed killing Muslims split off from Boko Haram to form Ansaru. Although Ansaru was originally composed of militants who supported Nur’s leadership over Shekau’s, Nur’s role is unknown.[13]  Ansaru conducted numerous attacks against foreigners in northern Nigeria and its neighbors between 2013 and 2014.[14] Ansaru stopped its attacks around 2014, and authorities captured its leader in 2016, effectively ending its campaign.[15]

Boko Haram became notorious when it kidnapped over 300 young girls from a secular school in Chibok, Nigeria, in April 2014. Just over 50 girls were able to escape immediately after the attack. The Twitter hashtag #BringBackOurGirls inspired several other campaigns on various social media websites in hopes of pressuring the Nigerian government to do more to recover the girls.[16]  In October 2014, the government announced chime bank atm locations it had negotiated a ceasefire with Boko Haram and that the schoolgirls would be released shortly. However, within two weeks of the announcement, Boko Haram released a video in which Shekau repudiated the ceasefire and claimed that the missing girls had already been converted to Islam and were married to Boko Haram members.[17]  The Chibok kidnappings prompted the United States to deploy additional counterterrorism resources to Nigerian law enforcement agencies.[18]

 As of January 2018, 106 girls had been rescued. The Nigerian government negotiated and the International Committee of the Red Cross facilitated the release in exchange for Boko Haram militants.[19]  The girls rescued were found living as wives and mothers among Boko Haram fighters. On January 15, 2018, Boko Haram released a video featuring kidnapped women and the remaining Chibok girls. [20]

In January 2015, Boko Haram unleashed a massive assault on the villages of Baga and Doron Baga in Borno State and claimed control over the area.  Local officials suggested that as many as 2,000 people were killed in these attacks, but the Nigerian government capped the death toll at 150.[21] A few weeks later, militants tried to attack Maiduguri, Borno’s capital city, but government troops prevented the planned takeover.[22] According to the Council on Foreign Relations, by August 2015 more than 16,000 people had been killed and 2.5 million people displaced because of Boko Haram violence.[23]

In response to the threat, the African Bank of america richland wa (AU) endorsed a military coalition to contain and degrade Boko Haram’s activities in Nigeria; they  changed the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to encompass counter-terrorist operations and increased its funding.  Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Benin pledged troops for the 7,500-strong Multinational Joint Task Force. The coalition aimed to protect the Nigerian border and the Lake Chad region but not participate in the conflict within Nigeria. The force deployed on March 6, 2015, and the offensive against Boko Haram began with Chadian and Nigerian airstrikes that drove the organization out of a dozen towns in Northern Nigeria.  As a result of Chadian participation in the MNJTF, Boko Haram began targeting the Chad basin region, torching homes and kidnapping villagers before being pushed back by the Chadian military.[24]

On February 7, 2015, Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced that national elections would be postponed for six weeks in order for security forces to launch an offensive to regain territory controlled by Boko Haram.[25]  Estimates suggested that Boko Haram controlled about 20,000 square miles of territory in northeastern Nigeria. [26] Attacks on civilians continued, including across borders in both Chad and Cameroon.[27]  On March 28, the Nigerian Election Day, Boko Haram killed 41 people in an attempt to keep voters from the polls but millions still voted.[28]

In early March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) in an audio message posted online, featuring Shekau. [29] Reportedly, Boko Haram militants were traveling to train at IS military camps at that time.  When IS accepted the pledge in late March, it referred to Boko Haram as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), a name that subsequently appeared on social media accounts linked to IS.  IS also encouraged Muslims to join Boko Haram and other West African militant groups.[30]  Some analysts argued that the affiliation between Boko Haram and IS was a desperate move by Boko Haram “to boost its members’ morale, image and attract local support” after the African Union coalition force drove the group into the Sambisa Forest.[31]  In April 2015, the Nigerian government considered the offensive against Boko Haram to be in its last stages: Boko Haram controlled no towns, and the coalition was closing in on the Sambisa Forest.[32]

Despite being pushed out of its stronghold, Boko Haram continued operations, often employing suicide bombers to attack civilian, police, and government targets throughout Nigeria.  In March 2016, militants from Boko Haram were reportedly fighting for IS in Libya.[33]

On August 3, 2016, IS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of the founder of Boko Haram, would assume leadership.  Two days later, Shekau responded that Barnawi’s followers were manipulating IS leaders in order to cut him off in a sort of coup and that he and his followers would not follow Barnawi. This dispute reportedly led to splits within Boko Haram.[34]  Barnawi was arrested in late 2016, but the two factions of Boko Haram remained, one known as ISWAP, and the other known as JAS. The media and government typically treated the two splinters as one group.

In late 2016 and early 2017 the number of killings by Boko Haram was significantly reduced, but activity increased again.  Between April and September 2017 there were an estimated 400 deaths.[35] The group remained active in northeast Nigeria, using suicide bombers to attack markets, universities, and displacement camps, and raiding villages. Most attacks were credited to Barnawi and occurred in Nigeria, for example, the 2017 ambush of an oil exploration team from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the reclaim of territory in Borno.[36]  Boko Haram’s escalation in 2017 is attributed to the withdrawal of Chadian forces from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) posted along Lake Chad.[37]

In 2018 the split within Boko Haram persisted. Barnawi continued to lead the Islamic Alj regional holdings stock West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Shekau led Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS). JAS was stronger, more active, and also more transnational in its operations.  Even so, the two groups were ideologically similar, and outside media typically treated them as the same group.



[1] ONuoha, Freedom. “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, June 9, 2014.

[2] Carsten,Paul.Suspected Boko Haram militants kill 11 including three aid workers in Nigeria,” Reuters World News, March 2, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/suspected-boko-haram-militants-kill-11-including-three-aid-workers-in-nigeria-idUSKCN1GE14Z. 

[3] Chothia, Farouk. “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” BBC News. May 20, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501.

[4] Zenn, Jacob. “Boko Haram’s International Connections.” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, Issue 1 Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. January, 2013.

[5] Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, editor. “Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security, and the state in Nigeria,” West African Politics and Society Series, Vol. 2. African Studies Center 2014. 

[6] ONuoha, Freedom. “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, June 9, 2014.

[7] Sergie, Mohammed Aly and Toni Johnson. “Boko Haram.” Council on Foreign Relations. Updated Oct. 7, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739.

[8] Adetunji, Jo. “Bomb attack kills at least 25 in northern Nigeria.” The Guardian. June 26, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/27/nigeria-bombings-terrorist-killings-islamist. 

[9]Chothia, Farouk. “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” BBC News. May 20, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501. 

[10] “Nigeria attacks claimed by Islamist sect Boko Haram.” BBC News.  June 1, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13618775.

[12] “Boko Haram attacks prompt Nigeria state of emergency.” BBC Bok financial denver. Jan. 1, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16373531.   

[13] Raghavan, Sudarsan. “Nigerian Islamist militants return from Mali with weapons, skills.” The Washington Post. May 31, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/nigerian-islamist-militants-return-from-mali-with-weapons-skills/2013/05/31/d377579e-c628-11e2-9cd9-3b9a22a4000a_story.html.

[14] Blanchard, Lauren. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions.” Congressional Research Service. June 10, 2014. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf. Zenn, Jacob. “Nigerian al-Qaedaism” The Hudson Group. March 11, 2014.    https://www.hudson.org/research/10172-nigerian-al-qaedaism.

[15] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru), July 19, 2017.  http://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e3d313.html. 

[16] Kristof, Nicholas. “Bring Back Our Girls.” New York Times. May 3 2014.

[17] “What now after Nigeria’s Boko Haram ceasefire fiasco?” BBC News. Nov. 3, 2014.

[18] Blanchard, Lauren. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions.” Congressional Research Service. June 10, 2014. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf. 

[19] Nigeria Chibok abductions: what we know” BBC News, May 8, 2017. "Chibok Girls: Kidnapped Schoolgirl Found in Nigeria." BBC News, May 18, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32299943

[20] Searcy, Dionne. “Boko Haram Video is Said to Show Captured Girls from Chibok” New York Times, Jan. 15, 2018. https://nyti.ms/2FEQmNp; "Chibok Girls: Kidnapped Schoolgirl Found in Nigeria." BBC News, May 18, 2016. “Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions.” Congressional Research Service. June 10, 2014. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf.

[21] Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Baga Destruction ‘shown in images’.” BBC News. Jan. 15, 2015.

[22] Ola, Lanre and Ardoo Abdullah. “Nigeria repels suspected Boko Haram attack on Maiduguri City.” Reuters. Jan. 25, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/25/us-nigeria-violence-maiduguri-idUSKBN0KY08720150125. 

[23]“ISIS Owns Headlines, but Nigeria’s Boko Haram Kills More than Ever,” NBC News, December 23, 2015 quoting the Council on Foreign Relations https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2015-year-in-review/isis-owns-headlines-nigeria-s-boko-haram-kills-more-ever-n480986.  

[24]Comolli, Victoria “The evolution and impact of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin” Humanitarian Practice Network. Oct 2017. "Nigeria postpones elections, focuses on major offensive against Boko Haram". The Christian Science Monitor. August 18, 2015. 

[25] Nossiter, Adam. “Nigeria Postpones Elections, Saying Security is a Concern.” New York Times. Feb. 7, 2015.  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/world/africa/nigeria-postpones-elections-citing-security-concerns.html?_r=0.

[26] Blair, David. “Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own territory.” The Telegraph. Jan. 10, 2015.

[27] "Boko Haram Goes on Deadly Rampage after Chad Offensive." Al Jazeera America. February 4, 2015.  

[28] “Boko Haram Kills 41 as Millions of Nigerians Vote in Close Presidential Election." CTVNews/AP. March 28, 2015.

[29] "Islamic State 'accepts' Boko Haram's Allegiance Pledge." BBC News. March 13, 2015.

[30] "Analysis: Islamic State Strengthens Ties with Boko Haram." BBC News. April 24, 2015.

[31] Chandler, Adam. "The Islamic State of Boko Haram?" The Atlantic. Mar. 9, 2015.

[32] "Nigerian Military Enter 'Final Stages' of Boko Haram Offensive." Newsweek. April 23, 2015. "Nigerian Troops Rescue More Boko Haram Captives from Forest Redoubt." The Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor. April 30, 2015.

[33] Cooper, Helene. “Boko Haram and ISIS Are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Says.”  The New York Times, April 20, 2016. 

[34] Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Jacob Zenn. "Boko Haram’s Doomed Marriage to the Islamic State." War on the Rocks, Aug. 26, 2016.

[35] “Nigerians fear 'no end in sight' to Boko Haram fight.”  Al Jazeera News, Oct. 1, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/nigerians-fear-sight.

[36] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Nigeria, January 18, 2018. 

[37] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Nigeria Situation, Situational Update - 01-30 November 2017, November 30, 2017. 

Источник: https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram

Four killed, five abducted by suspected Boko Haram insurgents in Borno

Unknown gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram insurgents have killed no fewer than four people and abducted five others ina an ambush along Monguno road in Borno state on Sunday.

The abducted persons include four aid workers and a technician working with a humanitarian agency.

According to witnesses, the attackers mounted a checkpoint at Gasarwa village, about 40 kilometers from Monguno local government area of o the state and operated unchallenged for about two hours.

The attack was also confirmed by a senior military officer who identified himself as Bulama Biu.

Biu said troops had been deployed to clear the area and ensure the safety of other motorists plying the road.

Boko Haram insurgents have in the past abducted aid workers and executed them after a while.

Two weeks ago some abducted aid workers were executed by the sect following claims that the government failed to meet their demands.


Previous PostThe News Room (12pm) Monday, December 23 2019Next PostEdo state fingers political opponents for market fires



Источник: https://www.tv360nigeria.com/four-killed-five-abducted-by-suspected-boko-haram-insurgents-in-borno/

Corruption and Escalating Boko-Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Victoria Nkemdilim Ogbuehi*

Department of Criminal Justice-Law and Public Policy, Walden University, Minneapolis, MN, USA

*Corresponding Author:
Victoria Nkemdilim Ogbuehi
Department of Criminal Justice-Law and Public Policy
Walden University, Minneapolis, MN, USA
Tel: +2348032241449
E-mail:[email protected]

Received date: 20/08/2018; Accepted date: 11/10/2018; Published date: 18/08/2018

Visit for more related articles atResearch & Reviews: Journal of Social Sciences

Abstract

It is no longer news that there has been an insurgency in the operations of Boko-Haram terrorists domiciled in the Northeastern Nigerian state of Borno since the group first struck in 2009. Apart from the mail bomb that claimed the life of Dele Giwa a renowned Nigerian journalist in 1986 military regime of IBB, with a few of such attacks in successive administration of Sani Abacha; Nigerian's had always felt immune to terrorist attacks before the series of bomb blasts that went off in 2009 at the October 1st Independence anniversary of Nigeria presided by President Goodluck Jonathan. No one was certain of the masterminds until the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger- Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility. At that time, however, there was a lot of news on terrorism and insurgency in the mainstream media especially after the September 11, 2001, attack where 19 militants associated with the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda hijacked four airplanes and carried out suicide attacks against targets in the United States. This is a presentation based on findings from doctrinal research on how corruption has Succeeded in inhibiting the fight against Boko-Haram insurgency with emphasis on North-eastern region of Nigeria since it is not just the region where the terrorists are domiciled, it also doubles as the region that has had the most adverse effects of all insurgent attacks put together since the inception of the activities of the Islamic sect (Boko-Haram). There is no doubt that the sect has wreaked havoc and has continued to do so almost unabated which many Nigerian's see as disappointing especially with the hopes that the Buhari's administration will deliver on one of its campaign promises of crushing Boko-Haram within one year in office. Though, the government has been consistent in its claims on severally occasions that the sect has been defeated "technically," Nigerian's are yet to come to terms with the actual meaning of "technical" defeat. Nevertheless, recent statistics from the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2017 underscores the claims by the government that Boko-Haram has been technically defeated. The report revealed that Nigeria recorded the most significant decrease in terrorism with 3100 fewer persons killed in 2016 than in 2015 when the group was rated the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world. Research & Reviews: Journal of Social Sciences JSS

Outrage as FG links Igboho with Boko Haram

THE Federal Government on Friday accused Yoruba Nation agitator, Chief Sunday Adeyemo (Igboho) of having links with financiers of Boko Haram. The Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) and Minister of Justice, Abubakar Malami (SAN), at a press conference in Abuja, disclosed that there were financial transactions between Igboho’s company and someone who has been convicted of financing Boko Haram. 

His allegation drew immediate reactions from Igboho and several groups. Igboho’s lawyer, Chief Yomi Alliyu, SAN, in a prompt reaction, described the AGF’s allegation as a fruitless effort to paint his client as a terrorist. Malami, during the press conference on ‘Investigation Reports on Acts of Terrorism and Allied Offences Perpetrated by Nnamdi Kanu and Report on the Sponsors and Financiers of Sunday Igboho and Associates’ was, however, silent on the identity of a federal first international bank and trust motley mn alleged to be one of the sponsors of Igboho. Malami said the report revealed that Igboho is the owner of a company, Adesun International Concept Limited, through which he received a sum of N127,145,000 from his financier between 22 October, 2013 and 28 September, 2020. 

\The minister told the press conference that a sum of N273,198,200 transaction outflows was recorded from Sunday Igboho’s account between 15 March, 2013 and 11 March, 2021. 

He said the report, which had been submitted go the Federal Government, found connections of financial transaction between Adesun International Concept Ltd and some construction companies, businesses, among others. 

He said investigations revealed that that Adesun International Concept Ltd, registered on 23 April, 2010, transferred N12,750,000 to Abbal Bako & Sons, which is allegedly being probed for terrorism financing activities. “It might be recalled that Abbal Bako & Sons and its promoter, Abdullahi Umar Usman, are suspects in the ongoing joint terrorist financing investigation. Abdullahi Umar Usman is, by way of financial transaction, connected to Surajo Abubakar Muhammad who was sentenced to life imprisonment in UAE on charges of financing terrorism (Boko Haram),” Malami disclosed. 

But in a statement issued on Friday, Alliyu challenged the AGF to name the lawmaker allegedly financing Igboho, threatening that the Minister of Justice would be slammed with “exemplary damages for defamation.” 

The statement titled ‘Chief Sunday Igboho is a businessman, not a terrorist’, signed by Igboho’s lawyer reads: “Our attention has been drawn to the text of a press conference by the Attorney General and Minister of Justice wherein he fruitlessly tried to paint our client and those his car trade as terrorists and/or financiers of terrorists. 

“I have gone through the text. Sunday was alleged to have transferred the sum of N12.7 million to Abbal Bako & Sons owned by Abdullahi Umar. Transferring money to bureau de change to buy dollars is what is done by every businessman of our client’s calibre. Thank God that his passports and various bills of ladings were carted away by the DSS during the ungodly invasion of 1st July, 2021. 

“Thus, so far, there is no evidence of receipt of money from Abbal Bako & Sons or Abdullahi Umar, going by the text of the press conference. What the Hon AGF stated are mere conjectures, not hard facts. Our client, according to him, paid Umar and not vice versa, thus belying what the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation earlier said that Chief Sunday Adeyemo is being financed by some people. The picture the learned AGF wanted to paint is that our client is being financed by Abdullah Umar, allegedly involved in terrorism financing. Who is now financing whom? 

“Again, Chief Adeyemo is a car dealer trading in the name of Adesun International Concept Ltd. Does it mean that anybody buying cars from him or selling cars to him is a terrorist? 

“Chief Sunday Adeyemo, a.k.a. Igboho Oosa, was not into Oodua Nation until last year. So, finding over N273 million turnover (in his account) between October 2013 and September 2020 shows that he was not a poor man. 

His house invaded by DSS on 1st July, 2020 is worth over N2 billion. “I challenge the Honourable AGF to mention the lawmaker that sent money to Chief Sunday Adeyemo for terrorist acts whether he would not be damnified in exemplary damages for defamation. “Up till date, our client has not been prosecuted or found liable for any criminal act or terrorism. There is also a valid and subsisting court judgment that agitation for self-determination is not an act of terrorism but a fundamental human right of any citizen. 

“My learned brother silk and Honourable AGF knows that suspicion, boko haram suspected financier executed matter how great, cannot grant conviction. “Chief Sunday Adeyemo i s not a terrori st bu t a campaigner for selfdetermination.” 

Also, Malami, during the press conference, said leader of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Nnamdi Kanu, who, according to him, has been at the centre of a subversive campaign against the Nigerian state, was arrested o n 1 4 October, 2015 and charged to court for treasonable felony, among other crimes. 

The minister claimed that Kanu was granted bail by on 25 April, 2017 but he breached the bail conditions and fled abroad, from where he intensified his campaign, using online Radio Biafra to instigate violence and incite members of IPOB to commit violent attacks against civil and democratic institutions, particularly security personnel, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and civilians. 

As a result of these criminal activities, Malami said IPOB was proscribed and designated a terrorist ealizetion by a Federal High Court in Abuja in an order made on 20 September, 2017 and despite the proscription, Kanu continued the subversive campaign, instigating and inciting broadcasts to direct members of the IPOB to launch attacks on the government. 

The minister said: “The EndSARS protests of October 2020 played into the sinister plans of Nnamdi Kanu, whereby he seized the protests through subversive and inciting online broadcasts and actively commanded and directed attacks on security personnel and facilities. 

“As a result of these broadcasts, members of IPOB attacked and killed security personnel and burnt down police stations, correctional centres, INEC offices, bus terminals, the palace of the Oba of Lagos, banks, hospitals, shopping malls, vehicles, among others. 

“On 12th December, 2020, Eastern Security Network (ESN) was formed by Nnamdi Kanu as an armed wing of IPOB with the mandate to advance the nefarious agenda of the outlawed group.” 

According to Malami, the destructive activities of IPOB/ ESN pose serious threat to Nigeria’s national security and its corporate existence, which led to the re-arrest of Kanu and members of his group in June and followed by the inauguration of a 24-member presidential adhoc committee. He said between October 2020 and June 2021, 175 security personnel were killed by IPOB/ESN, aside from the murder of traditional leaders, Obi I of Okwudor autonomous c ommunityEze E. Anayochukwu Durueburuo and Eze Sampson Osunwa of Ihebineowerre autonomous community as well as Dr Chike Akunyili and eight others. 

“As a consequence of Nnamdi Kanu’s broadcasts, there were 19 attacks on INEC facilities that resulted in the destruction of offices as well as burning of 18 INEC logistical vehicles, several election materials, equipment and  ICT gadgets in Abia, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Cross River, Enugu, Ebonyi and Imo states, among other destructions by the group. 

He disclosed that 396 firearms and 17,738 ammunition were carted away during the IPOB/ESN attacks on the Nigerian Correctional Service, Owerri, Imo State, where 1,841 inmates escaped. “We have also established that Kanu is not alone in his subversive activities. He has accomplices in Nigeria and abroad, individuals and groups as well as state amazon prime stock price non-state actors who are aiding and facilitating his campaign against the people and state of Nigeria. “Some of the state actors aided Kanu, even as a fugitive, in his destructive  m i s s i o ni g n o r i n g t h e terrorist nature of his activities,” best website to buy used cars online said and called on the countries to desist from aiding subversive acts by Kanu and IPOB against Nigeria and its people. 

Kanu didn’t kill Akunyili, others –IPOB

However, IPOB has debunked Malami’s allegations that its leader, Kanu, was the sponsor of the killing of Dr Chike Akunyili and numerous other people in the South East. 

According to the group, all destructions and killings in the zone were politically motivated and carried out by security agents recruited and dubbed unknown gunmen. IPOB spokesperson, Emma Powerful, in a statement he released after the AGF’s press conference in Abuja, said “the so-called unknown gunmen were set up to implicate IPOB and ESN as IPOB and ESN have no hands in the killings in Biafraland.” 

Ohanaeze, PANDEF ask FG to face bandits, herdsmen 

Meanwhile, the Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF) has challenged the Federal Government to investigate and expose sponsors of terrorists across the North and killer-herdsmen across the South as it has “swiftly and painstakingly done” in the cases of Kanu and Ighoho. 

The apex socio-cultural group of the South-South said while Kanu and Ighoho are not the problems of Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari’s “unhidden attitude of nepotism and bias” on national issues is the actual problem confronting the country. 

Reacting to the Friday press conference addressed by Malami detailing alleged destructive activities of Kanu and Ighoho as well as their sponsors, the National Publicity Secretar y of PANDEF, Mr Ken Robinson, told Saturday Tribune that Malami had never presented himself as the AttorneyGeneral and Minister of Justice of the Federation but that of the Fulani caliphate.

Ohanaeze 

The Ohanaeze Ndigbo Worldwide warned the Fedetral Government to raymour and flanigan credit card pay by phone the deployment of any fighter jets in the South-East ahead of the governorship election in Anambra State to avoid the reopening of the experiences of the Biafra war. Ohanaeze gave the warning in a statement signed by its Secretary General, Okechukwu Isiguzoro, after reviewing the details of the press conference addressed by AGF Malami on Friday. 

According to Ohanaeze, bandits that shot down military aircraft and shot at Abuja/Kaduna train are the real terrorists and should be declared as such before any deployment in the SouthEast. The group urged the Federal Government to give the IPOB leader, Kanu, a fair trial in court. 

South East youth group, COSEYL 

Similarly, the Coalition of South East Youth Leaders (COSEYL) called on AGF Malami to address the killings by Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram terrorists which it said are the real issues staring the country in the face. 

In a statement in Owerri, Imo State, on Friday by its President General, Goodluck Ibem, COSEYL said if the attention the Federal Government had paid to Kanu and Igboho was also paid to killer-herdsmen and terrorists, the issue of insecurity would have been a thing of the past in the country. 

Afenifere carpets Malami over claims on Igboho

Also, the pan-Yoruba socio-political organisation, Afenifere, knocked the AGF for implying that Sunday Igboho was being sponsored for terrorism in Nigeria. Afenifere, in a statement signed by its Secretary General, Chief Sola Ebiseni, said the latest development indicated that the Federal Government is hell-bent on destroying the Yoruba Nation campaigner. 

The organisation said: “The Federal Government with its Attorney-General will not stop amusing themselves with illogical reasoning on the nationality question. “It is expected that the AGF would be guided by the standard of a reasonable man which is a central test in legal inquiry before addressing the public. 

“The Federal Government and its security agencies should pay the damages awarded against them, apologise to Igboho and his household for the acts of terrorism committed against the peaceful campaigner. “The Federal Government may continue to play the ostrich but the whole world knows those who enacted, engineered and continue to promote terrorism in Nigeria.”

 

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Источник: https://tribuneonlineng.com/outrage-as-fg-links-igboho-with-boko-haram/

You can watch a thematic video

Boko Haram: A decade of terror explained - BBC Africa

4 Replies to “Boko haram suspected financier executed”

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