when did texas become a state

Annotation: As the population in Texas from the United States swelled, a revolt in Texas, but in 1832, General Antonio López de Santa Anna became. California became the 31st state on September 9, 1850. The city did not have facilities ready for a proper capital, and the winter of 1850 - 1851 was. Texas became a state in December 1845, participating in its first presidential An empty column indicates the state did not participate in that election.

When did texas become a state -

Texas Became A State In 1845, But Never Lost Its Republican Spirit

Later this year, way later this year, we’ll mark the 175th year of Texas statehood. That will be on Dec. 29. That’s the day in 1845 that Texas officially joined the United States of America, or, as the proudest of Texans say, the day the U.S. was allowed to join Texas.

Though the 29th was the day that President Polk signed the joint resolution that made Texas a state, there was some confusion as to the official moment that the Republic of Texas passed into history and statehood status began. Then-president of Texas, Anson Jones, said that Feb. 19, 1846 was the actual day. He presided over a ceremony in Austin where the Republic of Texas flag was lowered for the last time and the U.S. flag was raised in its place.

As you might surmise, the almost two months difference in official transfer of power led to problems. For instance, who should you pay import duties to – Texas or the U.S.? Lawsuits followed. The U.S. Supreme Court eventually weighed in on the matter and the official date of statehood was established as December the 29th, 1845. Make your checks payable to the U.S. Treasury, please.

You might see the discrepancy in statehood as the difference in marriage dates between a couple marrying first at the courthouse and later in church. One is legal and official and the other is ceremonial and spiritual.

Texas couldn’t just let President Polk’s signing of a document 1,500 miles away be all there was to the moment. They couldn’t allow the Republic so many had died for to pass into history without memorializing the moment in some proper way. So President Anson arranged a ceremony in front of the Texas Capitol, really just a house, that would turn out to both mourn the passing of the Republic and celebrate Texas as the newest state in the union.

What was needed here was what linguists call a “speech act” – a moment in time when something is made real by virtue of pronouncement. Speech acts are generally used by people of authority who have the power to make the words true by just saying them. “I pronounce you man and wife,” or, “I sentence you to 20 years in prison.” Anson Jones began with, “I, as President of the Republic … am now present to surrender into the hands of those whom the people of chosen, the power and authority we have some time held.”

Here is what transpired in that brief ceremony: Noah Smithwick, a blacksmith in attendance, remembered the moment the Texas flag came down.

“Many a head was bowed, many a broad chest heaved, and many a manly cheek was wet with tears when that broad field of blue in the center of which, like a signal light, glowed the lone star, emblem of the sovereignty of Texas, was furled and laid away among the relics of the dead republic.”

The United States flag was raised and the mood changed dramatically. Noah wrote: “We were most of us natives of the United States, and when the stars and stripes, the flag of our fathers, was run up and catching the breeze unrolled its heaven born colors to the light, cheer after cheer rent the air.”

The people celebrated statehood.

I like that Noah tended already toward that creature still common in Texas — the exceptionally proud Texan. He said that he thought “the star in the lower left corner [of the U.S. flag] should have been especially dedicated to Texas.” It’s as if he wanted it framed and separated in some way. How Texan of him.

So, the flag-raising complete, President Anson Jones announced, “The Republic of Texas is no more” — making it politically true, but never absolute because the residual influence of the Republic resides in the minds of many Texans today who still think of her as their country, their nation.

No doubt it was a bittersweet day, but 94% of Texans did vote for statehood, a level of agreement we haven’t enjoyed since. There was great happiness on the whole. Tyler, Texas, was founded that same year, in gratitude to U.S. President John Tyler, who started the movement for Texas annexation.

For a more in-depth look at this day, see: “When Was the Republic of Texas No More?: Revisiting the Annexation of Texas.” 

Источник: https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/texas-became-a-state-in-1845-but-never-lost-its-republican-spirit/

Texas annexation

Annexation of the Republic of Texas into the United States of America

Boundaries of Texas after the annexation in 1845

The Texas annexation was the 1845 annexation of the Republic of Texas into the United States of America. Texas was admitted to the Union as the 28th state on December 29, 1845.

The Republic of Texas declared independence from the Republic of Mexico on March 2, 1836. It applied for annexation to the United States the same year, but was rejected by the Secretary of State. At the time, the vast majority of the Texian population favored the annexation of the Republic by the United States. The leadership of both major U.S. political parties, the Democrats and the Whigs, opposed the introduction of Texas, a vast slave-holding region, into the volatile political climate of the pro- and anti-slavery sectional controversies in Congress. Moreover, they wished to avoid a war with Mexico, whose government refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of its rebellious northern province. With Texas's economic fortunes declining by the early 1840s, the President of the Texas Republic, Sam Houston, arranged talks with Mexico to explore the possibility of securing official recognition of independence, with the United Kingdom mediating.

In 1843, U.S. President John Tyler, then unaligned with any political party, decided independently to pursue the annexation of Texas in a bid to gain a base of support for another four years in office. His official motivation was to outmaneuver suspected diplomatic efforts by the British government for emancipation of slaves in Texas, which would undermine slavery in the United States. Through secret negotiations with the Houston administration, Tyler secured a treaty of annexation in April 1844. When the documents were submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification, the details of the terms of annexation became public and the question of acquiring Texas took center stage in the presidential election of 1844. Pro-Texas-annexation southern Democratic delegates denied their anti-annexation leader Martin Van Buren the nomination at their party's convention in May 1844. In alliance with pro-expansion northern Democratic colleagues, they secured the nomination of James K. Polk, who ran on a pro-Texas Manifest Destiny platform.

In June 1844, the Senate, with its Whig majority, soundly rejected the Tyler–Texas treaty. The pro-annexation Democrat Polk narrowly defeated anti-annexation Whig Henry Clay in the 1844 presidential election. In December 1844, lame-duck President Tyler called on Congress to pass his treaty by simple majorities in each house. The Democratic-dominated House of Representatives complied with his request by passing an amended bill expanding on the pro-slavery provisions of the Tyler treaty. The Senate narrowly passed a compromise version of the House bill (by the vote of the minority Democrats and several southern Whigs), designed to provide President-elect Polk the options of immediate annexation of Texas or new talks to revise the annexation terms of the House-amended bill.

On March 1, 1845, President Tyler signed the annexation bill, and on March 3 (his last full day in office), he forwarded the House version to Texas, offering immediate annexation (which preempted Polk). When Polk took office at noon EST the next day, he encouraged Texas to accept the Tyler offer. Texas ratified the agreement with popular approval from Texans. The bill was signed by President Polk on December 29, 1845, accepting Texas as the 28th state of the Union. Texas formally joined the union on February 19, 1846. Following the annexation, relations between the United States and Mexico deteriorated because of an unresolved dispute over the border between Texas and Mexico, and the Mexican–American War broke out only a few months later.

Background information[edit]

U.S. territorial expansion and Texas[edit]

First mapped by Spain in 1519, Texas was part of the vast Spanish empire seized by the Spanish Conquistadors from its indigenous people for over 300 years.[1] When the Louisiana territory was acquired by the United States from France in 1803, many in the U.S. believed the new territory included parts or all of present-day Texas.[2] The US-Spain border along the northern frontier of Texas took shape in the 1817–1819 negotiations between Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and the Spanish ambassador to the United States, Luis de Onís y González-Vara.[3] The boundaries of Texas were determined within the larger geostrategic struggle to demark the limits of the United States' extensive western lands and of Spain's vast possessions in North America.[4] The Florida Treaty of February 22, 1819[5][6] emerged as a compromise that excluded Spain from the lower Columbia River watershed, but established southern boundaries at the Sabine and Red Rivers, "legally extinguish[ing]" any American claims to Texas.[7][8] Nonetheless, Texas remained an object of fervent interest to American expansionists, among them Thomas Jefferson, who anticipated the eventual acquisition of its fertile lands.[9]

The Missouri crisis of 1819–1821 sharpened commitments to expansionism among the country's slaveholding interests, when the so-called Thomas proviso established the 36°30' parallel, imposing free-soil and slave-soil futures in the Louisiana Purchase lands.[10] While a majority of southern congressmen acquiesced to the exclusion of slavery from the bulk of the Louisiana Purchase, a significant minority objected.[11][12] Virginian editor Thomas Ritchie of the Richmond Enquirer predicted that with the proviso restrictions, the South would ultimately require Texas: "If we are cooped up on the north, we must have elbow room to the west."[13][14] Representative John Floyd of Virginia in 1824 accused Secretary of State Adams of conceding Texas to Spain in 1819 in the interests of Northern anti-slavery advocates, and so depriving the South of additional slave states.[15] Then-Representative John Tyler of Virginia invoked the Jeffersonian precepts of territorial and commercial growth as a national goal to counter the rise of sectional differences over slavery. His "diffusion" theory declared that with Missouri open to slavery, the new state would encourage the transfer of underutilized slaves westward, emptying the eastern states of bondsmen and making emancipation feasible in the old South.[16] This doctrine would be revived during the Texas annexation controversy.[17][18]

When Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1821,[19] the United States did not contest the new republic's claims to Texas, and both presidents John Quincy Adams (1825–1829) and Andrew Jackson (1829–1837) persistently sought, through official and unofficial channels, to procure all or portions of provincial Texas from the Mexican government, without success.[20]

Texas settlement and independence[edit]

Further information: Texas Revolution

Historical U.S. map, 1843. Most of the eastern states have been established, while the western half remains loosely divided into territories. Mexico and the Republic of Texas share a disputed border.
The boundaries of the United States and neighboring nations as they appeared in 1843
Mexican General López de Santa Anna's surrender to Sam Houston

Spanish and Indigenous immigrants, primarily from northeastern provinces of New Spain, began to settle Texas in the late 17th century. The Spanish constructed chains of missions and presidios in what is today Louisiana, east Texas, and south Texas. The first chain of missions was designed for the Tejas Indians, near Los Adaes. Soon thereafter, the San Antonio Missions were founded along the San Antonio River. The City of San Antonio, then known as San Fernando de Bexar, was founded in 1718. In the early 1760s, José de Escandón created five settlements along the Rio Grande River, including Laredo.

Anglo-American immigrants, primarily from the Southern United States, began emigrating to Mexican Texas in the early 1820s at the invitation of the Texas faction of the Coahuila y Texas state government, which sought to populate the sparsely inhabited lands of its northern frontier for cotton production.[21][22] Colonizing empresarioStephen F. Austin managed the regional affairs of the mostly American-born population – 20% of them slaves[23] – under the terms of the generous government land grants.[24] Mexican authorities were initially content to govern the remote province through salutary neglect, "permitting slavery under the legal fiction of 'permanent indentured servitude', similar to Mexico's peonage system.[25]

A general lawlessness prevailed in the vast Texas frontier, and Mexico's civic laws went largely unenforced among the Anglo-American settlers. In particular, the prohibitions against slavery and forced labor were ignored. The requirement that all settlers be Catholic or convert to Catholicism was also subverted.[26][27] Mexican authorities, perceiving that they were losing control over Texas and alarmed by the unsuccessful Fredonian Rebellion of 1826, abandoned the policy of benign rule. New restrictions were imposed in 1829–1830, outlawing slavery throughout the nation and terminating further American immigration to Texas.[28][29] Military occupation followed, sparking local uprisings and a civil war. Texas conventions in 1832 and 1833 submitted petitions for redress of grievances to overturn the restrictions, with limited success.[30] In 1835, an army under Mexican President Santa Anna entered its territory of Texas and abolished self-government. Texans responded by declaring their independence from Mexico on March 2, 1836. On April 20–21, rebel forces under Texas General Sam Houston defeated the Mexican army at the Battle of San Jacinto.[31][32] In June 1836 while held prisoner by the Texans, Santa Anna signed an agreement for Texas independence, but the Mexican government refused to ratify the agreement made under duress.[33] Texans, now de facto independent, recognized that their security and prosperity could never be achieved while Mexico denied the legitimacy of their revolution.[34]

In the years following independence, the migration of white settlers and importation of black slave labor into the vast republic was deterred by Texas's unresolved international status and the threat of renewed warfare with Mexico.[35] American citizens who considered migrating to the new republic perceived that "life and property were safer within the United States" than in an independent Texas.[36] In the 1840s, global oversupply had also caused a crash in the price of cotton, the country's main export.[37] The situation led to labor shortages, reduced tax revenue, large national debts and a diminished Texas militia.[38][39]

Jackson and Van Buren administrations[edit]

Mirabeau B. Lamar, second president of the Republic of Texas, terminated annexation efforts with the Martin Van Buren Administration in 1838.

The Anglo-American immigrants residing in newly independent Texas overwhelmingly desired immediate annexation by the United States.[40] But, despite his strong support for Texas independence from Mexico,[41] then-President Andrew Jackson delayed recognizing the new republic until the last day of his presidency to avoid raising the issue during the 1836 general election.[42][43] Jackson's political caution was informed by northern concerns that Texas could potentially form several new slave states and undermine the North-South balance in Congress.[44]

Jackson's successor, President Martin Van Buren, viewed Texas annexation as an immense political liability that would empower the anti-slavery northern Whig opposition – especially if annexation provoked a war with Mexico.[45] Presented with a formal annexation proposal from Texas minister Memucan Hunt, Jr. in August 1837, Van Buren summarily rejected it.[46] Annexation resolutions presented separately in each house of Congress were either soundly defeated or tabled through filibuster. After the election of 1838, new Texas president Mirabeau B. Lamar withdrew his republic's offer of annexation over these failures.[47] Texans were at an annexation impasse when John Tyler entered the White House in 1841.[48]

Tyler administration[edit]

US President John Tyler, champion of Texas annexation

William Henry Harrison, Whig Party presidential nominee, defeated US President Martin Van Buren in the 1840 general election. Upon Harrison's death shortly after his inauguration, Vice-President John Tyler assumed the presidency.[49] President Tyler was expelled from the Whig party in 1841 for repeatedly vetoing their domestic finance legislation. Tyler, isolated and outside the two-party mainstream, turned to foreign affairs to salvage his presidency, aligning himself with a southern states' rights faction that shared his fervent slavery expansionist views.[50]

In his first address to Congress in special session on June 1, 1841, Tyler set the stage for Texas annexation by announcing his intention to pursue an expansionist agenda so as to preserve the balance between state and national authority and to protect American institutions, including slavery, so as to avoid sectional conflict.[51] Tyler's closest advisors counseled him that obtaining Texas would assure him a second term in the White House,[52] and it became a deeply personal obsession for the president, who viewed the acquisition of Texas as the "primary objective of his administration".[53] Tyler delayed direct action on Texas to work closely with his Secretary of State Daniel Webster on other pressing diplomatic initiatives.[54]

With the Webster-Ashburton Treaty ratified in 1843, Tyler was ready to make the annexation of Texas his "top priority".[55] Representative Thomas W. Gilmer of Virginia was authorized by the administration to make the case for annexation to the American electorate. In a widely circulated open letter, understood as an announcement of the executive branch's designs for Texas, Gilmer described Texas as a panacea for North-South conflict and an economic boon to all commercial interests. The slavery issue, however divisive, would be left for the states to decide as per the US Constitution. Domestic tranquility and national security, Tyler argued, would result from an annexed Texas; a Texas left outside American jurisdiction would imperil the Union.[56] Tyler adroitly arranged the resignation of his anti-annexation Secretary of State Daniel Webster, and on June 23, 1843 appointed Abel P. Upshur, a Virginia states' rights champion and ardent proponent of Texas annexation. This cabinet shift signaled Tyler's intent to pursue Texas annexation aggressively.[57]

Tyler–Upshur–Calhoun campaign for Texas[edit]

President John Tyler's Secretaries of State Abel P. Upshur (left) and John C. Calhoun, who planned to deliver the Tyler-Texas annexation treaty on a pro-southern agenda

In late September 1843, in an effort to cultivate public support for Texas, Secretary Upshur dispatched a letter to the US Minister to Great Britain, Edward Everett, conveying his displeasure with Britain's global anti-slavery posture, and warning their government that forays into Texas's affairs would be regarded as "tantamount to direct interference 'with the established institutions of the United States'".[58] In a breach of diplomatic norms, Upshur leaked the communique to the press to inflame popular Anglophobic sentiments among American citizens.[59]

In the spring of 1843, the Tyler administration had sent executive agent Duff Green to Europe to gather intelligence and arrange territorial treaty talks with Great Britain regarding Oregon; he also worked with American minister to France, Lewis Cass, to thwart efforts by major European powers to suppress the maritime slave trade.[60] Green reported to Secretary Upshur in July 1843 that he had discovered a "loan plot" by American abolitionists, in league with Lord Aberdeen, British Foreign Secretary, to provide funds to the Texans in exchange for the emancipation of its slaves.[61] Minister Everett was charged with determining the substance of these confidential reports alleging a Texas plot. His investigations, including personal interviews with Lord Aberdeen, concluded that British interest in abolitionist intrigues was weak, contradicting Secretary of State Upshur's conviction that Great Britain was manipulating Texas.[62] Though unsubstantiated, Green's unofficial intelligence so alarmed Tyler that he requested verification from the US minister to Mexico, Waddy Thompson.[63]

John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, a pro-slavery extremist,[64] counseled Secretary Upshur that British designs on American slavery were real and required immediate action to preempt a takeover of Texas by the United Kingdom. When Tyler confirmed in September that the British Foreign Secretary Aberdeen had encouraged détente between Mexico and Texas, allegedly pressing Mexico to maneuver Texas towards emancipation of its slaves, Tyler acted at once.[65][66] On September 18, 1843, in consultation with Secretary Upshur, he ordered secret talks opened with Texas Minister to the United States Isaac Van Zandt to negotiate the annexation of Texas.[67] Face-to-face negotiations commenced on October 16, 1843.[68]

Texas–Mexico–United Kingdom negotiations[edit]

Sam Houstonagreed to open annexation negotiations with the Tyler administration in 1843.

By the summer of 1843 Sam Houston's Texas administration had returned to negotiations with the Mexican government to consider a rapprochement that would permit Texas self-governance, possibly as a state of Mexico, with Great Britain acting as mediator.[69][70] Texas officials felt compelled by the fact that the Tyler administration appeared unequipped to mount an effective campaign for Texas annexation.[71] With the 1844 general election in the United States approaching, the leadership in both the Democratic and Whig parties remained unequivocally anti-Texas.[72] Texas-Mexico treaty options under consideration included an autonomous Texas within Mexico's borders, or an independent republic with the provision that Texas should emancipate its slaves upon recognition.[73]

Van Zandt, though he personally favored annexation by the United States, was not authorized to entertain any overtures from the US government on the subject. Texas officials were at the moment deeply engaged in exploring settlements with Mexican diplomats, facilitated by Great Britain. Texas's predominant concern was not British interference with the institution of slavery – English diplomats had not alluded to the issue – but the avoidance of any resumption of hostilities with Mexico.[74] Still, US Secretary of State Upshur vigorously courted Texas diplomats to begin annexation talks, finally dispatching an appeal to President Sam Houston in January 1844. In it, he assured Houston that, in contrast to previous attempts, the political climate in the United States, including sections of the North, was amenable to Texas statehood, and that a two-thirds majority in Senate could be obtained to ratify a Texas treaty.[75]

Texans were hesitant to pursue a US-Texas treaty without a written commitment of military defense from America, since a full-scale military attack by Mexico seemed likely when the negotiations became public. If ratification of the annexation measure stalled in the US Senate, Texas could face a war alone against Mexico.[76] Because only Congress could declare war, the Tyler administration lacked the constitutional authority to commit the US to support of Texas. But when Secretary Upshur provided a verbal assurance of military defense, President Houston, responding to urgent calls for annexation from the Texas Congress of December 1843, authorized the reopening of annexation negotiations.[77]

The US–Texas treaty negotiations[edit]

As Secretary Upshur accelerated the secret treaty discussions, Mexican diplomats learned that US-Texas talks were taking place. Mexican minister to the U.S. Juan Almonte confronted Upshur with these reports, warning him that if Congress sanctioned a treaty of annexation, Mexico would break diplomatic ties and immediately declare war.[78] Secretary Upshur evaded and dismissed the charges, and pressed forward with the negotiations.[79] In tandem with moving forward with Texas diplomats, Upshur was secretly lobbying US Senators to support annexation, providing lawmakers with persuasive arguments linking Texas acquisition to national security and domestic peace. By early 1844, Upshur was able to assure Texas officials that 40 of the 52 members of the Senate were pledged to ratify the Tyler-Texas treaty, more than the two-thirds majority required for passage.[80] Tyler, in his annual address to Congress in December 1843, maintained his silence on the secret treaty, so as not to damage relations with the wary Texas diplomats.[81] Throughout, Tyler did his utmost to keep the negotiations secret, making no public reference to his administration's single-minded quest for Texas.[82]

The Tyler-Texas treaty was in its final stages when its chief architects, Secretary Upshur and Secretary of the Navy Thomas W. Gilmer, died in an accident aboard USS Princeton on February 28, 1844, just a day after achieving a preliminary treaty draft agreement with the Texas Republic.[83] The Princeton disaster proved a major setback for Texas annexation, in that Tyler expected Secretary Upshur to elicit critical support from Whig and Democratic Senators during the upcoming treaty ratification process.[84] Tyler selected John C. Calhoun to replace Upshur as Secretary of State and to finalize the treaty with Texas. The choice of Calhoun, a highly regarded but controversial American statesman,[85] risked introducing a politically polarizing element into the Texas debates, but Tyler prized him as a strong advocate of annexation.[86][87]

Robert J. Walker and the "safety-valve"[edit]

With the Tyler-Upshur secret annexation negotiations with Texas near consummation, Senator Robert J. Walker of Mississippi, a key Tyler ally, issued a widely distributed and highly influential letter, reproduced as a pamphlet, making the case for immediate annexation.[88] In it, Walker argued that Texas could be acquired by Congress in a number of ways – all constitutional – and that the moral authority to do so was based on the precepts for territorial expansion established by Jefferson and Madison, and promulgated as doctrine by Monroe in 1823.[89] Senator Walker's polemic offered analysis on the significance of Texas with respect to slavery and race. He envisioned Texas as a corridor through which both free and enslaved African-Americans could be "diffused" southward in a gradual exodus that would ultimately supply labor to the Central American tropics, and in time, empty the United States of its slave population.[90]

This "safety-valve" theory "appealed to the racial fears of northern whites" who dreaded the prospect of absorbing emancipated slaves into their communities if the institution of slavery collapsed in the South.[91] This scheme for racial cleansing was consistent, on a pragmatic level, with proposals for overseas colonization of blacks, which were pursued by a number of American presidents, from Jefferson to Lincoln.[92] Walker bolstered his position by raising national security concerns, warning that in the event annexation failed, Great Britain would maneuver the Republic of Texas into emancipating its slaves, forecasting a dangerous destabilizing influence on southwestern slaveholding states. The pamphlet characterized abolitionists as traitors who conspired with the British to overthrow the United States.[93][94]

A variation of the Tyler's "diffusion" theory, it played on economic fears in a period when slave-based staple crop markets had not yet recovered from the Panic of 1837. The Texas "escape route" conceived by Walker promised to increase demand for slaves in fertile cotton-growing regions of Texas, as well as the monetary value of slaves. Cash-poor plantation owners in the older eastern South were promised a market for surplus slaves at a profit.[95] Texas annexation, wrote Walker, would eliminate all these dangers and "fortify the whole Union."[96]

Walker's pamphlet brought forth strident demands for Texas from pro-slavery expansionists in the South; in the North, it allowed anti-slavery expansionists to embrace Texas without appearing to be aligned with pro-slavery extremists.[97] His assumptions and analysis "shaped and framed the debates on annexation but his premises went largely unchallenged among the press and public.[98]

Tyler-Texas treaty and the election of 1844[edit]

Main article: United States presidential election, 1844

Treaty of annexation concluded between the United States of America and the Republic of Texas
DraftedFebruary 27, 1844
SignedApril 12, 1844
LocationWashington
EffectiveNot ratified
Signatories
Consent refused by the U.S. Senate (Senate Journal, June 8, 1844, volume 430, pp. 436–438).

The Tyler-Texas treaty, signed on April 12, 1844, was framed to induct Texas into the Union as a territory, following constitutional protocols. To wit, Texas would cede all its public lands to the United States, and the federal government would assume all its bonded debt, up to $10 million. The boundaries of the Texas territory were left unspecified.[99] Four new states could ultimately be carved from the former republic – three of them likely to become slave states.[100] Any allusion to slavery was omitted from the document so as not to antagonize anti-slavery sentiments during Senate debates, but it provided for the "preservation of all [Texas] property as secured in our domestic institutions."[101]

Upon the signing of the treaty, Tyler complied with the Texans' demand for military and naval protection, deploying troops to Fort Jesup in Louisiana and a fleet of warships to the Gulf of Mexico.[102] In case the Senate failed to pass the treaty, Tyler promised the Texas diplomats that he would officially exhort both houses of Congress to establish Texas as a state of the Union upon provisions authorized in the Constitution.[103] Tyler's cabinet was split on the administration's handling of the Texas agreement. Secretary of War William Wilkins praised the terms of annexation publicly, touting the economic and geostrategic benefits with relation to Great Britain.[104] Secretary of the Treasury John C. Spencer was alarmed at the constitutional implications of Tyler's application of military force without congressional approval, a violation of the separation of powers. Refusing to transfer contingency funds for the naval mobilization, he resigned.[105]

Tyler submitted his treaty for annexation to the Senate, delivered April 22, 1844, where a two-thirds majority was required for ratification.[106][107] Secretary of State Calhoun (assuming his post March 29, 1844)[108] had sent a letter to British minister Richard Packenham denouncing British anti-slavery interference in Texas. He included the Packenham Letter with the Tyler bill, intending to create a sense of crisis in Southern Democrats.[109] In it, he characterized slavery as a social blessing and the acquisition of Texas as an emergency measure necessary to safeguard the "peculiar institution" in the United States.[110] In doing so, Tyler and Calhoun sought to unite the South in a crusade that would present the North with an ultimatum: support Texas annexation or lose the South.[111]

Tyler and the Polk presidential nomination[edit]

President Tyler expected that his treaty would be debated secretly in Senate executive session.[112] However, less than a week after debates opened, the treaty, its associated internal correspondence, and the Packenham letter were leaked to the public. The nature of the Tyler-Texas negotiations caused a national outcry, in that "the documents appeared to verify that the sole objective of Texas annexation was the preservation of slavery."[113] A mobilization of anti-annexation forces in the North strengthened both major parties' hostility toward Tyler's agenda. The leading presidential hopefuls of both parties, Democrat Martin Van Buren and Whig Henry Clay, publicly denounced the treaty.[114] Texas annexation and the reoccupation of Oregon territory emerged as the central issues in the 1844 general election.[115]

In response, Tyler, already ejected from the Whig party, quickly began to organize a third party in hopes of inducing the Democrats to embrace a pro-expansionist platform.[116] By running as a third-party candidate, Tyler threatened to siphon off pro-annexation Democratic voters; Democratic party disunity would mean the election of Henry Clay, a staunchly anti-Texas Whig.[117] Pro-annexation delegates among southern Democrats, with assistance from a number of northern delegates, blocked anti-expansion candidate Martin Van Buren at the convention, which instead nominated the pro-expansion champion of Manifest Destiny, James K. Polk of Tennessee. Polk unified his party under the banner of Texas and Oregon acquisition.[118]

In August 1844, in the midst of the campaign, Tyler withdrew from the race. The Democratic Party was by then unequivocally committed to Texas annexation, and Tyler, assured by Polk's envoys that as president he would effect Texas annexation, urged his supporters to vote Democratic.[119] Polk narrowly defeated Whig Henry Clay in the November election.[120] The victorious Democrats were poised to acquire Texas under President-elect Polk's doctrine of Manifest Destiny,[121] rather than on the pro-slavery agenda of Tyler and Calhoun.[122]

Congressional debate over annexation[edit]

Tyler-Texas Treaty defeat in the Senate[edit]

As a treaty document with a foreign nation, the Tyler-Texas annexation treaty required the support of a two-thirds majority in the Senate for passage. But in fact, when the Senate voted on the measure on June 8, 1844, fully two-thirds voted against the treaty (16–35).[123] The vote went largely along party lines: Whigs had opposed it almost unanimously (1–27), while Democrats split, but voted overwhelmingly in favor (15–8).[124] The election campaign had hardened partisan positions on Texas among Democrats.[125] Tyler had anticipated that the measure would fail, largely because of the divisive effects of Secretary Calhoun's Packenham letter.[126] Undeterred, he formally asked the House of Representatives to consider other constitutional means to authorize passage of the treaty. Congress adjourned before debating the matter.[127]

Reintroduction as a joint resolution[edit]

A map, published in the Newark Daily Advertiser as the U.S. Senate was considering a Joint Resolution for the Annexation of Texas that had been adopted by the House of Representatives.

The same Senate that had rejected the Tyler–Calhoun treaty by a margin of 2:1 in June 1844[128] reassembled in December 1844 in a short lame-duck session.[129] (Though pro-annexation Democrats had made gains in the fall elections, those legislators – the 29th Congress – would not assume office until March 1845.)[130] Lame-duck President Tyler, still trying to annex Texas in the final months of his administration, wished to avoid another overwhelming Senate rejection of his treaty.[131] In his annual address to Congress on December 4, he declared the Polk victory a mandate for Texas annexation[132] and proposed that Congress adopt a joint resolution procedure by which simple majorities in each house could secure ratification for the Tyler treaty.[133] This method would avoid the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Senate.[134] Bringing the House of Representatives into the equation boded well for Texas annexation, as the pro-annexation Democratic Party possessed nearly a 2:1 majority in that chamber.[135][136]

By resubmitting the discredited treaty through a House-sponsored bill, the Tyler administration reignited sectional hostilities over Texas admission.[137] Both northern Democratic and southern Whig Congressmen had been bewildered by local political agitation in their home states during the 1844 presidential campaigns.[138] Now, northern Democrats found themselves vulnerable to charges of appeasement of their southern wing if they capitulated to Tyler's slavery expansion provisions. On the other hand, Manifest Destiny enthusiasm in the north placed politicians under pressure to admit Texas immediately to the Union.[139]

Constitutional objections were raised in House debates as to whether both houses of Congress could constitutionally authorize admission of territories, rather than states. Moreover, if the Republic of Texas, a nation in its own right, were admitted as a state, its territorial boundaries, property relations (including slave property), debts and public lands would require a Senate-ratified treaty.[140] Democrats were particularly uneasy about burdening the United States with $10 million in Texas debt, resenting the deluge of speculators, who had bought Texas bonds cheap and now lobbied Congress for the Texas House bill.[141] House Democrats, at an impasse, relinquished the legislative initiative to the southern Whigs.[142]

Brown–Foster House amendment[edit]

Anti-Texas Whig legislators had lost more than the White House in the general election of 1844. In the southern states of Tennessee and Georgia, Whig strongholds in the 1840 general election, voter support dropped precipitously over the pro-annexation excitement in the Deep South—and Clay lost every Deep South state to Polk.[143] Northern Whigs' uncompromising hostility to slavery expansion increasingly characterized the party, and southern members, by association, had suffered from charges of being "soft on Texas, therefore soft on slavery" by Southern Democrats.[144] Facing congressional and gubernatorial races in 1845 in their home states, a number of Southern Whigs sought to erase that impression with respect to the Tyler-Texas bill.[145][146]

Southern Whigs in the Congress, including Representative Milton Brown and Senator Ephraim Foster, both of Tennessee, and Representative Alexander Stephens of Georgia[147] collaborated to introduce a House amendment on January 13, 1845,[148] that was designed to enhance slaveowner gains in Texas beyond those offered by the Democratic-sponsored Tyler-Calhoun treaty bill.[149] The legislation proposed to recognize Texas as a slave state which would retain all its vast public lands, as well as its bonded debt accrued since 1836. Furthermore, the Brown amendment would delegate to the U.S. government responsibility for negotiating the disputed Texas-Mexico boundary. The issue was a critical one, as the size of Texas would be immensely increased if the international border were set at the Rio Grande River, with its headwaters in the Rocky Mountains, rather than the traditionally recognized boundary at the Nueces River, 100 miles to the north.[150] While the Tyler-Calhoun treaty provided for the organization of a total of four states from the Texas lands – three likely to qualify as slave states – Brown's plan would permit Texas state lawmakers to configure a total of five states from its western region, with those south of the 36°30’ Missouri Compromise line pre-authorized to permit slavery upon statehood, if Texas designated them as such.[151]

Politically, the Brown amendment was designed to portray Southern Whigs as "even more ardent champions of slavery and the South, than southern Democrats."[152] The bill also served to distinguish them from their northern Whig colleagues who cast the controversy, as Calhoun did, in strictly pro- versus anti-slavery terms.[153] While almost all Northern Whigs spurned Brown's amendment, the Democrats quickly co-opted the legislation, providing the votes necessary to attach the proviso to Tyler's joint resolution, by a 118–101 vote.[154] Southern Democrats supported the bill almost unanimously (59–1), while Northern Democrats split strongly in favor (50–30). Eight of eighteen Southern Whigs cast their votes in favor. Northern Whigs unanimously rejected it.[155] The House proceeded to approve the amended Texas treaty 120–98 on January 25, 1845.[156] The vote in the House had been one in which party affiliation prevailed over sectional allegiance.[157] The bill was forwarded the same day to the Senate for debate.

Benton Senate compromise[edit]

By early February 1845, when the Senate began to debate the Brown-amended Tyler treaty, its passage seemed unlikely, as support was "perishing".[158] The partisan alignments in the Senate were near parity, 28–24, slightly in favor of the Whigs.[159] The Senate Democrats would require undivided support among their colleagues, and three or more Whigs who would be willing to cross party lines to pass the House-amended treaty. The fact that Senator Foster had drafted the House amendment under consideration improved prospects of Senate passage.[160]

Anti-annexation Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri had been the only Southern Democrat to vote against the Tyler-Texas measure in June 1844.[161][162] His original proposal for an annexed Texas had embodied a national compromise, whereby Texas would be divided in two, half slave-soil and half free-soil.[163] As pro-annexation sentiment grew in his home state, Benton retreated from this compromise offer.[164] By February 5, 1845, in the early debates on the Brown-amended House bill, he advanced an alternative resolution that, unlike the Brown scenario, made no reference whatsoever to the ultimate free-slave apportionment of an annexed Texas and simply called for five bipartisan commissioners to resolve border disputes with Texas and Mexico and set conditions for the Lone Star Republic's acquisition by the United States.[165]

The Benton proposal was intended to calm northern anti-slavery Democrats (who wished to eliminate the Tyler-Calhoun treaty altogether, as it had been negotiated on behalf of the slavery expansionists), and allow the decision to devolve upon the soon-to-be-inaugurated Democratic President-elect James K. Polk.[166] President-elect Polk had expressed his ardent wish that Texas annexation should be accomplished before he entered Washington in advance of his inauguration on March 4, 1845, the same day Congress would end its session.[167] With his arrival in the capital, he discovered the Benton and Brown factions in the Senate "paralyzed" over the Texas annexation legislation.[168] On the advice of his soon-to-be Secretary of the Treasury Robert J. Walker, Polk urged Senate Democrats to unite under a dual resolution that would include both the Benton and Brown versions of annexation, leaving enactment of the legislation to Polk's discretion when he took office.[169] In private and separate talks with supporters of both the Brown and Benton plans, Polk left each side with the "impression he would administer their [respective] policy. Polk meant what he said to Southerners and meant to appear friendly to the Van Burenite faction."[170] Polk's handling of the matter had the effect of uniting Senate northern Democrats in favor of the dual alternative treaty bill.[171]

On February 27, 1845, less than a week before Polk's inauguration, the Senate voted 27–25 to admit Texas, based on the Tyler protocols of simple majority passage. All twenty-four Democrats voted for the measure, joined by three southern Whigs.[172] Benton and his allies were assured that Polk would act to establish the eastern portion of Texas as a slave state; the western section was to remain unorganized territory, not committed to slavery. On this understanding, the northern Democrats had conceded their votes for the dichotomous bill.[173] The next day, in an almost strict party line vote, the Benton-Milton measure was passed in the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives.[174] President Tyler signed the bill the following day, March 1, 1845 (Joint Resolution for annexing Texas to the United States, J.Res. 8, enacted March 1, 1845, 5 Stat. 797).[175]

Annexation and admittance[edit]

Anson Jones, last president of the Lone Star Republic prior to Texas statehood

Senate and House legislators who had favored Benton's renegotiated version of the Texas annexation bill had been assured that President Tyler would sign the joint house measure, but leave its implementation to the incoming Polk administration.[176] But, during his last full day in office, President Tyler, with the urging of his Secretary of State Calhoun,[177] decided to act decisively to improve the odds for the immediate annexation of Texas. On March 3, 1845, with his cabinet's assent, he dispatched an offer of annexation to the Republic of Texas by courier, exclusively under the terms of the Brown–Foster option of the joint house measure.[178] Secretary Calhoun apprised President-elect Polk of the action, who demurred without comment.[179][180] Tyler justified his preemptive move on the grounds that Polk was likely to come under pressure to abandon immediate annexation and reopen negotiations under the Benton alternative.[181]

When President Polk took office on (at noon EST) March 4, he was in a position to recall Tyler's dispatch to Texas and reverse his decision. On March 10, after conferring with his cabinet, Polk upheld Tyler's action and allowed the courier to proceed to Texas with the offer of immediate annexation.[182] The only modification was to exhort Texans to accept the annexation terms unconditionally.[183] Polk's decision was based on his concern that a protracted negotiation by US commissioners would expose annexation efforts to foreign intrigue and interference.[184] While Polk kept his annexation endeavors confidential, Senators passed a resolution requesting formal disclosure of the administration's Texas policy. Polk stalled, and when the Senate special session had adjourned on March 20, 1845, no names for US commissioners to Texas had been submitted by him. Polk denied charges from Senator Benton that he had misled Benton on his intention to support the new negotiations option, declaring "if any such pledges were made, it was in a total misconception of what I said or meant."[185]

On May 5, 1845, Texas President Jones called for a convention on July 4, 1845, to consider the annexation and a constitution. On June 23, the Texan Congress accepted the US Congress's joint resolution of March 1, 1845, annexing Texas to the United States, and consented to the convention.[187] On July 4, the Texas convention debated the annexation offer and almost unanimously passed an ordinance assenting to it. The convention remained in session through August 28, and adopted the Constitution of Texas on August 27, 1845.[189] The citizens of Texas approved the annexation ordinance and new constitution on October 13, 1845.[citation needed]

President Polk signed the legislation making the former Lone Star Republic a state of the Union on December 29, 1845 (Joint Resolution for the admission of the state of Texas into the Union, J.Res. 1, enacted December 29, 1845, 9 Stat. 108).[190] Texas symbolically relinquished its sovereignty to the United States at the inauguration of Governor James Henderson on February 19, 1846.[191]

Border disputes[edit]

Neither the joint resolution nor the ordinance of annexation contain language specifying the boundaries of Texas, and only refer in general terms to "the territory properly included within, and rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas", and state that the new State of Texas is to be formed "subject to the adjustment by this [U.S.] government of all questions of boundary that may arise with other governments." According to George Lockhart Rives, "That treaty had been expressly so framed as to leave the boundaries of Texas undefined, and the joint resolution of the following winter was drawn in the same manner. It was hoped that this might open the way to a negotiation, in the course of which the whole subject of the boundaries of Mexico, from the Gulf to the Pacific, might be reconsidered, but these hopes came to nothing."[192]

There was an ongoing border dispute between the Republic of Texas and Mexico prior to annexation. Texas claimed the Rio Grande as its border based on the Treaties of Velasco, while Mexico maintained that it was the Nueces River and did not recognize Texan independence. In November 1845, President James K. Polk sent John Slidell, a secret representative, to Mexico City with a monetary offer to the Mexican government for the disputed land and other Mexican territories. Mexico was not inclined nor able to negotiate because of instability in its government[193] and popular nationalistic sentiment against such a sale.[194] Slidell returned to the United States, and Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor to garrison the southern border of Texas, as defined by the former Republic, in 1846. Taylor moved into Texas, ignoring Mexican demands to withdraw, and marched as far south as the Rio Grande, where he began to build a fort near the river's mouth on the Gulf of Mexico. The Mexican government regarded this action as a violation of its sovereignty, and immediately prepared for war. Following a United States victory and the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexico ceded its claims to Texas and the Rio Grande border was accepted by both nations.

Joint resolution precedent and legacy: Hawaii[edit]

Further information: Annexation of Hawaii

On August 12, 1898, the flag of the Republic of Hawaii over ʻIolani Palace was lowered and the United States flag raised to signify annexation.

The formal controversy over the legality of the annexation of Texas stems from the fact that Congress approved the annexation of Texas as a state, rather than a territory, with simple majorities in each house, instead of annexing the land by Senate treaty, as was done with Native American lands. Tyler's extralegal joint resolution maneuver in 1844 exceeded strict constructionist precepts, but was passed by Congress in 1845 as part of a compromise bill. The success of the joint house Texas annexation set a precedent that would be applied to Hawaii's annexation in 1897.[195]

Republican President Benjamin Harrison (1889–1893) attempted, in 1893, to annex Hawaii through a Senate treaty. When this failed, he was asked to consider the Tyler joint house precedent; he declined. Democratic President Grover Cleveland (1893–1897) did not pursue the annexation of Hawaii. When President William McKinley took office in 1897, he quickly revived expectations among territorial expansionists when he resubmitted legislation to acquire Hawaii. When the two-thirds Senate support was not forthcoming, committees in the House and Senate explicitly invoked the Tyler precedent for the joint house resolution, which was successfully applied to approve the annexation of Hawaii in July 1898.[196]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^Meacham, 2008, p. 315
  2. ^Merry, 2009, pp. 69–70: The Texas annexation issue "emerged atop a history stretching back to 1803 and the Thomas Jefferson's celebrated purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France. One problem was that the precise boundaries of the vast lands were unknown."
    Crapol, 2006, p. 176: "...  many people thought that all or at least part of Texas was included in the bargain."
    Remini, 2002, p. 55: "When the French sold Louisiana to the United States the western and northern boundaries were not defined and some Americans claimed that Texas was included in the purchase and they wanted it occupied."
  3. ^Dangerfield, 1952, p. 129: "...  Adams took up the [Louisiana] negotiations in December 1817."
  4. ^Merry, 2009, p. 70: "Spain and the United States found themselves in the dispute over Louisiana's western border and the extent to which Jefferson's purchase included the portion of Texas." And "[I]n 1819, the matter was incorporated into the two countries' efforts to settle the status of Florida."
    Dangerfield, 1952, pp. 128–129: "The cession of Florida was, of course, not the only bargaining point at the disposal of [Onis] in his attempt to prevent the United States from recognizing ... Spanish revolutionaries in South America. He was also ready to discuss the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase in their relation to the Empire of Spain.
  5. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 176: "... the Adams-Onis Treaty ... also known as the Florida treaty ..."
  6. ^Dangerfield, 1952, p. 152: "On February 22 [1819], the great Transcontinental Treaty was signed and sealed."
  7. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 176: "... the Sabine River ... today is the boundary between [the states of] Louisiana and Texas." P. 176: The US claim to Texas" was legally extinguished ..."
  8. ^Dangerfield, 1952, p. 156:"It was by no means a perfect Treaty – by excluding Texas [from US possession], it bequeathed to the United States a legacy of trouble and war – but was certainly a great Treaty."
  9. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 176: "Among diehard expansionists unwilling to give up hope of getting Texas at a future date was Thomas Jefferson. He assured his friend President James Monroe that, when acquired, Texas would become "the richest State of our Union, without any exception."
    Merry, 2009, p. 70: "[E]stablishing [Texas] west of the Sabine ... enraged many US expansionists" and "[a]nger over the treaty would linger for decades."
  10. ^Brown, 1966, p.24: The "architects of Southern power [objected to] the so-called Thomas Proviso, amending the Missouri bill to draw the ill-fated 36°30' line across the Louisiana Purchase, prohibiting slavery in the territory to the north, giving up the lion's share to freedom."
  11. ^Holt, 2004, p. 6: "In short, in 1820, a majority of southern congressmen accepted congressional prohibition of slavery from almost all of the western territories."
  12. ^Brown, 1966, pp. 25–26: "In fact, the vote on the [Thomas] Proviso illuminated an important division in Southern sentiment. Thirty-seven slave state congressmen opposed it, white thirty-nine voted for it ..." a harbinger that the opposition would "in due time rectify the Thomas Proviso."
  13. ^Brown, 1966, p. 25: "As the [Missouri] debates thundered to their climax, Ritchie in two separate editorials predicted the if the Proviso passed, the South must in due time have Texas".
  14. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 152: "The Thomas plan angered some Southerners. They denounced the unequal division of turf and constitutional precedent."
  15. ^Brown, 1966, p. 28: "In 1823–1824 some Southerners suspected that an attempt by Secretary of State Adams to conclude a slave trade convention with Great Britain was an attempt to reap the benefit of Northern anti-slavery sentiments; and some, notably John Floyd of Virginia, sought to turn the tables on Adams by attacking him for allegedly ceding Texas to Spain in the Florida treaty, thus ceding what Floyd called "two slaveholding states" and costing "the Southern interest" four Senators."
  16. ^Crapol, 2006, pp. 37–38: Tyler "believed in a theory of'diffusion' as a way to end slavery gradually and peacefully ... so as to "thin out and diffuse the slave population and, with fewer blacks in some of the older slave states of the upper South, it might become politically feasible to abolish slavery in states like Virginia" ... and "Tyler voted against proposals that restricted slavery in Missouri or any other portion of the remaining territory of the Louisiana Purchase."
  17. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 151: "The Southerner [John Tyler] who best defended diffusion during the Missouri Crisis would become a key actor in the Texas [annexation] epic.", p. 195: "...  the diffusion argument had emerged in the Missouri Controversy of the 1820s and would remain in the Texas Controversy of the 1840s."
  18. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 206: Pro-Texas arguments made by Senator Walker in 1843 were "remarkably similar to [Tyler's] diffusion theory he earlier had formulated at the time of the Missouri controversy."
  19. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 365
  20. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 176: "In fact, Mexican sovereignty [over Texas] was openly acknowledged" by the Adams and Jackson administrations, both of whom "tried to purchase all or part of Texas from the Mexicans."
    Merk, 1978, p. 270: "Mexican fears were ... aroused because of the persistence with which the United States government tried to buy Texas."
    Merry, 2009, p. "Jackson ... had sought to purchase the province from Mexico before Texas independence."
  21. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 176:"... Texans, mostly Americans who had emigrated to the province ..."
  22. ^Merk, 1978, p. 270: "The Anglo-Americans who went to Texas were attracted by the prospect of beautiful agricultural lands virtually free.", Meacham, 2008, p. 315, Ray Allen Billington,The Far Western Frontier, 1830–1860 (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), p. 116.
  23. ^Freehling, 1991, pp. 368–369
    Merry, 2009, p. 70: "Stephen [Austin] arrived in 1821 and established sway over 100,000 acres of [Mexican land grants] with the assistance of Tejano elites who sought to partner in his enterprise."
  24. ^Malone, 1960, p. 543: "Stephen F. Austin ... the chief promoter of colonization [in Texas]" and "... the basic reason for the migration of Americans" was the "liberal colonization law under which a league [7 square miles] of land was made available to each married settler ... for less than $200."
  25. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 365: "The Mexican government ... considered southwestern [US] entrepreneurs the most likely migrants" and invited them "to bring along their despotic alternative to Mexican economic peonage, black slavery ..."
  26. ^Malone, 1960, p. 543: "The vast distances in Texas, the premium that space paid to the individualism" contributed to "the disrespect of settlers for Mexican authority" and "Private violence was common ... and public violence was endemic."
  27. ^Merk, 1978, p. 270: "The Texan revolt was the result primarily of the initial Mexican error of admitting into the rich prairies of Texas a race of aggressive and unruly American frontiersmen who were contemptuous of Mexico and Mexican authority."
  28. ^Merk, 1978, p. 270: Mexican authorities feared that "... Texas was developing into an American state ...", Malone, 1960, p. 544: "... the Colonization Law of 1830 ... forbade further American migration to Texas."
  29. ^Freehling, 1991, p.545: "Neglected sovereign power [in Texas] was creating a vacuum" and Mexico "accordingly emancipated slaves" nationwide on "September 15, 1829"
  30. ^Varon, 2008, p. 127: "Texans had earned the reputation as defenders of slavery – they had vehemently protested efforts by successive Mexican administrations to restrict and gradually dismantle the institution, winning concessions such as the 1828 decree that allowed Texans to register their slaves, in name only, as 'indentured servants'".
    Malone, 1960, p. 544
  31. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 365: "... On April 21, 1836, General Sam Houston ambushed Santa Anna at San Jacinto ..."
  32. ^Malone, 1960, p. 544: "... the Texas Declaration of Independence of March 2, 1836 ..."
  33. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 365, Merk, 1978, pp. 275–276
  34. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 365
  35. ^Merry, 2009, p.71: "... an official state of war existed between the two entities, although it never erupted into full scale fighting."
  36. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 365: "... prospective American settlers [did not] have to be told that life and property were safer in the United States than in Texas ..." and slave-owners "considered slave property particularly unsafe across the border."
  37. ^Andrew J. Torget (2015). Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas Borderlands, 1800–1850. The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN .
  38. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 365: "Imminent war hung heavily over the Texas Republic's prospects": though "Few Texans feared that Mexico might win such a war," it would disrupt Texas's economy and society, making "slave property particularly unsafe." P. 367: "Texas's population shortage victimized more than the economy. Slim populations made for low tax revenue, a large national debt, and an undermanned army."
  39. ^Finkelman, 2011, pp. 29–30: "As long as Texas remained an independent republic, the Mexican government had no strong incentive to actively assert its claim of ownership. In the years since declaring independence, Texas had hardly prospered; its government was weak, its treasury was empty, and its debt was mounting every year. Mexico knew that eventually the independent government would fail."
  40. ^Malone, 1960, p. 545: Texans "avidly desired annexation by the United States.", Crapol, 2006, p. 176: Texans "overwhelmingly supported immediate annexation by the United States."
  41. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 367: "President Jackson was indeed a partisan of Texas annexation ... He recognized the independence of Texas ... on the last day of his administration ..." and "later claimed his greatest mistake was in failing to celebrate annexation as well as recognition."
  42. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 367: "On the last day of his administration ... he recognized the independence of Texas."
  43. ^Malone, 1960, p. 545: Jackson maintained "correct neutrality" towards Texas independence., Crapol, 2006, p. 53: "Unwilling to jeopardize the election of Van Buren ... Jackson had not sought immediate annexation ... although recognition was granted in early 1837 after Van Buren was safely elected ..." Merk, 1978, p. 279
  44. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 53: "... a widespread northern uneasiness that taking Texas would add a number of slave states and upset the congressional balance between North and South." Malone, 1960, p. 545: "... the American Anti-Slavery Society" charged that "Texas would make half a dozen [slave] states ... and annexation would give the South dominance in the Union." Merk, 1978, p. 279: "... it would precipitate a clash over the extension of slavery in the United States."
  45. ^Merry, 2009, p. 71: Van Buren "particularly feared any sectional flare-ups over slavery that would ensue from an annexation effort."
  46. ^Freehling, 1991, pp. 367–368: Van Buren "considered Texas potentially poisonous to American Union", and Whigs "could generate mammoth political capital out of any war with Mexico which was fought to gain a huge slaveholding republic and still more land for the Slavepower." "Van Buren would not even allow the Texas [minister to the US] to present an annexation proposal ... until months after his inauguration, then swiftly turned it down."
    Crapol, 2006, p. 177: "... in August 1837, the Texans officially requested annexation, but Van Buren, fearing an anti-slavery backlash and domestic turmoil, rebuffed them.", Malone, 1960, p. 545: Van Buren "facing a financial crisis [Panic of 1837] ... did not want to add to his diplomatic and political difficulties, rebuffed it." Merk, 1978, pp. 279–280
  47. ^Richard Bruce Winders, Crisis in the Southwest: The United States, Mexico, and the Struggle over Texas (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 41.
    Malone, 1960, p. 545: "In 1838, an annexation resolution that was presented in the Senate by a South Carolinian was voted down, while another that had been similarly introduced in the House was smothered by three-weeks filibustering speech by John Quincy Adams ... soon after the Texans withdrew their offer and turned their eyes toward Great Britain."
    Crapol, 2006, p. 177: "Texas withdrew their [annexation] offer in October 1838."
  48. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 177: "[A series of failures to annex Texas] was more of less where matters [on annexation] stood when John Tyler entered the White House."
  49. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 10: "Three days after taking the symbolic oath-taking [April 6, 1841], John Tyler issued an inaugural address to further buttress the legitimacy of his presidency."
  50. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 364: "Tyler vetoed [the Whigs] banking bill" and "again ... vetoed [it]." The Whigs congressional caucus "... excommunicated the President from the party ..." Tyler recruited "extreme States' Rights Whigs" to fill cabinet posts ..." p. 357: As the "first and last States' Rights Whig President" he would form a "coalition uncompromisingly for states' rights.", Merk, 1978, p. 280: Tyler ..."a president without a party ... turned to foreign affairs, where executive authority was greater ..."
  51. ^Merk, 1978, pp. 280–281: "... opportunities were open in foreign affairs – the annexation of Texas and a settlement of the Oregon dispute with England. The acquisition of Texas also beckoned.", Crapol, 2006, pp. 24–25: "John Tyler recognized, as his fellow Virginians Jefferson and Monroe ... that expansion was the republican key to preserving the delicate balance between national and state power" and"... bringing Texas into the Union headed Tyler's acquisitive agenda." P. 177: Tyler's "Madisonian formula, [where] empire and liberty became inseparable in order to sustain the incongruity of a slaveholding republic."
  52. ^Merk, 1978, p. 281: "The temper of the period was expansionist and its tide might carry the statesman [Tyler] riding it into a term of his own in the White House."
  53. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 177
  54. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 178:"Despite being preoccupied by these more urgent diplomatic initiatives, the president kept Texas uppermost on his long-term expansionist agenda."
  55. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 180
  56. ^Merk, 1978, p. 281: "The letter was recognized at once as a major pronouncement on the Texas issue." "And [Gilmer] was a believer in the new creed of the beneficence of slavery and also in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny.", Crapol, 2006, pp. 180–181
  57. ^Merk, 1978, p. 281: "[Daniel Webster's] presence in the Cabinet had become an embarrassment to Tyler as the annexation issue emerged." And "[Upshur] ... a devotee of strict construction and ... the beneficence of Negro slavery." And "[Upshur's] appointment was an omen of the coming drive for the annexation of Texas."
    Crapol, 2006, p. 194: Upshur agreed with Tyler "that bringing the Lone Star Republic in the Union as a slave state should be the administration's number one diplomatic priority."
    Freehling, 1991, p. 364: "... his Secretary of State [Upshur] could suggest a foreign policy [on Texas] fit to reassert executive authority and build a presidential party."
  58. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 197: Upshur's letter was an "effort to rally the American public in opposition to British machinations in Texas ..."
    Freehling, 1991, pp. 399–400: "... American Ambassador to London Edward Everett told Aberdeen of the Tyler-Upshur fury about English 'earnest pressing'... [encouraging] a Texas-Mexico emancipation rapprochement."
  59. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 197: Upshur's letter "a breach of diplomatic protocol ..."
  60. ^Varon, 2008, p. 166: "In 1841, Tyler had dispatched Green as an emissary to London, to move stealthily in diplomatic circles in search of 'proof' that England had designs on Texas
    Merk, 1978, p. 281–282: "The subjects of negotiation" included "adjustments of territorial issues ... of the Oregon dispute ..." and p. 282: "Green busied himself, in collaboration with ... Lewis Cass ... to defeat ratification of the ... Quintuple Treaty to suppress the maritime slave trade" which France approved.
  61. ^Merk, 1978, p. 282: "... the discovery of a British 'plot' to abolitionize Texas ... promised a government guarantee of interest on a loan to Texas ... devoted to abolitionizing Texas."
  62. ^Merk, 1978, p. 284: "Everett's report ... constituted a negation of the Duff Green letter and the charges Upshur wished to fasten to the British ministry ..." and expressed the opinion that Britain "was less committed to antislavery causes than had been its predecessor, or the British public."
    Merry, 2009, p. 74: "The British minister to Mexico ... Charles Elliot, had actually formulated a plan for extensive British loans to Texas in exchange for abolition and a free trade policy between the two countries. His clear aim was to detach Texas completely from United States influence ... Lord Aberdeen, British foreign secretary, on three occasions sought to assure America that Britain harbored no such ambitions ... But ... Duff Green, Tyler's man in London, chose to ignore Aberdeen's assurances. His motive is discernible in his private warnings to his friend Calhoun that, without the Texas issue, the Calhoun forces would be over whelmed by the presidential momentum of their rival Van Buren."
  63. ^Merry, 2009, p. 72: Duff Green's claims of a British loan plot, "though false ... was highly incendiary throughout the South – and also in the White House, occupied by a Virginia slaveholder and longtime Calhoun confidant."
  64. ^Merk, 1978, p. 282: "... the tidings from Green ... also went to Calhoun ... the mentor of southern extremists." And "[Calhoun] ... believed the "British were determined to abolish slavery ... throughout the continent ... a disaster," and he would "lead a campaign of propaganda on behalf of annexation."
  65. ^Merk, 1978, pp. 282–283: "On August 18, 1843 ... Lord Aberdeen was questioned in the House of Lords as to what the [British] government was doing regarding the trade in slaves to Texas and ... war between Mexico and Texas" he said that "an armistice had been arranged ..." and that "the British government hoped to see slavery abolished in Texas and everywhere else in the world" and to see "peace between Mexico and Texas."
  66. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 382
  67. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 195
    Merk, 1991, p. 283: "Prompt action was necessary to meet the threat. Tyler at once authorized Upshur to open negotiations with the Texas government ... on September 18, 1843 ..." and "word passed to Isaac Van Zandt ..."
  68. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 561
  69. ^Finkelman, 2011, p. 30: "By 1843, the government in Austin [Texas] was negotiating with Great Britain to intercede with Mexico to recognize Texas independence."
    Freehling, 1991, pp. 370–371
  70. ^Finkelman, 2011, p. 30: "It is hard to imagine that the slaveholding republic would have actually consented to any significant British influence in Texas because Britain was deeply hostile to slavery and had abolished it everywhere in its empire."
    Malone, 1960, p. 545: "Things were not going well in Texas ... in 1843 ... and [Sam Houston] had little choice but to flirt with the British for their backing."
  71. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 369
  72. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 369: "An American presidential election loomed ... [both parties] were determined to keep annexation out of the canvass."
  73. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 396: "... Texas could govern themselves if they conceded Mexicans' theoretical sovereignty" or Britain's minister to Mexico Doyle "[could] suggest that Mexico grant Texas independence if Texas should make [its] blacks independent."
  74. ^Merk, 1978, p. 284: "Van Zandt ... favored annexation ..." but had been instructed "to take no action on the matter ... and declined Upshur's invitation to enter" into talks. "The Texas government had no fear of British interference with its form of labor ... never so much as alluded to by British representatives in Texas." "What Texans really feared was reopening by Mexico of hostilities in the event of attempted annexation to the United States and a resulting withdrawal of [Britain]" as mediator.
  75. ^Merk, 1978, p. 285: Upshur wrote Houston "earlier American failures ... had been due to a misunderstanding of the issue." "Annexation was now favored even in the North to a great extent ..." and it would be feasible to win "a clear constitutional majority" in "the Senate for ratification."
  76. ^Merk, 1978, p. 285: "The question [of American military commitment] went to the heart of Texan hesitation about entering into American negotiation, and also at the heart of the American constitutional principle of separation of powers."
  77. ^Merk, 1978, p. 285: "Houston ... reversed his stand ... and recommended to [Texas] Congress the opening of an annexation negotiation."
    Crapol, 2006, p. 196: "After five months of hard bargaining, [Upshur] convinced enough members of Sam Houston's government of the sincerity of the Tyler administration's overtures and cajoled them into accepting American guarantees of protection and quick action."
  78. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 198: "... Almonte bluntly warned [Upshur], Mexico would sever diplomatic relations and immediately declare war."
  79. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 199: Uphsur denied "any knowledge of US-Texas negotiations to Minister Almonte ..."
  80. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 203: "... Upshur ... inform[ed] Texas officials that at least forty of fifty-two senators were solid for ratification ..."
  81. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 199: "It was the prudent thing to do if he hoped to retain the trust of the Texans and keep them at the negotiating table."
  82. ^Crapol, 2006, pp. 200–201
  83. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 207
  84. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 209: "The deaths of Upshur and Gilmer deprived [Tyler] of two of his best people and the most important architects of the administration's annexation policy ... the political landscape had been rocked."
  85. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 211: Calhoun "ranked with Daniel Webster and Henry Clay as America's leading political icons of the early republic."
  86. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 211: "... Tyler momentarily balked at the idea of appointing Calhoun as secretary of state because the South Carolinian might adversely polarize public opinion on the Texas question ... It was a decision he later came to regret."
  87. ^Merk, 1978, pp. 285–286: Calhoun "was known to be eager for Texas ... [and] had been Upshur's counselor on the issue."
    Merry, 2009, p. 67: Calhoun's appointment as Secretary of State was "guaranteed to generate controversy and disruption" on the Texas issue.
  88. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 418: "Once [Sam] Houston agreed to negotiate with Upshur, Walker authored an enormously influential pro-Texas pamphlet."
    Crapol, 2006, p. 204: "... Senator Walker published a lengthy pro-annexation letter" in a leading newspaper, "... a message to the American people outlining the manifold reasons why the United States should annex Texas," and "millions of copies were circulated" in pamphlet form.
    Merry, 2009, p. 85: Walker "had published a long pro-annexation treatise that had helped galvanize the issue and get [Texas annexation] into the public consciousness."
  89. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 22: "... the Monroe Doctrine [was] a restatement of the Madisonian/Jeffersonian faith in territorial expansion ..." also see p. 205.
  90. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 418: Walker asserted that "an annexed Texas, instead of helping to perpetuate slavery, would beneficially diffuse blacks away, first from the oldest [US] South, eventually from an emancipated North America." And pp. 419–420: The country would be emptied of blacks, 'not by abolition ... but slowly and gradually ...'
    Wilentz, 2008, p. 563: Walker "argued that annexation would lead to a dispersal of slave populations through the West and into Latin America, hasten slavery's demise" and create "an all-white United States – a rehashing of the old Jeffersonian 'diffusion' idea."
  91. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 205: "... in an appeal to the racial fears of northern whites ..." Walker warned that "the only safety-valve for the whole Union, and the only practicable outlet for the African population is through Texas, into Mexico and Central and South America".
  92. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 206: "The idea of shipping blacks to Africa ... was a solution Jefferson, Madison and John Tyler had embraced, and later pursued by Abraham Lincoln during the first year of the Civil War when he attempted to launch a Haitian colonization scheme."
  93. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 206: Walker warned of "the ever-threatening British who were intent on preventing annexation ... as part of their overall plan to undercut American national destiny."
  94. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 418: Failure to annex Texas, according to Walker "would lead to British-induced emancipation in Texas, then to Yankee-induced emancipation in the South, then to freed slaves swarming northwards towards their liberators."
  95. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 423: "Nowhere was the economic tremor of the 1840s more evident than in the older eastern South" where poor cotton yields "intensified the search for a way out." and "... in Texas, went the dream ... demand for slaves might increase slave prices, bailing out the less prosperous southeast. But close the safety valve, heap up redundant slaves back on the decaying older South, and black hands would be increasingly idle." And p. 424: "... the claustrophobia of the Southeast, pent up with too many increasingly dispensable" slaves.
  96. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 206: "Senator Walker ... once again proposed the all-purpose remedy of annexation [which would] 'strengthen and fortify the whole Union.'"
  97. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 418: "The Walker thesis transformed sorely pressed Northern Democrats from traitors who knuckled under to the Slavepower into heroes who would diffuse blacks further from the North."
  98. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 207: In the weeks and months following its publication, his letter "shaped and framed" the public debate.
    Freehling, 1991, p. 422: "No one called Walker's [analysis] 'untrue'."
  99. ^Merk, 1978, p. 286: "Texas ... admitted as a territory subject to the same constitutional provisions as other territories ..."
  100. ^Holt, 2005, p. 13: "Under the original terms of the Democratic resolution, Texas would be admitted to the Union as a territory, not as a state; furthermore, in return for paying off the bonded debt Texas had accrued since 1836, the United States would own all the unsold public land in the huge republic.
    Freehling, 1991, p. 440
  101. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 213
    Merk, 1978, p. 286: "What the Senate would ratify was kept constantly in mind" during the Tyler-Texas negotiation.
  102. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 213: "This garrison ... named the Army of Observation" and "... a powerful naval force to the Gulf of Mexico."
  103. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 213: "Tyler was true to his word."
  104. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 217: Cabinet members "were split on the wisdom of [Tyler's] Texas machinations ... Wilkins, a Democrat, was solidly behind Tyler on Texas ..." and "stressed the economic benefits for [his home state Pennsylvania] ..." and the need to prevent Texas from "becoming a commercial dependency of Great Britain."
  105. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 217: "Spencer thought Tyler's directive [to supply funds without Congressional sanction] was illegal ... After twice refusing to execute the president's order, Secretary Spencer resigned his cabinet post on May 2, 1844."
  106. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 408: "On April 22, 1844, the Senate received the pre-treaty correspondence [and] the [Tyler] treaty ..."
  107. ^Finkelman, 2011, p. 29: "A treaty required a two-thirds majority [in the Senate] for ratification."
  108. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 407: "The new Secretary of State [Calhoun] reached Washington March 29, 1844."
  109. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 415: "... Calhoun could only begin to provoke a 'sense of crisis' with southern Democrats.", and "The Packenham Letter could rally southern Democrats against the party's northern establishment ..."
    May, 2008, p. 113: "The Packenham Letter proved the claims of anti-annexationists and abolitionists that the Texas question was only about slavery – its expansion and preservation – despite Tyler's protestations to the contrary."
    Varon, 2008, p. 167: Calhoun "unabashedly cast Texas as a stronghold for slavery."
  110. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 408: The Packenham Letter "declared the national [Texas] treaty a sectional weapon, designed to protect slavery's blessings from England's documented interference" and "aimed at driving southerners to see England's soft threat in a hard-headed way."
    May 2008, pp. 112–113: "Calhoun ... insisted that the 'peculiar institution' was, in fact, 'a political institution necessary to peace, safety and prosperity."
  111. ^Merry, 2009, pp. 67–68: Calhoun "wanted to expand the country's slave territory and thus retain the South's numerical and political advantage in regional disputes. He also wanted to force a slave issue confrontation within the country ... if that confrontation should split the Union, Texas would add luster and power to an independent South."
    Freehling, 2008, pp. 409–410: "Nothing would have made Northern Whigs tolerate the [Packenham] document, and Northern Democrats would have to be forced to swallow their distaste for the accord. Calhoun's scenario of rallying enough slaveholders to push enough Northern Democrats to stop evading the issue was exactly the way the election of 1844 and annexation aftermath transpired."
  112. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 216: "... the Tyler administration assumed that the Senate would consider annexation in executive session ... which meant the text of the treaty and accompanying documents would not be made public until after the vote on ratification."
  113. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 214
  114. ^Crapol, 2006, pp. 216–217: "As opposition to the Texas treaty mounted, the two leading candidates for the Whig and Democratic presidential nominations came out against immediate annexation."
  115. ^Merk, 1978, p. 288: Tyler moved the annexation issue "into the presidential campaign of 1844, which was underway."
  116. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 218: "In an attempt to salvage his presidential candidacy and to gain approval of his Texas annexation treaty ... Tyler sanctioned a third-party movement ... [A] band of Tyler followers, many of them postmasters and other recipients of his executive patronage ..." and "... a tactical maneuver [to] pressure Democrats to adopt an expansionist platform favoring the annexation of Texas."
  117. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 218: "Tyler explained ... that the third-party ploy worked because it made Democrats realize that a '[Pro-]Texas man or defeat was the only choice.'"
    May, 2008, p. 114: "If Tyler stayed in the race, he threatened to draw enough votes from Polk to elect Clay, which handed Tyler an opportunity to secure his [Texas] legacy."
  118. ^Finkelman, 2011, p. 27: "This was a superb strategy, because while Polk was much more interested in Texas, asserting expansive claims in the Pacific Northwest made him palatable to many northerners."
    Crapol, 2006, p. 218: "After bitter wrangling they denied Martin Van Buren the nomination and chose ... James K. Polk ... an outspoken expansionist, and his campaign platform called for the reannexation of Texas and the reoccupation of Oregon."
  119. ^May, 2008, p. 119: "If Polk or his representative could give Tyler that guarantee [to annex Texas], he promised to 'withdraw' and support Polk enthusiastically." and p. 120: "Tyler's supporters easily switched their allegiance to Polk [because] 'Polk would be the advocate of most of [his] measures.'"
  120. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 219: "In November Polk narrowly defeated Henry Clay in the popular vote by just over 38,000 out of 2.7 million votes cast ..."
  121. ^Holt, 2005, p. 12: "The Democrats' triumph in the 1844 elections [the Polk victory] increased the odds of Texas annexation ... [and with] their heavy majority in the House, Democrats could easily pass the resolution containing the same terms as Tyler's rejected treaty."
  122. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 168: "Even Benton's allies of the Wright-Van Buren persuasion had argued during the campaign for annexation in the proper manner, objecting only to [the Tyler-Calhoun treaty, with emphasis on slavery expansion]" and p. 168: Pro-annexation Northern Democrats "came to Washington [D.C.] 'prepared to vote for admission [of Texas] as a state ... saying nothing about slavery."
  123. ^Senate Journal, June 8, 1844, volume 430, pp. 436–438
  124. ^May, 2008, pp. 114–115
    Freehling, 1991, p. 443
  125. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 168: "The chain of events running back through the Baltimore convention to Calhoun's Packenham letter had finally polarized the Democrats along North-South lines."
  126. ^Merry, 2009, pp. 72–73: Calhoun's "letter to British minister Richard Packenham ... contained language so incendiary and politically audacious that it would render Senate ratification nearly impossible ..."
  127. ^Crapol, 2006, pp. 218–219: "Untroubled by the initial failure, Tyler had carefully prepared for just such a contingency ... recommending [Congress] consider another path to annexation."
  128. ^Holt, 2005, pp. 10–11
  129. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 440: "... the lame-duck Congress returned to Washington in December 1844 ..." and p. 443: "The previous June, this same Senate had scuttled Tyler's treaty of annexation, 35–16."
    Holt, 2005, p. 12
  130. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 575
  131. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 575
    Holt, 2005, p. 12: '... Lame-duck President Tyler [asked Congress] for a joint resolution that would require only a simple majority vote in the House and Senate. This tack would avoid the far-more-elusive two-thirds Senate majority required to ratify a treaty."
  132. ^May, 2008, pp. 121–122
  133. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 440
    Wilentz, 2008, p. 575
    Holt, 2005, p. 12
  134. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 171: "... Benton and others maintained that if Texas were admitted as a state, with any stipulation of terms, this would be a treaty requiring the assent of two thirds of the Senate."
  135. ^Holt, 2005, p. 12: "With their heavy majority in the House, Democrats could easily pass the [Tyler] resolution containing the same terms as Tyler's rejected treaty. Anti-Texas Whigs controlled the Senate narrowly, 28–24.
  136. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 443, Freehling, 1978, p. 443: "The South-leaning Democratic Party controlled the House by almost a two-to-one majority."
  137. ^Varon, 2008, p. 173: "The joint resolution sparked nearly three months of acrimonious debate."
    Sellers, 1978, p. 168: "But instead of welcoming the large body of [northern Democrat] converts [to Texas annexation], who would have made annexation irresistible, the [Tyler] administration and Calhounites in Congress insisted on a vindication of the rejected treaty of the previous spring [of 1844], with all its Packenham associations."
  138. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 170: "[Texas] agitation ... had shaken both northern Democrats and Southern Whigs" during the 1844 elections."
  139. ^Sellers, 1966, pp. 170–171: "Yet, apart from slavery, annexation was popular in much of the North ..." with some politicians under "heavy pressure" to proceed with Texas annexation.
  140. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 171: "One major problem was finding constitutional justification" for Tyler's request "for annexation through... a simple majority in both houses of Congress, rather than by treaty. Some thought that Congress could not annex Texas as a territory, but only as a state, under the constitutional provision that Congress could admit new states. On the contrary, [Senator] Benton and others maintained that if Texas were admitted as a state, without any stipulation of terms, this would be a treaty requiring the assent of two-thirds of the Senate. Yet the status of Texas as an independent nation made it necessary to stipulate terms with regard to her public property, lands, and debts, to say nothing of the extent of states that might be created from her territory and the status of slavery in them"
    Crapol, 2006, p. 220: "When Congress reconvened it acted upon Tyler's request, but not before considerable debate on the issue of the legality and constitutionality of annexing Texas by joint resolution."
  141. ^Sellers, 1978, p. 168: "Particularly objectionable to the Benton–Van Buren men was the provision that the US become responsible for the inflated Texas debt, speculators in which had been most active lobbyists for annexation." and "Many opponents [of the Texas bill] resented the lobbying of Texas bondholders ... who hoped that the US would assume the Texas unpaid debt."
  142. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 172: "With Democrats in hopeless disagreement, the equally beleaguered southern Whigs now took a hand."
  143. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 437: "... Clay lost every state in the Deep South."
  144. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 437, 440: "... Southern Whigs suffered from being labeled soft on Texas."
  145. ^Holt, 2005, p. 12: "Aware ... that their party had been damaged in the South by the annexation issue in 1844, a few southern Whigs were now eager to annex Texas."
  146. ^Varon, 2008, p. 175: "A small but aggressive cadre of Southern Whigs ... certain that annexation had decimated them in the recent election, broke ranks and joined the Democrats [on the Texas annexation issue]."
  147. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 441: "Both Whig Senator Ephraim Foster ... who wrote Brown's amendment, and Whig Congressman Alexander Stephens ... who helped guide the measure through the House ..."
  148. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 440
  149. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 575
  150. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 455: "Mexican officials believed that Texas ended at the Nueces River. Texans claimed instead that their empire sprawled 100 miles further south, to the Rio Grande; [this] would swell [Texas] thousands of square miles" into Mexico.
  151. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 205: By extending the Missouri Compromise line, the amendment would "guarantee slavery in most of Texas."
    Holt, 2005, p. 13: "... Brown stipulated that as many as four additional states could be carved from Texas and that future Congresses must admit as slave states if Texans so desired."
  152. ^Holt, 2005, p. 13
  153. ^Sellers, 1966, p.172: "But the great camouflaged issue was by now slavery" with neither North nor South willing to compromise on the matter.
  154. ^Sellers, 1978, p. 173: Democratic "annexationists seiz[ed] upon the opportunity [and] took up the proposition of the surprised southern Whigs at the 'first hop' and passed it January 25 with their support."
    Freehling, 1991, pp. 442–443: "Southern Democrats, as usual, would not allow Whigs to become more successfully aggressive on slavery-related issues ... Democrats saved [Representative] Milton Brown Whiggery, [voting] to add Brown's amendment to the joint congressional resolution admitting slavery.
  155. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 443
  156. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 186: "Texas was still far more a party question than a sectional question.", May, 2008, p. 123, Holt, 2005, pp. 13–14
  157. ^Holt, 2005, p. 14: "The division over annexation remained more partisan than sectional."
  158. ^Holt, 2005, p. 14
  159. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 443
  160. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 186: "The situation in the Senate was extremely complex."
    Freehling, 1991, p. 443: "the amended joint resolution now faced a harder test in the Senate."
  161. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 446: "... the only Southern Democrat who had voted no on the annexation treaty ..."
  162. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 575
  163. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 572: "In the Senate, Thomas Hart Benton offered his own plan which would split Texas into two equal districts, one slave and one free, and require Mexico's consent."
  164. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 446: "... Benton's freeing of half a slave republic seemed too Yankee."
  165. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 575
  166. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 447
  167. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 173
  168. ^Freeling, 1991, p. 447: "The impasse paralyzed the Polk administration before the President-elect could take office."
    Sellers, 1966, p. 205
  169. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 220: "... a number of the senators had voted for the compromise resolution with the expectation that President-elect Polk would be the one to choose between the options of immediate annexation or renewed negotiations."
    Freehling, 1991, p. 447: "Polk supported a sleight of hand [which would] authorized the President to administer either the ... Benton ... or Brown versions of annexation."
  170. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 447
  171. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 447: "Neither Polk's contemporaries nor late historians have appreciated the extent to which he was responsible for the narrow passage of the joint resolution ... four days before his inauguration. It was at his suggestion that the House resolution, providing for immediate annexation ... was combined with Benton's bill, providing for a five-member commission to negotiate with Texas the terms of annexation. And it was his persuasion, convincing Bentonites that he would choose the Benton alternative, that procured the votes to pass the compromise measure."
  172. ^Holt, 2005, p. 15
    Freehling, 1991, pp. 447–448: "All Democrats and three turncoat Whigs" voted for the compromise treaty bill.
  173. ^Holt, 2005, pp. 14–15: The Benton-Van Burenite Senators "expected Polk to pursue [their] option because Polk explicitly promised Benton that he would do so. Only that promise brought northern Democrats on board."
  174. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 220
  175. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 215
  176. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 215: "The Bentonian Senators had voted for the compromise relying on the assurance of Calhoun's friend Senator George McDuffie that the Tyler administration" would not 'meddle' with the bill and "that the choice between the alternative methods of annexation would be left to Polk."
    May, 2008, p. 124
  177. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 577
  178. ^Freehling, 1991, p. 448: "... under Calhoun's urging, President Tyler, on the eve of departing the White House, dispatched a courier to Houston City, offering Texas admission to the Union under the Milton Brown formula for possible future division" into several slave states.
    Crapol, 2006, p. 220: Tyler "signed the joint resolution on March 1 [1844] and two days later, after first touching base with Polk, sent a dispatch to the Texans offering annexation and admission on the House plan."
  179. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 216: "Tyler did insist that Calhoun get Polk's reaction to the plan. But Polk cagily 'declined to express any opinion or to make any suggestion in reference to the subject', as Calhoun reported to Tyler ..."
  180. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 577
  181. ^Sellers, 1966, pp. 215–216
  182. ^Holt, 2004, p. 15: "[Tyler] dispatched a courier to Texas offering annexation under the Brown-amended version of the House bill. Rather than recall this courier, Polk broke his promise to the Van Burenites and endorsed Tyler's action."
  183. ^Sellers, 1966, p. 221: United States envoy to Texas Donelson "was now told [by Polk] to warn the Texans that the United States Congress might not accept ... amendments, and to urge that they accept the terms unconditionally."
    Wilentz, 2008, p. 577
  184. ^Holt, 2004, p. 15: "... rather than seek new negotiations to settle the boundary dispute between Texas and Mexico, as even Brown's amendment had called for, he declared the Rio Grande the recognized boundary and announced he would deploy American military forces to defend it."
    Sellers, 1966, p. 221: Polk in footnote: "... if negotiations had been opened by Commissioners great delay would necessarily have taken place, giving ample opportunity to British and French intrigues to have seriously embarrassed, if not defeated, annexation." (emphasis in original)
  185. ^Wilentz, 2008, p. 578
  186. ^Gammel, H.P.N. (1898). The Laws of Texas, 1822–1897. 2. pp. 1225–1227.
  187. ^Weeks, Wm. F. (1846). Debates of the Texas Convention. Archived from the original on February 6, 2016.
  188. ^Holt, 2005, p. 15
  189. ^Merk, 1978, p.308: "In Texas, on February 19, 1846, [Texas President] Anson Jones presided over the ceremony of the transfer of his state's sovereignty to the United States."
  190. ^George Lockhart Rives (1913). The United States and Mexico, 1821–48. 2. C. Scribner's Sons. p. 47.
  191. ^Donald Fithian Stevens, Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico (1991) p. 11.
  192. ^Miguel E. Soto, "The Monarchist Conspiracy and the Mexican War" in Essays on the Mexican War ed by Wayne Cutler; Texas A&M University Press. 1986. pp. 66–67.
  193. ^Crapol, 2006, p. 279: "Tyler's extralegal joint resolution ploy, which belied his pretensions to being a strict constructionist when it came to interpreting the Constitution, appealed to late-nineteenth century imperialists who sought ways to circumvent Senate opposition to a Hawaii annexation treaty."
  194. ^Crapol, 2006, pp. 279–280

References[edit]

  • Brown, Richard H. 1966. The Missouri Crisis, Slavery, and the Politics of Jacksonianism. South Atlantic Quarterly. pp. 55–72 in Essays on Jacksonian America, Ed. Frank Otto Gatell. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York . 1970.
  • Crapol, Edward P. 2006. John Tyler: the accidental president. The University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill. ISBN 978-0-8078-3041-3
  • Dangerfield, George. 1952. The Era of Good Feelings, America Comes of Age in the Period of Monroe and Adams Between the War of 1812 and the Ascendancy of Jackson. Harcourt, Brace & Co. New York. ISBN 978-0-929587-14-1
  • Finkelman, Paul. 2011. Millard Fillmore. New York: Times Books
  • Freehling, William W. 1991. The Road to Disunion: Volume I: Secessionists at Bay, 1776–1854. Oxford University Press. 1991. ISBN 978-0-19-507259-4.
  • Holt, Michael F. 2005. The fate of their country: politicians, slavery extension, and the coming of the Civil War. New York: Hill and Wang. ISBN 978-0-8090-4439-9
  • Malone, Dumas and Rauch, Basil. 1960. Empire for Liberty: The Genesis and Growth of the United States of America. Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc. New York.
  • May, Gary. 2008. John Tyler. New York: Times Books ISBN 978-0-8050-8238-8
  • Meacham, Jon. 2008. American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House. Random House, New York.
  • Merk, Frederick. 1978. History of the Westward Movement. Alfred A. Knopf. New York. ISBN 978-0-394-41175-0
  • Merry, Robert W. 2009. A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the Mexican War and the Conquest of the American Continent. Simon & Schuster. New York. ISBN 978-0-7432-9743-1
  • Remini, Robert V. 2002. John Quincy Adams. New York: Times Books
  • Sellers, Charles. 1966. James K. Polk, Continentalist. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. ISBN 978-0-8090-6051-1
  • Varon, Elizabeth R.Disunion!: The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789–1859. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8078-3232-5
  • Wilentz, Sean. 2008. The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. W.W. Horton and Company. New York. ISBN 978-0-393-32921-6

External links[edit]

  • Texas from Independence to Annexation. Avalon Project at Yale Law School.
  • Joint Resolution for Annexing Texas to the United States, Approved March 1, 1845.
  • Jones, Anson. Letters, Relating to the History of Annexation. Galveston: Civilian Office, 1848.
  • Ordinance of Annexation, Approved by the Texas Convention on July 4, 1845.
  • Dewey, Orville. Discourse on Slavery and the Annexation of Texas. New York: C.S. Francis & Co., 1844.
  • Map of United States and Mexico at the time of the annexation of Texas (omniatlas.com)

Secondary sources[edit]

Источник: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_annexation

Republic of Texas

Sovereign state in North America from 1836 to 1846

Republic of Texas
República de Tejas  (Spanish)

Motto: 

”Remember the Alamo”[1]

Map of the Republic of Texas. Since the Republic was not recognized by Mexico, its entire territory was disputed. The area that was controlled by the Republic is in dark green while the territory claimed by the Republic but not effectively controlled is in light green.

Map of the Republic of Texas. Since the Republic was not recognized by Mexico, its entire territory was disputed. The area that was controlled by the Republic is in dark green while the territory claimed by the Republic but not effectively controlled is in light green.

Capital
Common languagesEnglish and Spanish
Spoken languagesFrench, German, Portuguese, Native languages (Caddo, Comanche)
GovernmentUnitarypresidentialconstitutional republic
President1 

• 1836

David G. Burnet

• 1836–38

Sam Houston, 1st term

• 1838–41

Mirabeau B. Lamar

• 1841–44

Sam Houston, 2nd term

• 1844–46

Anson Jones
Vice President1 

• 1836

Lorenzo de Zavala

• 1836–38

Mirabeau B. Lamar

• 1838–41

David G. Burnet

• 1841–44

Edward Burleson

• 1844–45

Kenneth L. Anderson
LegislatureCongress

• Upper house

Senate

• Lower house

House of Representatives
Historical eraWestern Expansion

• Independence from Mexico

March 2, 1836

• Annexation by the United States

December 29, 1845

• Transfer of power

February 19, 1846
CurrencyTexas dollar
Today part of

1Interim period (March 16 – October 22, 1836): President: David G. Burnet, Vice President Lorenzo de Zavala

The Burnet Flagused from December 1836 to January 1839 as the national flag until it was replaced by the Lone Star Flag, and as the war flag from January 25, 1839, to December 29, 1845[2]

The Republic of Texas (Spanish: República de Tejas) was a sovereign state in North America that existed from March 2, 1836, to February 19, 1846, although Mexico considered it a rebellious province during its entire existence. It was bordered by Mexico to the west and southwest, the Gulf of Mexico to the southeast, the two U.S. states of Louisiana and Arkansas to the east and northeast, and United States territories encompassing parts of the current U.S. states of Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, and New Mexico to the north and west. The Anglo residents of the republic were known as Texians.

The region of the Mexican state of Coahuila y Tejas, now commonly referred to as Mexican Texas, declared its independence from Mexico during the Texas Revolution in 1835–1836, when the Centralist Republic of Mexico abolished autonomy from states of the Mexican federal republic. The major fighting in the Texas war of independence ended on April 21, 1836, but the Mexican Congress refused to recognize the independence of the Republic of Texas, since the agreement was signed by Mexican President General Antonio López de Santa Anna under duress as prisoner of the Texians. There were intermittent conflicts between Mexico and Texas into the 1840s. The United States recognized the Republic of Texas in March 1837 but declined to annex the territory.[3]

The Republic-claimed borders were based upon the Treaties of Velasco between the newly created Texas Republic and General Santa Anna, who had been captured in battle. The eastern boundary had been defined by the Adams–Onís Treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain, which recognized the Sabine River as the eastern boundary of Spanish Texas and western boundary of the Missouri Territory. Under the 1819 Adams–Onís Treaty, before Mexico's 1821 independence, the United States had renounced its claim to Spanish land to the east of the Rocky Mountains and to the north of the Rio Grande, which it claimed to have acquired as part of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.

The republic's southern and western boundary with Mexico was disputed throughout the republic's existence, since Mexico disputed the independence of Texas. Texas claimed the Rio Grande as its southern boundary, while Mexico insisted that the Nueces River was the boundary. In practice, much of the disputed territory was occupied by the Comanche and outside the control of either state, but Texian claims included the eastern portions of New Mexico, which was administered by Mexico throughout this period.

Texas was annexed by the United States on December 29, 1845,[4] and was admitted to the Union as the 28th state on that day, with the transfer of power from the Republic to the new state of Texas formally taking place on February 19, 1846.[5] However, the United States inherited the southern and western border dispute with Mexico, which had refused to recognize Texas's independence or U.S. offers to purchase the territory. Consequently, the annexation triggered the Mexican–American War (1846–1848).

History[edit]

Spanish Texas[edit]

Main article: Spanish Texas

During the late Spanish colonial era, Texas had been one of the Provincias Internas, and the region is known in the historiography as Spanish Texas. Though claimed by Spain, it was not formally colonized by the empire until competing French interests at Fort St. Louis encouraged Spain to establish permanent settlements in the area.[6] The region was occupied and claimed by the existing indigenous groups. Sporadic missionary incursions occurred into the area during the period from the 1690s–1710s, before the establishment of San Antonio as a permanent civilian settlement.[7] Owing to the area's relatively dense Native American populations, its remoteness from the population centers of New Spain, and the lack of any obvious valuable resources such as silver, Texas had only a small European population, although Spain maintained a small military presence to protect Catholic missionaries working among Native American tribes, and to act as a buffer against the French in Louisiana and British North America.

In 1762, Bourbon France ceded to Bourbon Spain most of its claims to the interior of North America, including its claim to Texas, as well as the vast interior that became Spanish Louisiana.[8] During the years 1799 to 1803, the height of the Napoleonic Empire in France, Spain returned Louisiana to France, which then promptly sold the territory to the United States. The status of Texas during these transfers was unclear and was not resolved until 1819, when the Adams–Onís Treaty between Spain and the United States ceded Spanish Florida to the United States, and established a clear boundary between Texas and Louisiana.[9]

Starting in 1810 with the outbreak of the Mexican War of Independence, New Spain sought a different relationship with the Spanish crown. Some Anglo Americans fought on the side of Mexico against Spain in filibustering expeditions. One of these, the Gutiérrez–Magee Expedition (also known as the Republican Army of the North) comprised by a group of about 130 Anglo Americans under the leadership of Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara. Gutiérrez de Lara initiated Mexico's secession from Spain with efforts contributed by Augustus Magee. Bolstered by new recruits, and led by Samuel Kemper (who succeeded Magee after his death in battle in 1813), the expedition gained a series of victories against soldiers led by the Spanish governor, Manuel María de Salcedo.

Their victory at the Battle of Rosillo Creek convinced Salcedo to surrender on April 1, 1813; he was executed two days later. On April 6, 1813, the victorious Republican Army of the North drafted a constitution and declared the independent Republic of Texas, with Gutiérrez as its president.[10] Soon disillusioned with the Mexican leadership, the Anglo Americans under Kemper returned to the United States.

The ephemeral Republic of Texas came to an end on August 18, 1813, with the Battle of Medina, where the Spanish Army crushed the Republican Army of the North. The harsh reprisals against the Texas rebels created a deep distrust of the Royal Spanish authorities, and veterans of the Battle of Medina later became leaders of the Texas Revolution and signatories of the Texas Declaration of Independence from Mexico 20 years later.[citation needed]

After the failure of the Expedition, there would be no serious push for a "Republic of Texas" for another six years, until 1819, when Virginian filibuster James Long invaded Spanish Texas in an attempt to liberate the region.

Eli Harris led 120 men across the Sabine River to Nacogdoches. Long followed two weeks later with an additional 75 men. On June 22, the combined force declared a new government, with Long as president and a 21-member Supreme Council. The following day, they issued a declaration of independence, modeled on the United States Declaration of Independence. The document cited several grievances, including "Spanish rapacity" and "odious tyranny" and promised religious freedom, freedom of the press, and free trade. The council also allocated 10 square miles of land to each member of the expedition, and authorized the sale of additional land to raise cash for the fledgling government. Within a month, the expedition had grown to 300 members.

The new government established trading outposts near Anahuac along the Trinity River and the Brazos River. Long's Republic of Texas also established the first English-language newspaper ever published in Texas, so named the Texas Republican, which existed only for the month of August 1819.

Long also contacted Jean Lafitte, who ran a large smuggling operation on Galveston Island. His letter suggested that the new government establish an admiralty court at Galveston, and offered to appoint Lafitte governor of Galveston. Unbeknownst to Long, Lafitte was actually a Spanish spy. While making numerous promises–and excuses–to Long, Lafitte gathered information about the expedition and passed it on to Spanish authorities. By July 16, the Spanish Consul in New Orleans had warned the viceroy in Mexico City that "I am fully persuaded that the present is the most serious expedition that has threatened the Kingdom".

With Lafitte's lack of assistance, the expedition soon ran low on provisions. Long dispersed his men to forage for food. Discipline began to break down, and many men, including James Bowie, returned home. In early October, Lafitte reached an agreement with Long to make Galveston an official port for the new country and name Lafitte governor. Within weeks, 500 Spanish troops arrived in Texas and marched on Nacogdoches. Long and his men withdrew. Over 40 men were captured. Long escaped to Natchitoches, Louisiana. Others fled to Galveston and settled along Bolivar Peninsula.

Undeterred in his defeat, Long returned once more in 1820, Long joined the refugees at Bolivar Peninsula on April 6, 1820, with more reinforcements. He continued to raise money to equip a second expedition. Fifty men attempted to join him from the United States, but they were arrested by American authorities as they tried to cross into Texas. The men who had joined Long were disappointed they were paid in scrip, and they gradually began to desert. By December 1820, Long commanded only 50 men.

With the aid of Ben Milam and others, Long revitalized the Supreme Council. He later broke with Milam, and the expedition led an uncertain existence until September 19, 1821, when Long and 52 men marched inland to capture Presidio La Bahía. The town fell easily on October 4, but four days later Long was forced to surrender by Spanish troops. He was taken prisoner and sent to Mexico City, where about six months later he was shot and killed by a guard – reportedly bribed to do so by José Félix Trespalacios, thus ending the Long Expeditions.

Mexican Texas[edit]

Main article: Mexican Texas

Along with the rest of Mexico, Texas gained its independence from Spain in 1821 following the Treaty of Córdoba, and the new Mexican state was organized under the Plan of Iguala, which created Mexico as a constitutional monarchy under its first Emperor Agustín de Iturbide. During the transition from a Spanish territory to a part of the independent country of Mexico, Stephen F. Austin led a group of American settlers known as the Old Three Hundred, who negotiated the right to settle in Texas with the Spanish Royal governor of the territory. Since Mexican independence had been ratified by Spain shortly thereafter, Austin later traveled to Mexico City to secure the support of the new country for his right to settle.[11] The establishment of Mexican Texas coincided with the Austin-led settlement, leading to animosity between Mexican authorities and ongoing American settlement of Texas. The First Mexican Empire was short-lived, being replaced by a republican form of government in 1823. In 1824, the sparsely populated territories of Texas and Coahuila were joined to form the state of Coahuila y Tejas. The capital was controversially located in southern Coahuila, the part farthest from Texas.

Following Austin's lead, additional groups of settlers, known as Empresarios, continued to colonize Mexican Texas from the United States. A spike in the price of cotton, and the success of plantations in Mississippi encouraged large numbers of white Americans to migrate to Texas and obtain slaves to try to replicate the business model.[12] In 1830, Mexican President Anastasio Bustamante outlawed American immigration to Texas, following several conflicts with the Empresarios over the status of slavery, which had been abolished in Mexico in 1829, but which the Texians refused to end.[13] Texians replaced slavery with long-term indentured servitude contracts signed by "liberated" slaves in the United States to work around the abolition of slavery. Angered at the interference of the Mexican government, the Empresarios held the Convention of 1832, which was the first formal step in what became the Texas Revolution.[14]

By 1834, the American settlers in the area outnumbered Mexicans by a considerable margin.[15] Following a series of minor skirmishes between Mexican authorities and the settlers, the Mexican government, fearing open rebellion of their Anglo subjects, began to step up military presence in Texas throughout 1834 and early 1835. Mexican President Antonio López de Santa Anna revoked the 1824 Constitution of Mexico and began to consolidate power in the central government under his own leadership. In 1835, the central government split Texas and Coahuila into two separate departments. The Texian leadership under Austin began to organize its own military, and hostilities broke out on October 2, 1835, at the Battle of Gonzales, the first engagement of the Texas Revolution.[16] In November 1835, a provisional government known as the Consultation was established to oppose the Santa Anna regime (but stopped short of declaring independence from Mexico). On March 1, 1836, the Convention of 1836 came to order, and the next day declared independence from Mexico, establishing the Republic of Texas.[17]

Independent republic[edit]

Politics[edit]

Map of the Republic of Texas and the Adjacent Territories by C.F. Cheffins, 1841

Sam Houston was elected as the new President of the Republic of Texas on September 5, 1836.[18] The second Congress of the Republic of Texas convened a month later, in October 1836, at Columbia (now West Columbia). Stephen F. Austin, known as the Father of Texas, died December 27, 1836, after serving two months as Secretary of State for the new Republic.

In 1836, five sites served as temporary capitals of Texas (Washington-on-the-Brazos, Harrisburg, Galveston, Velasco and Columbia), before PresidentSam Houston moved the capital to Houston in 1837. The next president, Mirabeau B. Lamar, moved the capital to the new town of Austin in 1839.

The first flag of the republic was the "Burnet Flag" (a single gold star on an azure field), followed in 1839 by official adoption of the Lone Star Flag.

Internal politics of the Republic centered on two factions. The nationalist faction, led by Lamar, advocated the continued independence of Texas, the expulsion of the Native Americans (Indians), and the expansion of Texas to the Pacific Ocean. Their opponents, led by Houston, advocated the annexation of Texas to the United States and peaceful coexistence with the Indians, when possible. The Texas Congress even passed a resolution over Houston's veto claiming the Californias for Texas.[19] The 1844 presidential election split the electorate dramatically, with the newer western regions of the Republic preferring the nationalist candidate Edward Burleson, while the cotton country, particularly east of the Trinity River, went for Anson Jones.[20]

Armed conflicts[edit]

The Comanche Indians furnished the main Indian opposition to the Texas Republic, manifested in multiple raids on settlements, capture, and rape of female pioneers, torture killings, and trafficking in captive slaves.[21] In the late 1830s, Sam Houston negotiated a peace between Texas and the Comanches. Lamar replaced Houston as president in 1838 and reversed the Indian policies. He returned to war with the Comanches and invaded Comancheria itself. In retaliation, the Comanches attacked Texas in a series of raids. After peace talks in 1840 ended with the massacre of 34 Comanche leaders in San Antonio, the Comanches launched a major attack deep into Texas, known as the Great Raid of 1840. Under command of Potsanaquahip (Buffalo Hump), 500 to 700 Comanche cavalry warriors swept down the Guadalupe River valley, killing and plundering all the way to the shore of the Gulf of Mexico, where they sacked the towns of Victoria and Linnville. The Comanches retreated after being pursued by 186 rangers, and were caught at the Battle of Plum Creek wherein they lost the plunder they had taken.[22] Houston became president again in 1841 and, with both Texians and Comanches exhausted by war, a new peace was established.[23]

Although Texas achieved self-government, Mexico refused to recognize its independence.[24] On March 5, 1842, a Mexican force of over 500 men, led by Ráfael Vásquez, invaded Texas for the first time since the revolution. They soon headed back to the Rio Grande after briefly occupying San Antonio. About 1,400 Mexican troops, led by the French mercenary general Adrián Woll, launched a second attack and captured San Antonio on September 11, 1842. A Texas militia retaliated at the Battle of Salado Creek while simultaneously, a mile and a half away, Mexican soldiers massacred a militia of fifty-three Texas volunteers who had surrendered after a skirmish.[25][26] That night, the Mexican Army retreated from the city of San Antonio back to Mexico.

Mexico's attacks on Texas intensified conflicts between political factions, including an incident known as the Texas Archive War. To "protect" the Texas national archives, President Sam Houston ordered them removed from Austin. The archives were eventually returned to Austin, albeit at gunpoint. The Texas Congress admonished Houston for the incident, and this episode in Texas history solidified Austin as Texas's seat of government for the Republic and the future state.[27]

There were also domestic disturbances. The Regulator–Moderator War involved a land feud in Harrison and Shelby Counties in East Texas from 1839 to 1844. The feud eventually involved Nacogdoches, San Augustine, and other East Texas counties. Harrison County Sheriff John J. Kennedy and county judge Joseph U. Fields helped end the conflict, siding with the law-and-order party. Sam Houston ordered 500 militia to help end the feud.

Criteria of citizenship[edit]

Citizenship was not automatically granted to all previous inhabitants of Texas and some residents were not allowed to continue living legally within the Republic without the consent of Congress. The Constitution of the Republic of Texas (1836) established different rights according to the race and ethnicity of each individual. Section 10 of the General Provisions of the Constitution stated that all persons who resided in Texas on the day of the Declaration of Independence were considered citizens of the Republic, excepting "Africans, the descendants of Africans, and Indians."[28] For new white immigrants, Section 6 established that, to become citizens, they needed to live in the Republic for at least six months and take an oath. While regarding the black population, section 9 established that black persons who were brought to Texas as slaves were to remain slaves and that not even their owner could emancipate them without the consent of Congress. Furthermore, the Congress was not allowed to make laws that affected the slave trade or declare emancipation. Section 9 also established that: "No free person of African descent, either in whole or in part, shall be permitted to reside permanently in the Republic, without the consent of Congress."[29]

Government[edit]

In September 1836 Texas elected a Congress of 14 senators and 29 representatives. The Constitution allowed the first president to serve for two years and subsequent presidents for three years. To hold an office or vote, a man had to be a citizen of the Republic.[30]

The first Congress of the Republic of Texas convened in October 1836 at Columbia (now West Columbia). Stephen F. Austin, often referred to as the "Father of Texas," died on December 27, 1836, after serving just two months as the republic's secretary of state. Due mainly to the ongoing war for independence, five sites served as temporary capitals of Texas in 1836: (Washington-on-the-Brazos, Harrisburg, Galveston, Velasco and Columbia). The capital was moved to the new city of Houston in 1837.

In 1839, a small pioneer settlement situated on the Colorado River in central Texas was chosen as the republic's seventh and final capital. Incorporated under the name Waterloo, the town was renamed Austin shortly thereafter in honor of Stephen F. Austin.

The court system inaugurated by Congress included a Supreme Court consisting of a chief justice appointed by the president and four associate justices, elected by a joint ballot of both houses of Congress for four-year terms and eligible for re-election. The associates also presided over four judicial districts. Houston nominated James Collinsworth to be the first chief justice. The county-court system consisted of a chief justice and two associates, chosen by a majority of the justices of the peace in the county. Each county was also to have a sheriff, a coroner, justices of the peace, and constables to serve two-year terms. Congress formed 23 counties, whose boundaries generally coincided with the existing municipalities. In 1839, Texas became the first nation in the world to enact a homestead exemption, under which creditors cannot seize a person's primary residence.

Education[edit]

President Anson Jones signed the charter for Baylor University in the fall of 1845.[31]Henry Lee Graves was elected Baylor's first president. It is believed to be the oldest university in Texas, however, Rutersville College was chartered in 1840 with land and the town of Rutersville.[32] Chauncey Richardson[33] was elected Rutersville's first president. The college later became Southwestern University in Georgetown, Fayette county.[33]University of Mary Hardin-Baylor was also chartered by the Republic of Texas in 1845, and received lands in Belton, Texas.[34]Wesleyan College, chartered in 1844 and signed by president Sam Houston, another predecessor to Southwestern did not survive long due to competition from other colleges.[35]Mirabeau Lamar signed a charter in 1844 for the Herman University for medicine but classes never started due to lack of funds.[36] The University of San Augustine was chartered June 5, 1837, but did not open until 1842 when Marcus A. Montrose became president. There were as many as 150 students enrolled, however, attendance declined to 50 in 1845, and further situations including animosity and embittered factions in the community closed the university in 1847.[37] Later it became the University of East Texas, and soon after that became the Masonic Institute of San Augustine in 1851. Guadalupe College at Gonzales was approved January 30, 1841, however, there were no construction efforts ensued for the next eleven years.[38]

Boundaries[edit]

Mexico between 1835 and 1935 faced many independence movements, including Texas.

  Territory which declared its independence from Mexico, 1835–1936

  Territory claimed by multiple independence movements

  Territory claimed by the Republic of the Rio Grande

  Other rebellions

The Texian leaders at first intended to extend their national boundaries to the Pacific Ocean, but ultimately decided to claim the Rio Grande as boundary, including much of New Mexico, which the Republic never controlled. They also hoped, after peace was made with Mexico, to run a railroad to the Gulf of California to give "access to the East Indian, Peruvian and Chilean trade".[39] When negotiating for the possibility of annexation to the U.S. in late 1836, the Texian government instructed its minister Wharton in Washington that if the boundary were an issue, Texas was willing to settle for a boundary at the watershed between the Nueces River and Rio Grande, and leave out New Mexico.[40]

In 1840 the first and only census of the Republic of Texas was taken, recording a population of about 70,000 people. San Antonio and Houston were recorded as the largest and second largest cities respectively.[citation needed]

Diplomatic relations and foreign trade[edit]

Main article: Foreign relations of the Republic of Texas

Texas' status as a slaveholding country and Mexico's claim on the territory caused significant problems in the foreign relations of Texas, with Mexico lobbying third countries not to aid the breakaway republic.[12]

Though supported by the vast majority of the population of Texas at the time of independence[citation needed], annexation by the United States was prevented by the leadership of both major U.S. political parties, the Democrats and the Whigs. They opposed the introduction of a vast slave-holding region into a country already divided into pro- and anti-slavery sections, and also wished to avoid a war with Mexico.

On March 3, 1837, U.S. President Andrew Jackson appointed Alcée La Branche American chargé d'affaires to the Republic of Texas, thus officially recognizing Texas as an independent republic.[41]France granted official recognition of Texas on September 25, 1839, appointing Alphonse Dubois de Saligny to serve as chargé d'affaires. The French Legation was built in 1841, and still stands in Austin as the oldest frame structure in the city.[42] Conversely, the Republic of Texas embassy in Paris was located in what is now the Hôtel de Vendôme, adjacent to the Place Vendôme in the 1st arrondissement of Paris.[43]

The Republic also received diplomatic recognition from Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Yucatán. The United Kingdom hesitated to grant official recognition of Texas due to its own friendly relations with Mexico,[citation needed] but admitted Texian goods into British ports on their own terms. In London, immediately opposite the gates to St. James's Palace, Sam Houston's original Embassy of the Republic of Texas to the Court of St. James's is now a hat shop but is clearly marked with a large plaque and there was a nearby restaurant by Trafalgar Square called the Texas Embassy Cantina but it closed in June 2012.[44] A plaque on the exterior of 3 St. James's Street in London notes the upper floors of the building (which have housed the noted wine merchant Berry Brothers and Rudd since 1698) housed the Texas Legation.

The United Kingdom eventually recognized Texas in the 1840s after a cotton price crash, in a failed attempt to coerce Texas to give up slavery (replacing slave-produced cotton from southern U.S. states), and to stop expansion of the United States to the southwest.[12] The cotton price crash of the 1840s bankrupted the Republic, increasing the urgency of finding foreign allies who could help prevent a reconquest by Mexico.[12]

Presidents and vice presidents[edit]

Main article: President of the Republic of Texas

Presidents and Vice Presidents of the Republic of Texas
No. Portrait President Term of office Party Term Previous office Vice President
Davidgburnet2.jpgDavid Burnet
(1788-04-18)April 18, 1788 – (1870-12-05)December 5, 1870
(aged 82)

March 16, 1836

October 22, 1836
Nonpartisan Interim
Delegate to the
Convention of 1833
Lorenzo de Zavala
1 SHouston 2.jpgSam Houston
(1793-03-02)March 2, 1793 – (1863-07-26)July 26, 1863
(aged 70)

October 22, 1836

December 10, 1838
Nonpartisan 1
(1836)
Commander-in-Chief
of the Texian Army
(1836)
Mirabeau B. Lamar
2 Mirabeaulamar 2.jpgMirabeau Lamar
(1798-08-16)August 16, 1798 – (1859-12-19)December 19, 1859
(aged 61)
December 10, 1838

December 13, 1841
Nonpartisan 2
(1838)
1st
Vice President of the
Republic of Texas
(1836–1838)
David G. Burnet
3 SHouston 2.jpgSam Houston
(1793-03-02)March 2, 1793 – (1863-07-26)July 26, 1863
(aged 70)
December 13, 1841

December 9, 1844
Nonpartisan 3
(1841)
1st
President of the
Republic of Texas
(1836–1838)
Edward Burleson
4 Anson jones.pngAnson Jones
(1798-01-20)January 20, 1798 – (1858-01-09)January 9, 1858
(aged 59)
December 9, 1844

February 19, 1846
Nonpartisan 4
(1844)
11th
Secretary of State
of the Republic of Texas
(1841–1844)
Kenneth Anderson
December 9, 1844 – July 3, 1845

Statehood[edit]

Main article: Texas annexation

On February 28, 1845, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that authorized the United States to annex the Republic of Texas. On March 1, US PresidentJohn Tyler signed the bill. The legislation set the date for annexation for December 29 of the same year. Faced with imminent American annexation of Texas, Charles Elliot and Alphonse de Saligny, the British and French ministers to Texas, were dispatched to Mexico City by their governments. Meeting with Mexico's foreign secretary, they signed a "Diplomatic Act" in which Mexico offered to recognize an independent Texas with boundaries determined with French and British mediation. Texas President Anson Jones forwarded both offers to a specially elected convention meeting at Austin, and the American proposal was accepted with only one dissenting vote. The Mexican proposal was never put to a vote. Following the previous decree of President Jones, the proposal was then put to a vote throughout the republic.

Postage stamp issued on the 100th anniversary of Texas statehood, 1945
Proposals for Texas's north and west boundaries in 1850 debate

On October 13, 1845, a large majority of voters in the republic approved both the American offer and the proposed constitution that specifically endorsed slavery and emigrants bringing slaves to Texas.[45] This constitution was later accepted by the U.S. Congress, making Texas a U.S. state on the same day annexation took effect, December 29, 1845 (therefore bypassing a territorial phase).[46] One of the motivations for annexation was the huge debts which the Republic of Texas government had incurred. As part of the Compromise of 1850, in return for $10,000,000 in Federal bonds, Texas dropped claims to territory that included parts of present-day Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Wyoming.

The resolution did include two unique provisions: First, it said up to four additional states could be created from Texas' territory with the consent of the State of Texas (and that new states north of the Missouri Compromise Line would be free states). Though the resolution did not make exceptions to the constitution,[47] the U.S. Constitution does not require Congressional consent to the creation of new states to be ex post to applications, nor does the U.S. Constitution require applications to expire. To illustrate the strength of the latter caveat, the 27th Amendment was submitted to the states in 1789, yet was not ratified until 1992—thus, the expressed consent of Congress, via this resolution, to the creation of new states would not expire nor require renewal. Second, Texas did not have to surrender its public lands to the federal government. While Texas did cede all territory outside of its current area to the federal government in 1850, it did not cede any public lands within its current boundaries. Consequently, the lands in Texas that the federal government owns are those it subsequently purchased. This also means the state government controls oil reserves, which it later used to fund the state's public university system through the Permanent University Fund.[48] In addition, the state's control over offshore oil reserves in Texas runs out to 3 nautical leagues (9 nautical miles, 10.357 statute miles, 16.668 km) rather than three nautical miles (3.45 statute miles, 5.56 km) as with other states.[49][50]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^"Texas State Moto – Friendship". wheretexasbecametexas.org. August 4, 2016.
  2. ^ abc"Flags of Texas". Handbook of Texas Online. Texas State Historical Association. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
  3. ^Henderson (2008), p. 121.
  4. ^O'Neill, R. (2011). Texas War of Independence. Rosen Publishing Group. p. 85. ISBN .
  5. ^Kelly F. Himmel (1999). The Conquest of the Karankawas and the Tonkawas: 1821–1859. Texas A&M University Press. p. 93. ISBN .
  6. ^Weber, David J. (1992), The Spanish Frontier in North America, Yale Western Americana Series, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, p. 149, ISBN 
  7. ^Chipman, Donald E. (2010) [1992], Spanish Texas, 1519–1821 (revised ed.), Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 126, ISBN 
  8. ^Weber (1992), p. 198.
  9. ^Lewis, James E. (1998), The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783–1829, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p. 124, ISBN 
  10. ^Weber (1992), p. 299.
  11. ^Edmondson, J.R. (2000). The Alamo Story-From History to Current Conflicts. Plano, TX: Republic of Texas Press. p. 63. ISBN .
  12. ^ abcdAndrew J. Torget (2015). Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas Borderlands, 1800–1850. The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN .
  13. ^Robert A. Calvert, Arnoldo De Leon, and Gregg Cantrell, The history of Texas (2014) pp 64–74.
  14. ^Eugene C. Barker, The Life of Stephen F. Austin, Founder of Texas (2010) pp 348–50.
  15. ^Manchaca (2001), pp. 172, 201.
  16. ^Hardin, Stephen L. (1994). Texian Iliad. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. p. 12. ISBN .
  17. ^Lack, Paul D. (1992). The Texas Revolutionary Experience: A Political and Social History 1835–1836. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. pp. 86–87. ISBN .
  18. ^"TSHA

    History

    Excerpts taken from: “Prairie View, A Study In Public Conscience” by Dr. George Ruble Woolfolk – “A Centennial History of Texas A&M University, 1876-1976 Vol. II” by Henry C. Dethloff Edited by Frank D. Jackson

    Establishment – 1876

    Prairie View A&M University, the first state supported College in Texas for African Americans, was established during the Reconstruction Period after the Civil War. This was an historical period in which political and economic special interest groups were able to aggressively use the Federal Government to establish public policy, in an attempt to “alter or reshape the cultural milieu of the vanquished southern states”. The University had its beginnings in the Texas Constitution of 1876, which, in separate articles, established an “Agricultural and Mechanical College” and pledged that “Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provisions shall be made for both.” As a consequence of these constitutional provisions, the Fifteenth Legislature established “Alta Vista Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas for Colored Youth” on August 14,1876.

    Enrollment of the First Students – 1878

    The Board of Directors purchased the lands of the Alta Vista Plantation (1388 acres), from Mrs. Helen Marr Kirby, the widow of the late Col. Jared Ellison Kirby, for the establishment of the State Agriculture & Mechanical College of Texas for Colored Youth. The College was named “Alta Vista Agriculture & Mechanical College for Colored Youth”. The A&M Board of Directors was authorized to appoint a President of A&M College and Alta Vista College with an assigned principal station at Alta Vista to administer the college’s day to day affairs. Confederate President Jefferson Davis recommended Mr. Thomas S. Gathright of Mississippi, also from Mississippi and he brought Mr. L.W. Minor, of Mississippi to serve as Principal. Eight young African American men, the first of their race to enroll in a state-supported college in Texas, began their studies on March 11, 1878.

    Names Given to the University – 1998

    The Fifteenth Legislature August 14, 1876, established “Alta Vista Agriculture & Mechanical College of Texas for Colored Youth”; The Sixteenth Legislature April 19, 1879, established “Prairie View State Normal School” in Waller County for the Training of Colored Teachers; The Twentieth Legislature in 1887 attached the Agriculture & Mechanical Department to Prairie View Normal School; The Twenty-sixth Legislature in 1899 changed the name to “Prairie View State Normal & Industrial College”; The Forty-ninth Legislature June 1, 1945, changed the name to “Prairie View University”; The Fiftieth Legislature March 3, 1947, established “The Texas State University for Negroes (Texas Southern University) and changed the name of Prairie View University to “Prairie View Agricultural & Mechanical College of Texas”; The Sixty-third Legislature in 1973 changed the name to “Prairie View A&M University”.

    The PVAMU Story

    Prairie View A&M University, the second oldest public institution of higher education in Texas, originated in the Texas Constitution of 1876. On August 14, 1876, the Texas Legislature established the “Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas for Colored Youths” and placed responsibility for its management with the Board of Directors of the Agricultural and Mechanical College at Bryan. The A&M College of Texas for Colored Youths opened at Prairie View, Texas on March 11, 1878.

    The University’s original curriculum was designated by the Texas Legislature in 1879 to be that of a “Normal School” for the preparation and training of teachers. This curriculum was expanded to include the arts and sciences, home economics, agriculture, mechanical arts and nursing after the University was established as a branch of the Agricultural Experiment Station (Hatch Act, 1887) and as a Land Grant College (Morrill Act, 1890). Thus began the tradition of agricultural research and community service, which continues today.

    The four-year senior college program began in 1919 and in 1937, a division of graduate studies was added, offering master’s degrees in agricultural economics, rural education, agricultural education, school administration and supervision, and rural sociology.

    In 1945, the name of the institution was changed from Prairie View Normal and Industrial College to Prairie View University, and the school was authorized to offer, “as need arises,” all courses offered at the University of Texas. In 1947, the Texas Legislature changed the name to Prairie View A&M College of Texas and provided that “courses be offered in agriculture, the mechanics arts, engineering, and the natural sciences connected therewith, together with any other courses authorized at Prairie View at the time of passage of this act, all of which shall be equivalent to those offered at the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas at Bryan.” On August 27, 1973, the name of the institution was changed to Prairie View A&M University, and its status as an independent unit of the Texas A&M University System was confirmed.

    In 1981, the Texas Legislature acknowledged the University’s rich tradition of service and identified various statewide needs which the University should address including the assistance of students of diverse ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds to realize their full potential, and assistance of small and medium-sized communities and businesses in their growth and development.

    In 1983, the Texas Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to restructure the Permanent University Fund to include Prairie View A&M University as a beneficiary of its proceeds. The Permanent University Fund is a perpetual endowment fund originally established in the Constitution of 1876 for the sole benefit of Texas A&M University and the University of Texas. The 1983 amendment also dedicated the University to enhancement as an “institution of the first class” under the governing board of the Texas A&M University System. The constitutional amendment was approved by the voters on November 6, 1984.

    In January 1985, the Board of Regents of the Texas A&M University System responded to the 1984 Constitutional Amendment by stating its intention that Prairie View A&M University become “an institution nationally recognized in its areas of education and research.” The Board also resolved that the University receive its share of the Available University Fund, as previously agreed to by Texas A&M University and the University of Texas.

    In October 2000, the Governor of Texas signed the Priority Plan, an agreement with the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights to make Prairie View A&M University an educational asset accessible by all Texans. The Priority Plan mandates creation of many new educational programs and facilities. It also requires removing language from the Institutional Mission Statement which might give the impression of excluding any Texan from attending Prairie View A&M University.

    The University’s enrollment now exceeds 8,000 including more than 2,000 graduate students. Students come from throughout the United States as well as many foreign countries. In the last five years, 5,970 degrees were awarded, including more than 2,400 graduate degrees. During the University’s 130-year history, some 46,000 academic degrees have been awarded

    Our Mission

    Prairie View A&M University is a state-assisted, public, comprehensive land grant institution of higher education. The university was designated in a 1984 amendment to the Texas Constitution as an “institution of the first class.” It is dedicated to achieving excellence and relevance in teaching, research, and service. It seeks to invest in programs and services that address issues and challenges affecting the diverse ethnic and socioeconomic population of Texas and the larger society including the global arena. The university seeks to provide a high quality educational experience for students who, upon completion of bachelors, masters, or doctorate degrees, possess self-sufficiency and professional competence. The experience is imbued by the institution’s values including, but not limited to, access and quality, accountability, diversity, leadership, relevance, and social responsibility.

    Источник: https://www.pvamu.edu/about_pvamu/college-history/

    Dec 29, 1845 CE: Texas Becomes a State

    On December 29, 1845, Texas became the 28th state in the United States. Formerly part of Mexico, Texas had been an independentcountry since 1836.

    Since its independence, Texas had sought annexation by the U.S. However, the process took nearly 10 years due to political divisions over slavery. Texas entered the nation as a state that legalized slavery, and seceded from it 15 years later as part of the Confederate States of America. Shortly after the elction of Abraham Lincoln, the confederacy seceded from the United States to continue enslaving people of African descent.

    annex

    Verb

    to add or incorporate land into an existing parcel, state, or nation.

    Confederate

    Adjective

    having to do with the Confederate States of America (south) during the Civil War.

    country

    Noun

    geographic territory with a distinct name, flag, population, boundaries, and government.

    enslaved person

    Noun

    person who is owned by another person or group of people.

    independent

    Adjective

    free from influence, threat, or support.

    secede

    Verb

    to withdraw from part of a union or alliance.

    More Dates in History

    Источник: https://www.nationalgeographic.org/thisday/dec29/texas-becomes-state/

    What Is Juneteenth?

    The First Juneteenth

    “The people of Texas are informed that, in accordance with a proclamation from the Executive of the United States, all slaves are free. This involves an absolute equality of personal rights and rights of property between former masters and slaves, and the connection heretofore existing between them becomes that between employer and hired labor. The freedmen are advised to remain quietly at their present homes and work for wages. They are informed that they will not be allowed to collect at military posts and that they will not be supported in idleness either there or elsewhere.” —General Orders, Number 3; Headquarters District of Texas, Galveston, June 19, 1865

    When Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger issued the above order, he had no idea that, in establishing the Union Army’s authority over the people of Texas, he was also establishing the basis for a holiday, “Juneteenth” (“June” plus “nineteenth”), today the most popular annual celebration of emancipation from slavery in the United States. After all, by the time Granger assumed command of the Department of Texas, the Confederate capital in Richmond had fallen; the “Executive” to whom he referred, President Lincoln, was dead; and the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery was well on its way to ratification.

    But Granger wasn’t just a few months late. The Emancipation Proclamation itself, ending slavery in the Confederacy (at least on paper), had taken effect two-and-a-half years before, and in the interim, close to 200,000 black men had enlisted in the fight. So, formalities aside, wasn’t it all over, literally, but the shouting?

    It would be easy to think so in our world of immediate communication, but as Granger and the 1,800 bluecoats under him soon found out, news traveled slowly in Texas. Whatever Gen. Robert E. Lee had surrendered in Virginia, the Army of the Trans-Mississippi had held out until late May, and even with its formal surrender on June 2, a number of ex-rebels in the region took to bushwhacking and plunder.

    That’s not all that plagued the extreme western edge of the former Confederate states. Since the capture of New Orleans in 1862, slave owners in Mississippi, Louisiana and other points east had been migrating to Texas to escape the Union Army’s reach. In a hurried re-enactment of the original Middle Passage, more than 150,000 slaves had made the trek west, according to historian Leon Litwack in his book Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of SlaveryAs one former slave he quotes recalled, ” ‘It looked like everybody in the world was going to Texas.’ ”

    When Texas fell and Granger dispatched his now famous order No. 3, it wasn’t exactly instant magic for most of the Lone Star State’s 250,000 slaves. On plantations, masters had to decide when and how to announce the news — or wait for a government agent to arrive — and it was not uncommon for them to delay until after the harvest. Even in Galveston city, the ex-Confederate mayor flouted the Army by forcing the freed people back to work, as historian Elizabeth Hayes Turner details in her comprehensive essay, “Juneteenth: Emancipation and Memory,” in Lone Star Pasts: Memory and History in Texas.

    Those who acted on the news did so at their peril. As quoted in Litwack’s book, former slave Susan Merritt recalled, ” ‘You could see lots of niggers hangin’ to trees in Sabine bottom right after freedom, ’cause they cotch ’em swimmin’ ‘cross Sabine River and shoot ’em.’ ” In one extreme case, according to Hayes Turner, a former slave named Katie Darling continued working for her mistress another six years (She ” ‘whip me after the war jist like she did ‘fore,’ ” Darling said).

    Hardly the recipe for a celebration — which is what makes the story of Juneteenth all the more remarkable. Defying confusion and delay, terror and violence, the newly “freed” black men and women of Texas, with the aid of the Freedmen’s Bureau (itself delayed from arriving until September 1865), now had a date to rally around. In one of the most inspiring grassroots efforts of the post-Civil War period, they transformed June 19 from a day of unheeded military orders into their own annual rite, “Juneteenth,” beginning one year later in 1866.

    ” ‘The way it was explained to me,’ ” one heir to the tradition is quoted in Hayes Turner’s essay, ” ‘the 19th of June wasn’t the exact day the Negro was freed. But that’s the day they told them that they was free … And my daddy told me that they whooped and hollered and bored holes in trees with augers and stopped it up with [gun] powder and light and that would be their blast for the celebration.’ ”

    Other Contenders

    There were other available anniversaries for celebrating emancipation, to be sure, including the following:

    * Sept. 22: the day Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation Order in 1862

    * Jan. 1: the day it took effect in 1863

    * Jan. 31: the date the 13th Amendment passed Congress in 1865, officially abolishing the institution of slavery

    * Dec. 6: the day the 13th Amendment was ratified that year

    * April 3: the day Richmond, Va., fell

    * April 9: the day Lee surrendered to Ulysses Grant at Appomattox, Va.

    * April 16: the day slavery was abolished in the nation’s capital in 1862

    * May 1: Decoration Day, which, as David Blight movingly recounts in Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memorythe former slaves of Charleston, S.C., founded by giving the Union war dead a proper burial at the site of the fallen planter elite’s Race Course

    * July 4: America’s first Independence Day, some “four score and seven years” before President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation

    Each of these anniversaries has its celebrants today. Each has also had its share of conflicts and confusion. July 4 is compelling, of course, but it was also problematic for many African Americans, since the country’s founders had given in on slavery and their descendants had expanded it through a series of failed “compromises,” at the nadir of which Frederick Douglass had made his own famous declaration to the people of Rochester, N.Y., on July 5, 1852: “What, to the American slave, is your 4th of July? I answer; a day that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity.”

    The most logical candidate for commemoration of the slave’s freedom was Jan. 1. In fact, the minute Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation had taken effect at the midpoint of the war, Northern black leaders like Douglass led massive celebrations in midnight jubilees; and on its 20th anniversary in 1883, they gathered again in Washington, D.C., to honor Douglass for all that he and his compatriots had achieved.

    Yet even the original Emancipation Day had its drawbacks — not only because it coincided with New Year’s Day and the initiation dates of numerous other laws, but also because the underlying proclamation, while of enormous symbolic significance, didn’t free all the slaves, only those in the Confederate states in areas liberated by Union troops, and not those in the border states in which slavery remained legal until the ratification of the 13th Amendment. (Historians estimate that about 500,000 slaves — out of a total of 3.9 million — liberated themselves by escaping to Union lines between 1863 and the end of the war; the rest remained in slavery.)

    Because of its partial effects, some scholars argue that perhaps the most significant aspect of the Emancipation Proclamation was the authorization of black men to fight in the war, both because their service proved to be crucial to the North’s war effort, and because it would be cited as irrefutable proof of the right of blacks to citizenship (which would be granted by the 14th Amendment).

    No one in the post-Civil War generation could deny that something fundamental had changed as a result of Lincoln’s war measure, but dwelling on it was a separate matter, David Blight explains. Among those in the ‘It’s time to move on’ camp were Episcopal priest and scholar Alexander Crummell, who, in a May 1885 address to the graduates of Storer College, said, “What I would fain have you guard against is not the memory of slavery, but the constant recollection of it, as the commanding thought of a new people.” On the other side was Douglass, who insisted on lighting a perpetual flame to “the causes, the incidents, and the results of the late rebellion.” After all, he liked to say, the legacy of black people in America could “be traced like that of a wounded man through a crowd by the blood.”

    Hard as Douglass tried to make emancipation matter every day, Jan. 1 continued to be exalted — and increasingly weighed down by the betrayal of Reconstruction. (As detailed in Plessy v. Ferguson: Who Was Plessy?, the Supreme Court’s gift to the 20th anniversary of emancipation was striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875.) W.E.B. Du Bois used this to biting effect in his Swiftian short story, “A Mild Suggestion” (1912), in which he had his black main character provide a final solution to Jim Crow America’s obsession with racial purity: On the next Jan. 1 (“for historical reasons” it would “probably be best,” he explained), all blacks should either be invited to dine with whites and poisoned or gathered in large assemblies to be stabbed and shot. “The next morning there would be ten million funerals,” Du Bois’ protagonist predicted, “and therefore no Negro problem.”

    Juneteenth Endures

    While national black leaders continued to debate the importance of remembering other milestone anniversaries, the freed people of Texas went about the business of celebrating their local version of Emancipation Day. For them, Juneteenth was, from its earliest incarnations, as Hayes Turner and others have recorded, a past that was “usable” as an occasion for gathering lost family members, measuring progress against freedom and inculcating rising generations with the values of self-improvement and racial uplift. This was accomplished through readings of the Emancipation Proclamation, religious sermons and spirituals, the preservation of slave food delicacies (always at the center: the almighty barbecue pit), as well as the incorporation of new games and traditions, from baseball to rodeos and, later, stock car races and overhead flights.

    Like a boxer sparring with his rival, year after year Juneteenth was strengthened by the contest its committee members had to wage against the Jim Crow faithful of Texas, who, in the years following Reconstruction, rallied around their version of history in an effort to glorify (and whitewash) past cruelties and defeats. When whites forbade blacks from using their public spaces, black people gathered near rivers and lakes and eventually raised enough money to buy their own celebration sites, among them Emancipation Park in Houston and Booker T. Washington Park in Mexia.

    Texas Juneteenth Day Celebration, 1900

    Texas Juneteenth Day Celebration, 1900 (Austin History Center, Austin Public Library)

    When white leaders like Judge Lewis Fisher of Galveston likened the black freedman (“Rastus,” he called him) to “a prairie colt turned into a feed horse [to eat] ignorantly of everything,” Juneteenth celebrants dressed in their finest clothes, however poor, trumpeting the universal concerns of citizenship and liberty, with hero-speakers from the Reconstruction era and symbols like the Goddess of Liberty on floats and in living tableaux. And when Houston refused to close its banks on Memorial Day in 1919 (only to do so four days later on Jefferson Davis Day, honoring the former Confederate president), Juneteenth celebrants still did their own remembering, in Hayes Turner’s words, to project “identification with American ideals” in “a potent life-giving event … a joyful retort to messages of overt racism … a public counter-demonstration to displays of Confederate glorification and a counter-memory to the valorization of the Lost Cause.”

    Strengthening the holiday’s chances at survival was its move across state lines — one person, one family, one carload or train ticket at a time. As Isabel Wilkerson writes in her brilliant book, The Warmth of Other Suns:The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration, “The people from Texas took Juneteenth Day to Los Angeles, Oakland, Seattle, and other places they went.” As it spread, the observance was also changing. This was especially true in the 1920s, Turner explains, with the Consumer Age infiltrating black society with advertisements for fancier Juneteenth getups and more elaborate displays of pomp and circumstance.

    This did not mean that Juneteenth’s advances remained unbroken, however. Despite local committees’ best efforts, with each new slight, with each new segregation law, with each new textbook whitewashing and brutal lynching in the South, African Americans felt increasingly disconnected from their history, so that by the time World War II shook the nation, they could no longer faithfully celebrate freedom in a land that still rendered them second-class citizens worthy of dying for their country but not worthy of being honored or treated equally for it. Hence, the wartime Double V campaign.

    It is possible that Juneteenth would have vanished from the calendar (at least outside of Texas) had it not been for another remarkable turn of events during the same civil rights movement that had exposed many of the country’s shortcomings about race relations. Actually, it occurred at the tail end of the movement, two months after its most prominent leader had been shot down.

    As is well-known, Martin Luther King Jr. had been planning a return to the site of his famous “I Have a Dream” speech in Washington, this time to lead a Poor People’s March emphasizing nagging class inequalities. Following his assassination, it was left to others to carry out the plan, among them his best friend, the Rev. Ralph Abernathy, and his widow, Coretta Scott King. When it became clear that the Poor People’s March was falling short of its goals, the organizers decided to cut it short on June 19, 1968, well aware that it was now just over a century since the first Juneteenth celebration in Texas.

    As William H. Wiggins Jr., a scholar of black folklore and cultural traditions, explained in a 2009 interview with Smithsonian magazine: “[T]hese delegates for the summer took that idea of the [Juneteenth] celebration back to their respective communities. [F]or example, there was one in Milwaukee.” Another in Minnesota. It was, in effect, another great black migration. Since then, Wiggins added, Juneteenth “has taken on a life of its own.”

    Juneteenth Today

    Responding to this new energy, in 1979 Texas became the first state to make Juneteenth an official holiday. (Ironically, the bill was passed on June 7, the anniversary of Homer Plessy’s arrest on the East Louisiana line, as covered in Plessy v Ferguson: Who Was Plessy.) Leading the charge was Rep. Al Edwards of Houston, often referred to as “the father of the Juneteenth holiday,” who framed it as a “source of strength” for young people, according to Hayes Turner. (As a concession to Lost Cause devotees, Texas reaffirmed its commitment to observing Jan. 19 as Confederate Heroes Day.)

    Since then, 41 other states and the District of Columbia have recognized Juneteenth as a state holiday or holiday observance, including Rhode Island earlier this year. “This is similar to what God instructed Joshua to do as he led the Israelites into the Promised Land,” Al Edwards told Yahoo in 2007. “A national celebration of Juneteenth, state by state, serves a similar purpose for us. Every year we must remind successive generations that this event triggered a series of events that one by one defines the challenges and responsibilities of successive generations. That’s why we need this holiday.”

    You can follow Edwards’ efforts and others’ worldwide at juneteenth.com, founded in 1997 by Clifford Robinson of New Orleans. Another organization, the National Juneteenth Observance Foundation, founded and chaired by the Rev. Ronald Meyers, is committed to making Juneteenth a federal holiday on a par with Flag and Patriot days. (Note: They are not calling for Juneteenth to be a paid government holiday, like Columbus Day.) “We may have gotten there in different ways and at different times,” Meyers told Time magazine in 2008, “but you can’t really celebrate freedom in America by just going with the Fourth of July.” You can follow his organization’s activities at nationaljuneteenth.com.

    These days, Juneteenth is an opportunity not only to celebrate but also to speak out. Last year, for example,The Rootreported that the U.S. Department of State leveraged the holiday for releasing its 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report, with then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noting, “Today we are celebrating what’s called ‘Juneteenth’ … But the end of legal slavery in the United States, and in other countries around the world, has not, unfortunately, meant the end of slavery. Today it is estimated as many as 27 million people around the world are victims of modern slavery.”

    As further proof that Juneteenth is back on the rise, this Wednesday, June 19, Washington, D.C., will be abuzz during the unveiling of a Frederick Douglass statue in the famed U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, thanks to the work of D.C. Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton. (Douglass will join three other African Americans in the hall: Rosa Parks, Sojourner Truth and Martin Luther King Jr.) No doubt Douglass would be surprised to learn that such an honor had not been scheduled for Jan. 1 (the 150th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation), but glad nevertheless that the country is still finding ways to remember “the causes, the incidents, and the results of the late rebellion.”

    Postscript

    I grew up in West Virginia, many miles from the site of the first Juneteenth, and I never heard of the holiday until I went off to college. But I have come to see the beauty in its unexpected past and persistence. Besides, June 19 is generally a more comfortable day for outdoor family fun — for fine jazz music and barbecue — than Jan. 1, a day short on sunlight. In my article “Should Blacks Collect Racist Memorabilia?” I quoted W.E.B. Du Bois’ summation of Black Reconstruction: “The slave went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward slavery.” At the time I failed to appreciate just how apt a description it was.

    Of all Emancipation Day observances, Juneteenth falls closest to the summer solstice (this Friday, June 21), the longest day of the year, when the sun, at its zenith, defies the darkness in every state, including those once shadowed by slavery. By choosing to celebrate the last place in the South that freedom touched — reflecting the mystical glow of history and lore, memory and myth, as Ralph Ellison evoked in his posthumous novel, Juneteenth — we remember the shining promise of emancipation, along with the bloody path America took by delaying it and deferring fulfillment of those simple, unanticipating words in Gen. Granger’s original order No. 3: that “This involves an absolute equality of personal rights and rights of property between former masters and slaves.” 

    My hope this Juneteenth is that we never forget it.

    Fifty of the 100 Amazing Facts will be published on The African Americans: Many Rivers to Cross website. Read all 100 Facts on The Root.

    Tags: 19th century, Civil Rights Movement, Emancipation Proclamation, Jim Crow, Martin Luther King Jr., Plessy v. Ferguson

    Источник: https://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history/what-is-juneteenth/

    The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) future continues to be uncertain as the law’s constitutionality will once again be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Texas1 (known as Texas v. U.S. in the lower courts). Oral argument is scheduled for Tuesday, November 10, 2020. This ongoing litigation challenges the ACA’s minimum essential coverage provision (known as the individual mandate) and raises questions about the entire law’s survival. The individual mandate provides that most people must maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage; those who do not do so must pay a financial penalty (known as the shared responsibility payment) to the IRS. The individual mandate was upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing power by a five member majority of the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius in 2012.

    In the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), Congress set the shared responsibility payment at zero dollars as of January 1, 2019, leading to the current litigation. In December 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that the individual mandate is no longer constitutional because the associated financial penalty no longer “produces at least some revenue” for the federal government.2 But, instead of deciding whether the rest of the ACA must be struck down, the 5th Circuit sent the case back to the trial court for additional analysis. However, the Supreme Court has now agreed to review the case.

    The ACA remains in effect while the litigation is pending. However, if all or most of the law ultimately is struck down, it will have complex and far-reaching consequences for the nation’s health care system, affecting nearly everyone in some way. A host of ACA provisions could be eliminated, including protections for people with pre-existing conditions, subsidies to make individual health insurance more affordable, expanded eligibility for Medicaid, coverage of young adults up to age 26 under their parents’ insurance policies, coverage of preventive care with no patient cost-sharing, closing of the doughnut hole under Medicare’s drug benefit, and a series of tax increases to fund these initiatives.

    This issue brief answers key questions about the litigation as we await a decision from the Supreme Court about the ACA’s survival.

    1.  Who Is Challenging the ACA?

    A group of 20 states, led by Texas, sued the federal government in February 2018, seeking to have the entire ACA struck down (the “state plaintiffs”).3 These states are represented by 18 Republican attorneys general and 2 Republican governors. After Democratic victories in the 2018 mid-term elections, two of these states, Wisconsin and Maine, withdrew from the case in early 2019, leaving 18 states challenging the ACA on appeal (Figure 1).4

    Figure 1: States’ positions in California v. Texas at the Supreme Court

    Two individuals joined the lawsuit in the trial court in April 2018, as plaintiffs challenging the ACA.5 These plaintiffs are self-employed residents of Texas who claim that the individual mandate requires them to purchase health insurance that they otherwise would not buy, although there is no penalty if they fail to buy coverage.

    2.  What Is the Federal Government’s Position in the Case, and How Has It Changed Over Time?

    Throughout the litigation, the federal government has not defended the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate. Instead, the federal government agrees with the state and individual plaintiffs that the individual mandate is no longer constitutional under Congress’s taxing power as a result of the TCJA provision that set the financial penalty at zero.6 It is unusual for the federal government to take a position that does not seek to uphold a federal law.

    Unlike the plaintiffs, the federal government argued at the trial court that only the ACA’s protections for people with pre-existing conditions, including guaranteed issue and community rating, should be struck down along with the individual mandate. The federal government took the position that these provisions cannot function effectively without the individual mandate but the rest of the ACA should be allowed to survive.

    Notably, the federal government changed its position while the case was on appeal at the 5th Circuit (Figure 2). First, the federal government took what the 5th Circuit called a “significant change in litigation position”7 by deciding to support the trial court’s decision that the individual mandate is inseverable from the entire ACA.8 This change came after the federal government had appealed, asking the 5th Circuit to review the trial court’s decision. Next, the federal government raised new arguments about the scope of relief that the court should grant, asserting that the federal government should be enjoined from enforcing only the ACA provisions that injure the plaintiffs. For example, the federal government identified “several criminal statutes used to prosecute individuals who defraud our healthcare system” that are part of the ACA that it believes should survive.9 The federal government also argued for the first time in the 5th Circuit that any injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ACA should apply only in the plaintiff states.10

    The federal government is asking the Supreme Court to prohibit it from enforcing only the ACA provisions that are found to harm the individual plaintiffs. Even though the federal government is arguing that the entire ACA should be found invalid (because the individual mandate is no longer constitutional and cannot be severed from the rest of the law), the federal government does not want the Court to necessarily prevent it from still enforcing parts of the law. Instead, the federal government is seeking a more limited remedy:  it contends that “relief should reach only the enforcement of the ACA provisions that injure the individual plaintiffs.”11 The federal government has not clearly identified which specific ACA provisions fall into this category and is asking the Supreme Court to send the case back to the lower courts to determine this issue.12

    Figure 2: Key dates in California v. Texas

    3.  Who is Defending the ACA?

    Another 17 states, led by California, were permitted by the trial court to intervene in the case and defend the ACA (the “state intervener-defendants”). Subsequently, the 5th Circuit allowed four more states to intervene in the case on appeal, bringing the total number of states defending the ACA in the case to 21 .13 In addition, six states filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in support of the ACA (Figure 1).

    The 5th Circuit also allowed the U.S. House of Representatives to intervene in the case to defend the ACA on appeal.14 However, the 5th Circuit did not decide whether the House has standing to pursue the appeal.15 The standing of the state intervener-defendants and/or the House is particularly important in this case, since the federal government is not defending the ACA (Figure 3). At the Supreme Court, the parties are not contesting, and the Court has not asked for briefing on, California’s ability to pursue an appeal (California and the House both filed cert petitions raising the same issues, and the Court accepted California’s petition).

    Figure 3: Alignment of the Parties in California v. Texas

    4.  What Did the 5th Circuit Decide?

    The 5th Circuit issued a 2:1 decision finding the individual mandate unconstitutional and sending the case back to the trial court for additional analysis about whether the rest of the ACA can survive. There are three main issues in the case: (A) whether the parties have standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction; (B) whether the ACA’s individual mandate, as amended by the TCJA, is constitutional; and (C) if the mandate is unconstitutional, whether it can be severed from the rest of the ACA, or on the other hand, whether other provisions of the ACA also must be invalidated. Figure 4 illustrates the legal questions and potential outcomes in the case.

    (A) The parties have standing to litigate the case.

    The 5th Circuit decided that the case presented a live controversy for it to resolve, despite the unusual alignment of the parties’ positions. Although the federal government is “in almost complete agreement on the merits of the case” with the plaintiffs, it also has indicated that it will continue to enforce the ACA unless or until a court issues a final order striking the law down.16 The state intervener-defendants have standing to pursue an appeal because they would be injured by the loss of federal ACA funding, such as funding for the Medicaid expansion and the Medicaid Community First Choice attendant care program, if the trial court’s decision is upheld.17

    Figure 4: Legal Questions and Potential Outcomes in California v. Texas

    The 5th Circuit decided that the both the individual and state plaintiffs have standing to challenge the ACA in court. Standing ensures that federal courts are deciding actual cases or controversies as required by the U.S. Constitution. Standing is essential for the court to have jurisdiction to decide a case and therefore cannot be waived. To establish standing, a party must suffer an injury that is concrete and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and likely to be redressed by a favorable court ruling. The 5th Circuit agreed with the trial court that the individual plaintiffs have standing because they have spent money that they otherwise would not have spent, absent the individual mandate, to purchase health insurance.18 The 5th Circuit also decided that the state plaintiffs have standing because they are incurring costs from the individual mandate from having to verify which state employees have minimum essential coverage.19

    The dissent reached the opposite conclusion, finding that neither the individual nor the state plaintiffs has standing to bring the case. According to the dissent, any injury experienced by the individual plaintiffs “is entirely self-inflicted” because “absolutely nothing” will happen to them if they do not purchase insurance to meet the individual mandate now that the penalty is set at zero.20 The dissent also concluded that the state plaintiffs lack standing because they failed to provide evidence showing that “at least some state employees have enrolled in employer-sponsored health insurance” or that “anyone has enrolled in their Medicaid programs solely because of the unenforceable coverage requirement.”21

    (B) The individual mandate is unconstitutional after the TCJA set the financial penalty at zero.

    The 5th Circuit decided that the individual mandate as amended by the TCJA is unconstitutional. The court agreed with the state and individual plaintiffs and the federal government’s assertion that the requirement to produce some revenue is “essential” to the Supreme Court’s earlier finding in NFIB that the individual mandate could be saved as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to tax.22 Without that feature, the mandate is a command to purchase health insurance, which as the Supreme Court held in NFIB, is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.

    The dissent concluded that the individual mandate remains constitutional because the TCJA amendment is “a law that does nothing.”23 The dissent reasoned that the TCJA did not change the text of the coverage requirement and therefore did not change the individual mandate into a mandatory command to purchase insurance. Rather, Congress “changed the parameters” of the choice about whether to purchase insurance from paying a tax penalty to “no consequences at all.24

    (C) The trial court’s analysis about whether the individual mandate is severable from the rest of the ACA was incomplete.

    The 5th Circuit sent the case back to the trial court for additional analysis about which ACA provisions should survive without the individual mandate. The trial court incorrectly focused on the intent of Congress in 2010 when passing the ACA and instead should have considered Congress’ intent when enacting the TCJA and setting the shared responsibility payment at zero in 2017.25 In so doing, the trial court should “employ a finer-toothed comb. . . and conduct a more searching inquiry into which provisions of the ACA Congress intended to be inseverable from the individual mandate. . . us[ing] its best judgment to determine how best to break the ACA down into constituent groups, segments, or provisions to be analyzed.”26

    The 5th Circuit also directed the trial court to consider the federal government’s new argument that any order prohibiting enforcement of the ACA should extend only to provisions that injure the plaintiffs and apply only in the plaintiff states. The trial court may consider whether the federal government timely raised this argument and whether Supreme Court precedent supports limiting the remedy in this way.27

    The dissent criticized the majority’s failure to send the case back to the trial court instead of resolving the severability issue. Severability is a question of law, which the 5th Circuit could have resolved without sending the case back to the trial court. The dissent agreed with the majority that the severability analysis should look to the intent of Congress when passing the TCJA in 2017. However, the dissent concluded that the fact that Congress changed the tax penalty amount to zero while leaving the rest of the ACA in place indicates that Congress intended for all of the other provisions to remain in effect.28

    5.  What is Happening at the Supreme Court?

    The Supreme Court has agreed to review four legal questions in the case. First, the Court will consider whether Texas and the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring the lawsuit to challenge the individual mandate. If so, the Court will determine whether the TCJA rendered the individual mandate unconstitutional. If the mandate is unconstitutional, the Court will decide whether the rest of the ACA can survive. Finally, if the entire ACA is held invalid, the Court will resolve whether the entire law should be unenforceable nationwide or whether it should be unenforceable only to the extent that provisions injure the individual plaintiffs.

    The case will be argued at the Supreme Court on November 10, 2020. The Court has allotted one hour and twenty minutes for oral argument, with 40 minutes for each side. California will argue for 30 minutes of the time allotted to the parties defending the ACA, with the remaining 10 minutes argued by the House. The time allotted to the parties challenging the ACA will be evenly divided between the federal government and Texas, with 20 minutes for each. The Court denied Ohio and Montana’s motion to participate in oral argument as amici curiae in support of neither side. The decision could come as late as the end of term in June 2021.

    Looking Ahead

    If the Supreme Court finds that the individual mandate is unconstitutional and invalidates only that provision, the practical result will be essentially the same as the ACA exists today, without an enforceable mandate. If the Supreme Court adopts the position that the federal government took during the trial court proceedings and invalidates the individual mandate as well as the protections for people with pre-existing conditions, then federal funding for premium subsidies and the Medicaid expansion would stand, and it would be up to states whether to reinstate the insurance protections. The Supreme Court also could decide that Texas and the individual plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the lawsuit, which would allow the ACA as it exists today to remain in effect.

    The most far-reaching consequences, affecting nearly every American in some way, will occur if the Supreme Court ultimately decides that all or most of the ACA must be overturned, as the federal government now argues. The number of non-elderly individuals who are uninsured decreased by 18.6 million from 2010 to 2018, as the ACA went into effect. The ACA made significant changes to the individual insurance market, including requiring protections for people with pre-existing conditions, creating insurance marketplaces, and authorizing premium subsidies for people with low and modest incomes. The ACA also made other sweeping changes throughout the health care system including expanding Medicaid eligibility for low-income adults; requiring private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid expansion coverage of preventive services with no patient cost sharing; phasing out the Medicare prescription drug doughnut hole coverage gap; reducing the growth of Medicare payments to health care providers and insurers; establishing new national initiatives to promote public health, care quality, and delivery system reforms; and authorizing a variety of tax increases to finance these changes. All of these provisions could be overturned if all or most of the ACA is struck down by the courts, and it would be enormously complex to disentangle these provisions from the overall health care system.

    For now, the ACA remains in effect. The trial court’s original decision that the entire ACA should be invalidated was never implemented and was set aside by the 5th Circuit. Additionally, the Trump Administration has indicated that it intends to continue enforcing the ACA while the appeal is pending. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in the case could come as late as June 2021, the Court’s decision to review the case now, without waiting for the lower courts to complete their review, will minimize the amount of time that the ACA’s future remains uncertain.29 If the Supreme Court had not agreed to review the case now, the litigation likely would have continued for several more years, while the trial court issued a new decision on severability and that decision was then reviewed by the 5th Circuit, before returning to the Supreme Court. Still, 10 years after its enactment, the only certainty for the ACA in the foreseeable future is that there is continuing uncertainty about its ultimate survival.

    Источник: https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-california-v-texas-a-guide-to-the-case-challenging-the-aca/

    Texas

    The Alamo in San Antonio is the site of the 1836 Battle of the Alamo.

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    Coyotes often form their dens from woodchuck or badger burrows.

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    Mountain lions cubs are born with spots, which usually disappear by the time they are roughly nine months old.

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    The Alamo in San Antonio is the site of the 1836 Battle of the Alamo.

    The Alamo in San Antonio is the site of the 1836 Battle of the Alamo.

    Photograph by James Anderson, iStockphoto

    Get facts and photos about the 28th state.

    • Nickname: The Lone Star State
    • Statehood: 1845; 28th state
    • Population (as of July 2015): 27,469,114
    • Capital: Austin
    • Biggest City: Houston
    • Abbreviation: TX
    • State bird: mockingbird
    • State flower: bluebonnet

    HISTORY

    People first came to the area that is now Texas at least 16,700 years ago. Thousands of years later Native American tribes, including the Akokisa, Karankawa, Mogollon, and Comanche, lived on the land.

    Spanish settlers promoting Christianity, called missionaries, were some of the first Europeans to live in what is now Texas. In 1821 Mexico took control of the land, eventually calling the area Coahuila y Tejas. But in 1835 settlers living in this province—often just called Texas—rebelled, beginning the Texas Revolution. The rebels suffered a terrible defeat by the Mexican army at the 1836 battle at the Alamo, a mission in San Antonio. But the loss only inspired the settlers to fight on. With a cry of “Remember the Alamo!” many joined the rebel army, and soon Mexico gave up.

    Texas became an independent nation called the Republic of Texas in 1836. But fending off hostile tribes and Mexican troops was difficult for a small country, and Texas joined the United States in 1845. In 1861 Texas left the Union and rejoined after the Civil War ended in 1870.

    WHY’S IT CALLED THAT?

    It’s said that the Caddo tribe greeted Spanish settlers by saying Tay-yas, which means “friends”—and sounds like “Texas.”

    Texas is nicknamed the Lone Star State because in 1836, when the Republic of Texas declared itself an independent nation, it flew a flag with a single star on it.

    texas state flag

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    when did texas become a state src="">

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    GEOGRAPHY AND LANDFORMS

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    Texas is bordered by New Mexico in the northwest; Oklahoma in the north and northeast; Arkansas, Louisiana, and the Gulf of Mexico in the east; and Mexico in the southwest.

    The hilly southern and when did texas become a state part of the state is called the Gulf Coastal Plains. It includes the Pine Belt, where most of Texas’ commercial timber grows. The Interior Lowlands cover the northeast and have some of the state’s biggest ranches. The Great Plains stretch across the north and west parts of the state, and extend all the way to Canada. Far west is the Basin and Range Province, Texas’ only mountainous region. It’s bordered on the first mid illinois bank and trust altamont il by the Rio Grande, the river that marks the boundary between the United States and Mexico.

    WILDLIFE

    two mountain lion kittens

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    In Texas you might spot black bears, armadillos, coyotes, cougars, endangered cats called jaguarundis, tiger salamanders, and leopard frogs. And don’t miss the birds! Texas has more species of birds than any other state, including screech owls and hummingbirds. Plant life includes trees such as pinyon pines, Texas mesquite, and cottonwood, plus a wide range of cacti.

    NATURAL RESOURCES

    Though you might have heard of Texas’ oil rigs—hundreds of them pump beneath the earth—the state is also famous for another natural resource: cattle. Texas has about 12 million cattle, more than any other state in the country. Texas also produces wool and cotton, and has one of the largest wind-power-producing farms in the world with more than 100,000 acres of wind turbines. At one point the turbines provided 45 percent of the state’s electricity needs.

    FUN STUFF

    —Juneteenth, the federal holiday that celebrates freedom for enslaved people, started in Texas.

    —Frontiersman and politician Davy Crockett moved to Texas around 1835 and died while fighting at the Alamo. Two U.S. presidents were born in Texas: Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson. Houston’s Johnson Space Center, also known as Mission Control, carries President Johnson’s name.

    —Because it’s so close to Mexico, Texans have developed a cuisine that’s a mix of Mexican food and American cooking called Tex-Mex.

    —Want to feel like a cowboy? Visit one of Texas’s thousands of ranches and rodeos.

    —Six flags have flown over Texas: British, French, Mexican, Texan, United States, and Confederate. That’s how Six Flags amusement park got its name!

    Texas

    Barry the bald eagle kicks up his heels in Texas when he hangs out with his friend MC Tex the mockingbird. There's a reason they call it the Lone Star State!

    Источник: https://kids.nationalgeographic.com/geography/states/article/texas
    1944 cartoon regarding the opening of the park

    In 1944, American’s attention was focused on distant lands as the Second World War raged around the globe. Despite a world in political turmoil and an uncertain future, it was the year that Big Bend National Park was set aside for public benefit and enjoyment.

    On theater screens across the country Laurance Olivier was starring in Shakespeare’s "Henry V" and Gene Autry sang "Don’t Fence Me In." It cost merely three cents to mail a first class letter. Scientists at Harvard University construct the first automatic, general-purpose digital computer. DNA is isolated by Oswald Avery. Pensive, a bright chestnut Thoroughbred racehorse, wins the Kentucky Derby. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected to an unprecedented fourth term in office. On June 6, American and British troops made their famous D-Day landing on the shores of Normandy, which would turn the tide of the war and change the course of history.
    Half a world away, only a week later, Big Bend was officially established as a national park.

    1930s road sign to the Big Bend park

    What made Big Bend so important that a President would shift his focus from a world in turmoil to the wilderness of southwest Texas? It was a noble purpose. To set something aside for future generations with the fate of the present generation still uncertain was an act of optimism in an uncertain world.

    Still, for some folks, it was difficult to imagine this wild, rugged country as a park, international or otherwise. For years, most people had viewed it as too remote and dangerous to be of any use. The Spaniards had dubbed the area "El Despoblado," the uninhabited land. While many other areas of the west were being when did texas become a state at a furious pace, Big Bend’s remote location and harsh terrain dissuaded most aspiring settlers. It was not until after the establishment of nearby military outposts at Fort Davis and Fort Stockton in the 1850s and the coming of the Southern Pacific railroad a generation later, that settlers began to come to the Big Bend in substantial numbers. Many of these early settlers were miners or ranchers.
    Angora sheep on the Wilson Ranch, 1930s

    The Big Bend country was a rancher’s dream. Native grasses were abundant and there was adequate water in the form of creeks and springs. Land was cheap and held promise for anyone with the guts and ambition to give it a try. Many place names familiar to park visitors today came from this ranching era: Hannold Draw, Rice Tank, and the Sam Nail and Homer Wilson ranches are but a few examples. Coincidentally, one of the top songs of 1944, "Don’t Fence Me In," seemed particularly applicable to Big Bend ranchers. In the early days, they practiced open range ranching. Only in later years would some of the ranchers find it necessary to fence in their land. Ranching in the Big Bend was not an easy life, but it was home.

    While the creation of the national park was a popular notion with most Americans, it was not a decision easily accepted by many of the ranchers who were told they would have to sell their land. Under these conditions, many ranchers allowed cattle, sheep, and goat herds to increase in size to the detriment of the grasslands on which they fed. This overgrazing hastened erosion and changed the appearance of desert plant communities.

    The region was named Big Bend for the drastic change in course of the river from a southeastern to a northeastern flow. As the Rio Grande flows through the Chihuahuan Desert, it carves not only majestic canyons, but also a political boundary. Big Bend’s location on the United States/Mexico border has always provided a mystique to the park.

    Over the past hundred years, the border has experienced peace and stability as well as raiders and revolutionaries. The Mexican Revolution spilled over the international border several times between 1915 and 1920, resulting in some bandit raids of the area. The most famous of these raids took place at Glenn Spring on May 5, 1916, when several people were killed. However, bandits were only a small part of the story of the border. The majority of folks who lived along the border were neighbors who cooperated in order to survive. In the 1930s, calm returned to the region and the military departed. It was during this time that the wonders of the Big Bend country were becoming known outside the area.
    Everett Townsend with members of the 1936 International Park Commission
    Thanks to the efforts of entrepreneur J. O. Langford, E. E. Townsend and newspaperman Amon Carter, the Big Bend National Park idea was hatched. Langford was the proprietor of Hot Springs and advertised the wonders of the area, especially his Hot Springs. E. E. Townsend had spent much of his life here, first as a U.S. Customs Service agent, and later as sheriff. When he was elected to the State Legislature in the 1930s, he dreamed of the creation of a park to preserve and promote the wonders of the Big Bend. Working with the influential publisher of the Fort Worth Star Telegram Amon Carter and scores of other park supporters, Townsend saw his dream become reality. By 1933, the men had garnered enough support to have the area set aside as Texas Canyons State Park, renamed Big Bend State Park several months later.
    CCC crew constructing the road into the Chisos Basin

    Before the area would be suitable for visitors, roads, trails, and facilities needed to be developed. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), an agency born out of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, provided an ideal work force. The CCC was a program designed to alleviate unemployment for thousands of young men while at the same time conserving natural resources. Several hundred young men, most of whom were Hispanic, worked in the Chisos Mountains between 1934 and 1942. Using only picks, shovels, rakes, and a dump truck, the CCC workers surveyed and built the seven-mile access road into the Chisos Mountains Basin. The course of the road and stone culverts have remained basically unchanged over the past seventy years. Later, CCC work crews built the Lost Mine Trail and several stone and adobe cottages in the Basin. It is a lasting tribute to the "CCC boys" that their hard work and skilled labor are still being enjoyed by park visitors today.

    Despite all the progress made by the creation of the state park and the work of the CCC, Big Bend supporters wanted something more—a national park. They felt that the area was nationally significant and merited recognition as a national park. The National Park Service sent a team to investigate the values of the area. Their report was enthusiastic and they endorsed the national park idea. Unfortunately, two of the team members, Roger Toll of Yellowstone, and George Wright of the Washington office, were killed in a car accident on their return from the meeting. Toll and Wright Mountains were named in their memory.
    President Roosevelt receives the deed for the Big Bend from Amon Carter; June 6, 1944

    It would take several years and much hard work for the national park to become a reality. In the midst of the Great Depression, park supporters had to come up with the money to purchase all the land within the proposed park area. In 1942, $1.5 million was allocated by the State of Texas to purchase approximately 600,000 acres from private owners.

    The State of Texas delivered the deed to the Federal Government in September, 1943 and Big Bend National Park was officially established on June 12, 1944. Within a few weeks, the park located its headquarters in the CCC barracks in the Basin. In its first year, Big Bend recorded 1,409 visitors. In recent years annual visitation has increased to over 400,000!
    Car driving down the Basin Road, late 1930s.

    The original plans for the national park included a hospital in the Chisos Mountains Basin as well as a large resort hacienda that would have been built by the CCC if World War II had not occurred. There was also a plan for a two-hundred thousand acre longhorn cattle ranch to be located within the proposed Big Bend National Park. The construction of a cog railroad from the Chisos Basin to the South Rim was also considered.

    Although some of these plans never became reality, Big Bend did become a national park. Unforseen designations have also brought Big Bend international attention. In 1976, Big Bend was recognized by the United Nations as an "International Biosphere Reserve." This designation identifies Big Bend as a prominent example of the Chihuahuan Desert ecosystem and holds opportunities for biological research and environmental monitoring.

    As the increase in visitation over the past sixty years testifies, more and more people are discovering the pleasures of a visit to one of the most inspiring and diverse parks in the country. Big Bend is a place to relax, to contemplate the pace of the natural world, to challenge one's own outdoor skills, to study wildlife or plants, and to simply enjoy the splendor of wilderness.

    Big Bend is a gift from those who came before us, who worked hard to promote and protect the area as a national park. Today, we have the opportunity to enjoy and learn from the park as well as the responsibility to protect Big Bend for future generations.
    Big Bend Car

    For Further Reading

    • Welsh, Michael. Landscape of Ghosts, River of Dreams: An Administrative History of Big Bend National Park. National Park Service, 2002.
    • Gómez, Arthur R. A Most Singular Country : A History of Occupation in the Big Bend. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1990.
    • Hilton, David Edmond. The "Father" of Big Bend National Park. Big Spring TX: Sprinkle Printing Co., 1988.
    • Jameson, John R. The Story of Big Bend National Park. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996.
    • Casey, Clifford B. Soldiers, ranchers and miners in the Big Bend. Washington, D.C.: National Park Service Division of History, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, when did texas become a state https://www.nps.gov/bibe/learn/historyculture/tgttn.htm

    The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) future continues to be uncertain as the law’s constitutionality will once again be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Texas1 (known as Texas v. U.S. in the lower courts). Oral argument is scheduled for Tuesday, November 10, 2020. This ongoing litigation challenges the ACA’s minimum essential coverage provision (known as the individual mandate) and raises questions about the entire law’s survival. The individual mandate provides that most people must maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage; those who do not do so must pay a financial penalty (known as the shared responsibility payment) to the IRS. The individual mandate was upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing power by when did texas become a state five member majority of the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius in 2012.

    In the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), Congress set the shared responsibility payment at zero dollars as of January 1, 2019, leading to the current litigation. In December 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that the individual mandate is no longer constitutional because the associated financial penalty no longer “produces at least some revenue” for the federal government.2 But, instead of deciding whether the rest of the ACA must be struck down, the 5th Circuit sent the case back to the trial court for additional analysis. However, the Supreme Court has now agreed to review the case.

    The ACA remains in effect while the litigation is pending. However, if all or most of the law ultimately is struck down, it will have complex and far-reaching consequences for the nation’s health care system, affecting nearly everyone in some way. A host of ACA provisions could be eliminated, including protections for people with pre-existing conditions, subsidies to make individual health insurance more affordable, expanded eligibility for Medicaid, coverage of young adults up to age 26 under their parents’ insurance policies, coverage of preventive care with no patient cost-sharing, closing of the doughnut hole under Medicare’s drug benefit, and a series of tax increases to fund these initiatives.

    This issue brief answers key questions about the litigation as we await a decision from the Supreme Court about the ACA’s survival.

    1.  Who Is Challenging the ACA?

    A group best bank fishing spots near me 20 states, led by Texas, sued the federal government in February 2018, seeking to have the entire ACA struck down (the “state plaintiffs”).3 These states are represented by 18 Republican attorneys general and 2 Republican governors. After Democratic victories in the 2018 mid-term elections, two of these states, Wisconsin and Maine, withdrew from the case in early 2019, leaving 18 states challenging the ACA on appeal (Figure 1).4

    Figure 1: States’ positions in California v. Texas at the Supreme Court

    Two individuals joined the lawsuit in the trial court in April 2018, as plaintiffs challenging the ACA.5 These plaintiffs are self-employed residents of Texas who claim that the individual mandate requires them to purchase health insurance that they otherwise would not buy, although there is no penalty if they fail to buy coverage.

    2.  What Is the Federal Government’s Position in the Case, and How Has It Changed Over Time?

    Throughout the litigation, the federal government has not defended the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate. Instead, the federal government agrees with the state and individual plaintiffs that the individual mandate is no longer constitutional under Congress’s taxing power as a result of the TCJA provision that set the financial penalty at zero.6 It is unusual for the federal government to take a position that does not seek to uphold a federal law.

    Unlike the plaintiffs, the federal government argued at the trial court that only the ACA’s protections for people with pre-existing conditions, including guaranteed issue and community rating, should be struck down along with the individual mandate. The federal government took the position that these provisions cannot function effectively without the individual mandate but the rest of the ACA should be allowed to survive.

    Notably, the federal government changed its position while the case was on appeal at the 5th Circuit (Figure 2). First, the federal government took what the 5th Circuit called a “significant change in litigation position”7 by deciding to support the trial court’s decision that the individual mandate is inseverable from the entire ACA.8 This change came after the federal government had appealed, asking the 5th Circuit to review the trial court’s decision. Next, the federal government raised new arguments about the scope of relief that the court should grant, asserting that the federal government should be enjoined from enforcing only the ACA provisions that injure the plaintiffs. For example, the federal government identified “several criminal statutes used to prosecute individuals who defraud our healthcare system” that are part of the ACA that it believes should survive.9 The federal government also argued for the first time in the 5th Circuit that any injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ACA should apply only in the plaintiff states.10

    The federal government is asking the Supreme Court to prohibit it how to open a savings account bank of america enforcing only the ACA provisions that are found to harm the individual plaintiffs. Even though the federal government is arguing that the entire ACA should be found invalid (because the individual mandate is no longer constitutional and cannot be severed from the rest of the law), the federal government does not want the Court to necessarily prevent it from still enforcing parts of the law. Instead, the federal government is seeking a more limited remedy:  it contends that “relief should reach only the enforcement of the ACA provisions that injure the individual plaintiffs.”11 The federal government has not clearly identified which specific ACA provisions fall into this category and is asking the Supreme Court to send the case back to the lower courts to determine this issue.12

    Figure 2: Key dates in California v. Texas

    3.  Who is Defending the ACA?

    Another 17 states, led by California, were permitted by the trial court to intervene in the case and defend the ACA (the “state intervener-defendants”). Subsequently, the 5th Circuit allowed four more states to intervene in the case on appeal, bringing the total number of states defending the ACA in the case to 21 .13 In addition, six states filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in support of the ACA (Figure 1).

    The 5th Circuit also allowed the U.S. House of Representatives to intervene in the case to defend the ACA on appeal.14 However, the 5th Circuit did not decide whether the House has standing to pursue the appeal.15 The standing of the state intervener-defendants and/or the House is particularly important in this case, since the federal government is not defending the ACA (Figure 3). At the Supreme Court, the parties are not contesting, and the Court has not asked for briefing on, California’s ability to pursue an appeal (California and the House both filed cert petitions raising the same issues, and the Court accepted California’s petition).

    Figure 3: Alignment of bank of america near me hours on saturday Parties in California v. Texas

    4.  What Did the 5th Circuit Decide?

    The 5th Circuit issued a 2:1 decision finding the individual mandate unconstitutional and sending the case back to the trial court for additional analysis about whether the rest of the ACA can survive. There are three main issues in the case: (A) whether the parties have standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction; (B) whether the ACA’s individual mandate, as amended by the TCJA, is constitutional; and (C) if the mandate is unconstitutional, whether it can be severed from the rest of the ACA, or on the other hand, whether other provisions of the ACA also must be invalidated. Figure 4 illustrates the legal questions and potential outcomes in the case.

    (A) The parties have standing to litigate the case.

    The 5th Circuit decided that the case presented a live controversy for it to resolve, despite the unusual alignment of the parties’ positions. Although the federal government is “in almost complete agreement on the merits of the case” with the plaintiffs, it also has indicated that it will continue to enforce the ACA unless or until a court issues a final order striking the law down.16 The state intervener-defendants have standing to pursue an appeal because they would be injured by the loss of federal ACA funding, such as funding for the Medicaid expansion and the Medicaid Community First Choice attendant care program, if the trial court’s decision is upheld.17

    Figure 4: Legal Questions and Potential Outcomes in California v. Texas

    The 5th Circuit decided that the both the individual and state plaintiffs have standing to challenge when did texas become a state ACA in court. Standing ensures that federal courts are deciding actual cases or controversies as required by the U.S. Constitution. Standing is essential for the court to have jurisdiction to decide a case and therefore cannot be waived. To establish standing, a party must suffer an injury that is concrete and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and likely to be redressed by a favorable court ruling. The 5th Circuit agreed with the trial court that the individual plaintiffs have standing because they have spent money that they otherwise would not have spent, absent the individual mandate, to purchase health insurance.18 The 5th Circuit also decided that the state plaintiffs have standing because they are incurring costs from the individual mandate from having to verify which state employees have minimum essential coverage.19

    The dissent reached the opposite conclusion, finding that neither the individual nor the state plaintiffs has standing to bring the case. According to the dissent, any injury experienced by the individual plaintiffs “is entirely self-inflicted” because “absolutely nothing” will happen to them if they do not purchase insurance to meet the individual mandate now that the penalty is set at zero.20 The dissent also concluded that the state plaintiffs lack standing because they failed to provide evidence showing that “at least some state employees have enrolled in employer-sponsored health insurance” or that “anyone has enrolled in their Medicaid programs solely because of the unenforceable coverage requirement.”21

    (B) The individual mandate is unconstitutional after the TCJA set the financial penalty at zero.

    The 5th Circuit decided that the individual mandate as amended by the TCJA is unconstitutional. The court agreed with the state and individual plaintiffs and the federal government’s assertion that the requirement to produce some revenue is “essential” to the Supreme Court’s earlier finding in NFIB that the individual mandate could be saved as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to tax.22 Without that feature, the mandate is a command to purchase health insurance, which as the Supreme Court held in NFIB, is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.

    The dissent concluded that the individual mandate remains constitutional because the TCJA amendment is “a law that does nothing.”23 The dissent reasoned that the TCJA did not change the text of the coverage requirement and therefore did not change the individual mandate into a mandatory command to purchase insurance. Rather, Congress “changed the parameters” of the choice about whether to purchase insurance from paying a tax penalty to “no consequences at all.24

    (C) The trial court’s analysis about whether the individual mandate is severable from the rest of the ACA was incomplete.

    The 5th Circuit sent the case back to the trial court for additional analysis about which ACA provisions should survive without the individual mandate. The trial court incorrectly focused on the intent of Congress in 2010 when passing the ACA and instead should have considered Congress’ intent when enacting the TCJA and setting the shared responsibility payment at zero in 2017.25 In so doing, the trial court should “employ a finer-toothed comb. . and conduct a more searching inquiry into which provisions of the ACA Congress intended to be inseverable from the individual mandate. . us[ing] its best judgment to determine how best to break the ACA down into constituent groups, segments, or provisions to be analyzed.”26

    The 5th Circuit also directed the trial court to consider the federal government’s new argument that any order prohibiting enforcement of the ACA should extend only to provisions that injure the plaintiffs and apply only in the plaintiff states. The trial court may consider whether the federal government timely raised this argument and whether Supreme Court precedent supports limiting the remedy in this way.27

    The dissent criticized the majority’s failure to send the case back to the trial court instead of resolving the severability issue. Severability is a question of law, which the 5th Circuit could have resolved without sending the case back to the trial court. The dissent agreed with the majority that the severability analysis should look to the intent of Congress when passing the TCJA in 2017. However, the dissent concluded that the fact that Congress changed the tax penalty amount to zero while leaving the rest of the ACA in place indicates that Congress intended for all of the other provisions to remain in effect.28

    5.  What is Happening at the Supreme Court?

    The Supreme Court has agreed to review four legal questions in the case. First, the Court will consider whether Texas and the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring the lawsuit to challenge the individual mandate. If so, the Court will determine whether the TCJA rendered the individual mandate unconstitutional. If the mandate is unconstitutional, the Court will decide whether the rest of the ACA can survive. Finally, if the entire ACA is held invalid, the Court will resolve whether the entire law should be unenforceable nationwide or whether it should be unenforceable only to the extent that provisions injure the individual plaintiffs.

    The case will be argued at the Supreme Court on November 10, 2020. The Court has allotted one hour and twenty minutes for oral argument, with 40 minutes for each side. California will argue for 30 minutes of the time allotted to the parties defending the ACA, with the remaining 10 minutes argued by the House. The time allotted to the parties challenging the ACA will be evenly divided between the federal government and Texas, with 20 minutes for each. The Court denied Ohio and Montana’s motion to participate in oral argument as amici curiae in support of neither side. The decision could come as late as the end of term in June 2021.

    Looking Ahead

    If the Supreme Court finds that the individual mandate is unconstitutional and invalidates only that provision, the practical result will be essentially the same as the ACA exists today, without an enforceable mandate. If the Supreme Court adopts the position that the federal government took during the trial court proceedings and invalidates the individual mandate as well as the protections for people with pre-existing conditions, then federal funding for premium subsidies and the Medicaid expansion would stand, and it would be up to states whether to reinstate the insurance protections. The Supreme Court also could decide that Texas and the individual plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the lawsuit, which would allow the ACA as it exists today to remain in effect.

    The most far-reaching consequences, affecting nearly every American in some way, will occur if the Supreme Court ultimately decides that all or most of the ACA must be overturned, as the federal government now argues. The number of non-elderly individuals who are uninsured decreased by 18.6 million from 2010 to 2018, as the ACA went into effect. The ACA made significant changes to the individual insurance market, including requiring protections for people with pre-existing conditions, creating insurance marketplaces, and authorizing premium subsidies for people with low and modest incomes. The ACA also made other sweeping changes throughout the health care system including expanding Medicaid eligibility for low-income adults; requiring private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid expansion coverage of preventive services with no patient cost sharing; phasing out the Medicare prescription drug doughnut hole coverage gap; reducing the growth of Medicare payments to health care providers and insurers; establishing new national initiatives to promote public health, care quality, and delivery system reforms; and authorizing a variety of tax increases to finance these changes. All of these provisions could be overturned if all or most of the ACA is struck down by the courts, and it would be enormously complex to disentangle these provisions from the overall health care system.

    For now, the ACA remains in effect. The trial court’s original decision that the entire ACA should be invalidated was never implemented and was set aside by the 5th Circuit. Additionally, the Trump Administration has indicated that it intends to continue enforcing the ACA while the appeal is pending. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in the case could come as late as June 2021, the Court’s decision to review the case now, without waiting for the lower courts to complete their review, will minimize the amount of time that the ACA’s future remains uncertain.29 If the Supreme Court had not agreed to review the case now, the litigation likely would have continued for several more years, while the trial court issued a new decision on severability and that decision was then reviewed by the 5th Circuit, before returning to the Supreme Court. Still, 10 years after its enactment, the only certainty for the ACA in the foreseeable future is that there is continuing uncertainty about its ultimate survival.

    Источник: https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-california-v-texas-a-guide-to-the-case-challenging-the-aca/

    10 reasons why so many people are moving to Texas

    By Tom Geoghegan
    BBC News, Washington

    Half of the 10 fastest-growing cities in the US are in Texas, according to new figures. Why?

    Every way you look at it, there are a lot of people moving to Texas.

    Five of the 10 fastest-growing cities in the country between 2011 and 2012 were in Texas, according to new figures from the US Census Bureau. New York is way out in front in terms of added population, but Houston is second with San Antonio and Austin fourth and fifth.

    In terms of percentage growth, it's even more Texas, Texas, Texas. Among the five cities that grew most, as a proportion of their size, between 2011 and 2012, three are Texan. San Marcos is out in front with the highest rate of growth among all US cities and towns - 4.9%.

    Some of this Texan population boom is due to a natural increase - more births than deaths - but the numbers moving into the state from elsewhere in the US and from abroad far outstrip every other American state. Why?

    "I don't think people go for the weather or topography," says Joel Kotkin, professor of urban development at Chapman University in Orange, California. "The main reason people go is for employment. It's pretty simple.

    "The unconventional oil and gas boom has helped turn Texas into an economic juggernaut, particularly world energy capital Houston, but growth has also been strong in tech, manufacturing and business services."

    Critics have questioned whether the "Texas miracle" is a myth, based on cheap labour and poor regulation.

    But Kotkin says Texas has plenty of high-wage, blue-collar jobs and jobs for university graduates, although people looking for very high-wage jobs would probably head to Seattle, San Francisco and New York.

    Four of the top 10 metropolitan areas for job growth in 2013 are in Texas, according to Kotkin's website, New Geography.

    Texas also has a huge military presence, which grew as defence spending increased in the decade after 9/11. Many retired Texans first came to the state as service personnel.

    Once employed, it's hugely important that your pay cheque goes as far as possible, says Kotkin.

    "New York, LA and the [San Francisco] Bay Area are too expensive for most people to live, but Houston has the highest 'effective' pay cheque in the country."

    Kotkin came to this conclusion after looking at the average incomes in the country's 51 largest metro areas, and adjusting them for when did texas become a state cost of living. His results put three Texan areas in the top 10.

    Houston is top because of the region's relatively low cost of living, including consumer prices, utilities and transport costs and, most importantly, housing prices, he says.

    "The ratio of the median home price to median annual household income in Houston is only 2.9. In San Francisco, it's 6.7.

    "In New York, San Francisco and LA, if you're blue-collar you will be renting forever and struggling to make ends meet. But people in Texas have a better shot at getting some of the things associated with middle-class life."

    Land is cheaper than elsewhere and the process of land acquisition very efficient, says Dr Ali Anari, research economist at the Real Estate Center at Texas A&M University.

    "From the time of getting a building permit right through to the construction of homes, Texas is much quicker than other states.

    "There is an abundant supply of land and fewer regulations and more friendly government, generally a much better business attitude here than other states."

    This flexibility, plus strict lending rules, helped to shield the state from the recent housing market crash.

    Texas is one of only seven states where residents pay no personal state income tax, says Kay Bell, contributing tax editor at Bankrate and Texan native.

    The state has a disproportionate take from property taxes, which has become a big complaint among homeowners, she adds. But overall, only five states had a lower individual tax burden than Texas, according to Tax Foundation research.

    There are also tax incentives for businesses and this week legislators cut more than $1bn off proposed business taxes.

    5. Pick your own big city

    Texas has six of the country's 20 biggest cities, says Erica Grieder, author of Big, Hot, Cheap and Right: What America Can Learn from the Strange Genius of Texas.

    Contrast this to, for example, Illinois, where if you want to live in a big city you can live in Chicago or you have to move out of state, she says.

    But if you're in Texas you can be in Houston, San Antonio, Dallas, Austin, Fort Worth, or El Paso.

    Restaurant manager Christopher Hislop, 33, moved in 2007 from Los Angeles to Austin, where he met his wife and they now have a nine-month-old boy.

    "I came to Austin for a wedding and thought it was a really cool city and the people were nice - it was everything that LA wasn't but still had that hip vibe without pretension. The nightlife is great and there's an emphasis on getting out and about - they maintain trailways and nature.

    "It's not Texas at all and that's what I liked about it. I don't know Texas very well, I grew up in Chicago, but Austin is not Texas because you think of 10-gallon hats and guys on horseback. It's a cliché but Austin isn't like that, it's hip and in the now. The rest of Texas is very conservative."

    People like to perpetuate a myth that Austin is still the Austin it once was, says Joshua Long, author of Weird City: Sense of Place and Creative Resistance in Austin, Texas. So as it's become a big city, a movement has developed to "keep it cool, keep it weird and keep it environmentally friendly".

    Because of its good-value housing, Texas has been particularly popular with families, and some of its cities now have an above-average number of children. San Antonio is home to the largest community of gay parents.

    In Texas, you can have a reasonable mortgage and pretty good schools, says Grieder. And restaurants are invariably family-friendly.

    "You hear about the high drop-out rate but Texas education scores pretty well at national tests for 4th and 8th graders in math, reading and science. The aggregate is about average.

    "The perception is that Texas has poor schools but it's not correct. Across the country in general, we don't have schools as good as we would like them to be."

    In eighth-grade maths, for instance, Texas scored higher than the national average and outscored the three other big states of California, New York and Florida. On Sunday, an education budget was approved that restored cuts made in 2011.

    "Texas is liberal in the classic sense, it's laissez-faire, so there's a lack of regulations," says Grieder, and this can apply to the obvious (business regulations) or the less obvious (city rules).

    "The classic social contract is - can i open a bank account with chase online not going to do a ton to help you but we're not going to get in your way. That's not 100% true of the state but there's that strand in the state."

    Mortgage lending is an obvious exception. But there has been strong opposition to banning texting while driving and a proposed tax on soda.

    And Governor Rick Perry is poised to sign off the strongest email privacy laws in the US, which would require state law enforcement agencies to get a warrant before accessing emails.

    9. Texans are normal people

    The state likes to proclaim itself as an unpretentious, down-to-earth place where people are easy to get along with.

    As John Steinbeck wrote: "Texas has a tight cohesiveness perhaps stronger than any other section of America."

    And for people with conservative values, it could be a natural home, although demographic shifts have prompted speculation it will be a Democratic state in the future.

    People dream about moving to California, but they don't dream about moving to Texas, says Grieder, yet many of those reluctant to move there end up liking it.

    She adds: "[They] realise that Texans aren't all Bible thumping, gun-toting people. The job is the trigger to come but you find it's pretty nice to live here."

    10. And they're not going anywhere

    All this doesn't just bring in new arrivals - native Texans aren't leaving the state either. It is the "stickiest" state in the country, according to the latest figures from the Pew Research Center, which suggest that more than three-quarters of adults born in Texas still live there. Alaska is the least sticky.

    You can follow the Magazine on Twitter and on Facebook

    Источник: https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22649624

    Texas Became A State In 1845, But Never Lost Its Republican Spirit

    Later this year, way later this year, we’ll mark the 175th year of Texas statehood. That will be on Dec. 29. That’s the day in 1845 that Texas officially joined the United States of America, or, as the proudest of Texans say, the day the U.S. was allowed to join Texas.

    Though the 29th was the day that President Polk signed the joint resolution that made Texas a state, there was some confusion as to the official moment that the Republic of Texas passed into history and statehood status began. Then-president of Texas, Anson Jones, said that Feb. 19, 1846 was the actual day. He presided over a ceremony in Austin where the Republic of Texas flag was lowered for the last time and the U.S. flag was raised in its place.

    As you might surmise, the almost two months difference in official transfer of power led to problems. For instance, who should you pay import duties to – Texas or the U.S.? Lawsuits followed. The U.S. Supreme Court eventually weighed in on the matter and the official date of statehood was established as December the 29th, 1845. Make your checks payable to the U.S. Treasury, please.

    You might see the discrepancy in statehood as the difference in marriage dates between a couple marrying first at the courthouse and later in church. One is legal and official and the other is ceremonial and spiritual.

    Texas couldn’t just let President Polk’s signing of a document 1,500 miles away be all there was to the moment. They couldn’t allow the Republic so many had died for to pass into history without memorializing the moment in some proper way. So President Anson arranged a ceremony in front of the Texas Capitol, really just a house, that would turn out to both mourn the passing of the Republic and celebrate Texas as the newest state in the union.

    What was needed here was what linguists call a “speech act” – a moment in time when something is made real by virtue of pronouncement. Speech acts are generally used by people of authority who have the when did texas become a state to make the words true by just saying them. “I pronounce you man and wife,” or, “I sentence you to 20 years in prison.” Anson Jones began with, “I, as President of the Republic … am now present to surrender into the hands of those whom the people of chosen, the power and authority we have some time held.”

    Here is what transpired in that brief ceremony: Noah Smithwick, a blacksmith in attendance, remembered the moment the Texas flag came down.

    “Many a head was bowed, many a broad chest heaved, and many a manly cheek was wet with tears when that broad field of blue in the center of which, like a signal light, glowed the lone star, emblem of the sovereignty of Texas, was furled and laid away among the relics of the dead republic.”

    The United States flag was raised and the mood changed dramatically. Noah wrote: “We were most of us natives of the United States, and when the stars and stripes, the flag of our fathers, was run up and catching the breeze unrolled its heaven born colors to the light, cheer after cheer rent the air.”

    The people celebrated statehood.

    I like that Noah tended already toward that creature still common in Texas — the exceptionally proud Texan. He said that he thought “the star in the lower left corner [of the U.S. flag] should have been especially dedicated to Texas.” It’s as if he wanted it framed and separated in some way. How Texan of him.

    So, the flag-raising complete, President Anson Jones announced, “The Republic of Texas is no more” — making it politically true, but never absolute because the residual influence of the Republic resides in the minds of many Texans today who still think of her as their country, their nation.

    No doubt it was a bittersweet day, but 94% of Texans did vote for statehood, a level of agreement we haven’t enjoyed since. There was great happiness on the whole. Tyler, Texas, was founded that same year, in gratitude to U.S. President John Tyler, who started the movement for Texas annexation.

    For a more in-depth look at this day, see: “When Was the Republic of Texas No More?: Revisiting the Annexation of Texas.” 

    Источник: https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/texas-became-a-state-in-1845-but-never-lost-its-republican-spirit/
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